Aku Abdallah v. William Scism , 424 F. App'x 84 ( 2011 )

CLD-152 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-1545
___________
AKU YAZID ABDALLAH,
f/k/a Edward Anthony Hart,
Appellant
v.
WILLIAM SCISM
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 10-0054)
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 31, 2011
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 20, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Aku Yazid Abdallah, an inmate at the Allenwood Low Security Correctional
Institution, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the district court’s legal conclusions
and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings. See Cradle v. United States
ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). For the reasons discussed below, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
In June 2003, Abdallah was convicted of committing two armed robberies in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and was sentenced to 214 months’ imprisonment. He
appealed his conviction, claiming, among other things, that the indictment should have
been dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. We rejected that argument and
affirmed the District Court’s judgment. See United States v. Hart, 112 F. App’x 855 (3d
Cir. 2004) (Abdallah was previously known as Edward Hart).
In 2006, Abdallah filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In this motion, he
raised 18 claims; “[f]our of these claims pertain to Defendant’s contention that his
conviction should be vacated because he was indicted more than ten years after the
statute of limitations ran on the charges against him.” United States v. Hart, Civ. A. No.
06-4463, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34972, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2008). The District
Court denied the motion, and Abdallah did not appeal.
Abdallah then filed the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 that is at issue here. Once
again, he has argued that the “prosecution was initiated against the Petitioner over ten
years beyond the expiration of the five year” statute of limitations. The District Court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review Abdallah’s petition, and thus dismissed it
without prejudice to Abdallah’s right to seek permission from this Court to file a
successive motion under § 2255. Abdallah then filed a timely notice of appeal.
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We agree with the District Court’s analysis. As we have recognized, “under the
explicit terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, unless a § 2255 motion would be ‘inadequate or
ineffective,’ a habeas corpus petition under § 2241 cannot be entertained by the court.”
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538 (quoting § 2255(e)); see also Application of Galante, 437 F.2d
1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (“This Court has time and again ruled that in a situation such
as here presented habeas corpus relief is unavailable for lack of jurisdiction.”).
Abdallah argues that it is appropriate for him to proceed under § 2241 because he
is challenging the execution of his sentence. Section 2241 does “confer[] habeas
jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity
but the execution of his sentence.” Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).
However, Abdallah’s substantive argument is that he was prosecuted after the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations. Thus, notwithstanding the way he now attempts
to frame his claim, he is in fact alleging that his conviction and sentence are unlawful.
Cf. Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 901 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that
prisoners must proceed under § 2255 to challenge “any error that occurred at or prior to
sentencing” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We will not permit Abdallah to
circumvent the requirements of § 2255 through artful labeling.
Even where prisoners seek to challenge their conviction and sentence (like
Abdallah does here), they may proceed under § 2241 where “the remedy by [§ 2255]
motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the] detention.” § 2255(e). In
In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997), we explained that § 2255 may be
inadequate or ineffective where an intervening change in law has potentially made the
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conduct for which the petitioner was convicted non-criminal. However, the exception is
narrow: a motion under § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective simply because the
district court has refused to grant relief or the petitioner is prevented by § 2255(h)’s
gatekeeping requirements from litigating his current claims. See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538(“It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is
determinative.”).
The exception is not applicable here. Abdallah previously filed a § 2255 motion
in which he raised the identical claim that he seeks to assert in this action. The fact that
the District Court denied his first motion, and that he must receive certification from this
Court before filing a successive motion, see § 2255(h), does not render § 2255 inadequate
or ineffective. See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).
Moreover, Abdallah’s petition does not fall within In re Dorsainvil’s purview. He does
not rely on some intervening change of law; instead, he continues to assert a (flawed)
defense that has existed since the day he was indicted. See id. He has therefore failed to
show that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. 1
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Abdallah has filed a document that he called a “Nunc Pro Tunc To Notice
of Appeal.” It is not clear what decision he would like this Court to render nunc pro tunc.
In this filing he also invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2106. That statute, which empowers us to
choose from a broad range of remedies, see Barnes v. United States, 678 F.2d 10, 11 (3d
Cir. 1982), does not affect our analysis here, cf. Unitherm Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich,
Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 402 n.4 (2006) (holding that the authority granted by § 2106 “must be
exercised consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
interpreted by this Court”). Finally, after the Clerk listed this case for possible summary
affirmance, Abdallah filed a response in which he complained that he had not received
notice of the reason that his case had been so listed. Contrary to his argument, the letter
that the Clerk sent to him explains in detail the summary-affirmance procedure.
Moreover, since we are affirming the District Court’s order based on the same rationale
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Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Abdallah’s § 2241 petition, and
we will summarily affirm its order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
that the Court set forth in its order, Abdallah has been fully apprised of the substantive
failings of his case.
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