Scott Njos v. Warden Lewisburg USP , 573 F. App'x 91 ( 2014 )


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  • ALD-285                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 14-1404
    ___________
    SCOTT NJOS,
    Appellant
    v.
    WARDEN LEWISBURG USP
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-02721)
    District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Summary Action
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    July 10, 2014
    Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: July 29, 2014)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Scott Njos, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
    dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the
    following reasons, we will summarily affirm.1
    Njos was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Illinois of several crimes and subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Njos
    unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence in a series of motions pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 2255, each of which was denied by the sentencing court either on the merits
    or as an unauthorized successive motion barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). United States v.
    Njos, No. 3-07-cr-50036 (N.D. Ill.)
    Njos then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 in the
    Middle District of Pennsylvania, as he was incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg at that time.
    In his petition, Njos contended that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    over his criminal charges because the offenses charged did not take place on land
    acquired or reserved for the use of the United States, and that only the state courts of
    Illinois had jurisdiction to prosecute him for the alleged crimes. The Magistrate Judge
    recommended dismissing the petition as an unauthorized second or successive motion
    pursuant to § 2255(h). The District Court adopted the report and recommendation and
    dismissed the petition, and Njos timely appealed.
    1
    We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may
    summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a substantial
    issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. We may affirm on any basis supported by the
    record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 
    650 F.3d 246
    , 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
    2
    Upon review, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Njos’s
    petition. A petition filed pursuant to § 2241 can be used to challenge some aspect of the
    execution of a federal inmate’s sentence, such as denial of parole. See Coady v. Vaughn,
    
    251 F.3d 480
    , 485 (3d Cir. 2001). The presumptive means for a federal prisoner to
    challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence, however, is a motion filed under
    § 2255 in the sentencing court. See Okereke v. United States, 
    307 F.3d 117
    , 120 (3d Cir.
    2002). A federal petitioner can seek such relief under § 2241 only if the remedy provided
    by § 2255 is “inadequate” or “ineffective” to test the legality of his detention. § 2255(e);
    In re Dorsainvil, 
    119 F.3d 245
    , 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). A § 2255 motion is not inadequate
    or ineffective merely because a previous § 2255 motion was denied by the sentencing
    court, see Litterio v. Parker, 
    369 F.2d 395
    , 396 (3d Cir. 1966), nor is it ineffective due to
    a petitioner’s failure to seek authorization for a second or successive habeas petition as
    required by §§ 2244 and 2255(h). See In re 
    Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251
    .
    In the instant matter, Njos sought to challenge the validity of his federal
    conviction. The District Court properly determined that the proper vehicle for raising
    such a claim is a motion pursuant to § 2255. Because his previous § 2255 motions were
    denied, he was required to first seek authorization to file a second or successive habeas
    petition pursuant to §§ 2244 and 2255(h). Accordingly, we discern no error in the
    District Court’s dismissal of Njos’s petition. There being no substantial question
    presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm.
    3