United States v. Spruill , 373 F. App'x 318 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-4976
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY SPRUILL
a/k/a TOP CAT
Anthony Spruill,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 0313-2:05-cr-00532)
District Judge: Hon. R. Barclay Surrick
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 12, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI* , Judge
(Filed: April 13, 2010)
OPINION
* Hon. Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Anthony Spruill was convicted by a jury of possession of five or more
kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On
appeal, he challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress his statements
and the Court’s imposition of a 405-month sentence. We will affirm.
I.
Facts
Spruill made the inculpatory statements to F.B.I. Special Agent Edward Galant
while he was in prison on state criminal charges. Galant had previously advised Spruill
that his drug dealing activities were the subject of an ongoing federal investigation. Two
days after Spruill was arrested, Galant and a Philadelphia police detective interviewed
Spruill at the correctional facility, and read him his Miranda rights. Spruill signed a form
stating that he understood his rights and chose to waive them. Thereafter, Spruill
admitted that he was selling approximately 30 kilograms of cocaine per month and
discussed a number of other persons involved in the drug dealing operation. Several days
later, Spruill contacted Galant and asked for another meeting. Galant testified that he
orally advised Spruill of his rights. Spruill’s testimony was to the contrary, but he
acknowledged that he understood his rights at that time. At the second meeting with
Galant, Spruill gave further statements that he supplied drugs to multiple persons and he
provided additional information on others involved in local drug dealing activities.
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Thereafter, the Government filed a criminal complaint in federal court charging
Spruill with drug trafficking. He was arrested on a federal warrant. Galant interviewed
Spruill once more and, after advising him of his rights, secured a waiver. Spruill then
made the third inculpatory statement which he sought to suppress.
Spruill was indicted on September 15, 2005 on one count of possession of more
than five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. He pled not guilty and moved to
suppress the three statements. After a hearing, the District Court denied the motion.
Following a trial, the jury found him guilty and the Court sentenced him to 405 months
imprisonment to be served consecutively with his state sentence.
II.
Motion to Suppress
Spruill argues that his conviction should be reversed because his statements were
involuntary. We are unpersuaded. Spruill testified at the suppression hearing that he
knew his rights. The District Court found that no promises were made to Spruill in
exchange for his statements. Moreover, Spruill has long-standing involvement in the
criminal justice system, and the encounters with Agent Galant were brief, allowing little
opportunity for coercion. In United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 2005), we
enumerated factors that should be considered in determining whether statements made to
investigators are voluntary. After consideration of these factors, we have no basis to
disagree with the District Court’s determination that the statements were voluntary.
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Spruill also argues that his statements should not have been admitted because they
were made during a period of detention. He contends that admission of his confession
violates Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which requires federal arrestees to be
presented before a federal magistrate “without unnecessary delay,” and 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which directs district courts to consider “the time elapsing between arrest and
arraignment” when determining the voluntariness of confessions. This argument was
rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez Sanchez, which held that §
3501 does not apply to a defendant held in state custody because there has been no
“delay” in bringing that person before a federal magistrate. See 511 U.S. 350, 357-58
(1994). We will therefore uphold the District Court’s denial of Spruill’s suppression
motion.
III.
Sentencing Determination
Spruill challenges his sentence on the ground that the District Court allegedly
failed to give the careful and reasoned consideration to all of the statutory factors required
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He argues that the District Court took into account only the
need to protect the public and failed to consider, inter alia, his age and personal
background. This court has made clear that the sentencing court need not make explicit
findings with respect to each factor; the record must simply demonstrate that all of the
facts were taken into account. United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir.
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2006).
Before announcing the sentence, the District Court first discussed Spruill’s lengthy
criminal history and then discussed other considerations, including Spruill’s age and the
circumstances surrounding this crime. The District Court set forth its rationale in
reaching the sentencing determination. In addition to the District Court’s concern for
protecting the public, the Court referred to the other sentencing objectives, explicitly
addressing deterrence, rehabilitation and the seriousness of Spruill’s crime. The Court
also considered the nature of the offense and the range of sentences that the Sentencing
Guidelines establish and made a reasoned explanation for its determination. Finally, the
Court clearly understood the gravity of the sentence imposed, and made its decision only
because it felt “compelled” under the circumstances. App. at 534.
We are satisfied that the District Court fulfilled its responsibility to “consider[] the
parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence entered by the
District Court.
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