United States v. Roger Sedlak ( 2013 )

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DLD-283 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1860
___________
DAVID SOLAN,
Appellant
v.
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE, WARDEN OF FCI FORT DIX, ANY SUCCESSOR
WARDENS TO HER AT FCI FORT DIX AND/OR ANY WARDENS AT ANY
OTHER FCF TO WHICH PLTF. MAY BE TRANSFERRED BY THE BOP WHILE
THIS LAWSUIT IS PENDING
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-01895)
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 13, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 25, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant David Solan appeals the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment to the defendant, Donna Zickefoose, the former warden of the prison where
Solan is being held. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary
standard of review. See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d
86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009). For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order.
This case concerns the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System
(TRULINCS), a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) program designed to, among other
things, make a form of e-mail available to prisoners. See Federal Bureau of Prisons,
TRULINCS FAQs, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/trulincs_faq.jsp (last visited
June 10, 2013). While TRULINCS was made available at all BOP facilities on February
2, 2011, see id., BOP Program Statement 5265.13 permits the warden to “limit or deny
the privilege of a particular inmate.” As relevant here, Program Statement 5265.13
provides that “[i]nmates are excluded from electronic messaging when it is determined
that their use would threaten the safety, security, or orderly running of the institution or
the protection of the public and staff.” As an example, the Program Statement explains
that “an inmate with a personal history or special skills or knowledge of using
computers/email/Internet or other communication methods as a conduit for committing
illegal activities will be excluded.” Id.2
Warden Zickefoose has barred Solan from using TRULINCS e-mail. In a written
statement, Warden Zickefoose justified her decision on two grounds: (1) Solan has
significant pre-incarceration computer expertise; and (2) Solan was punished at his
previous prison for misusing the computer system to tamper with other inmates’ legal
work. After challenging Warden Zickefoose’s decision, without success, through the
administrative system, he filed a complaint in the District Court. He claimed, pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388(1971), that Warden Zickefoose violated his rights under the First Amendment, the Due
Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause by excluding him from the e-mail
system, and that the relevant Program Statement violates the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). The District Court concluded that Warden Zickefoose was entitled to
qualified immunity on the constitutional claims and granted summary judgment to her on
all claims, and Solan appealed to this Court.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. As to Solan’s First Amendment
claim,1 we agree that prisoners maintain a First Amendment “right to communicate with
family and friends,” and that e-mail can be a means of exercising this right. Valdez v.
Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the critical question is whether
the prison’s decision to exclude Solan from using e-mail “is reasonably related to
1
The first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis is “whether the official’s conduct
violated a constitutional or federal right,” Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 174 (3d
Cir. 2010), and because this prong is dispositive in this case, we do not reach the second
prong.
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legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In making
the “reasonableness” inquiry, we consider (1) “whether there is a valid, rational
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate interest put forth to justify
it”; (2) “whether inmates have an alternative means of exercising the right”; (3) “the
burden on prison resources that would be imposed by accommodating the right”; and (4)
“whether there are alternatives to the regulation that fully accommodate the inmate’s
rights at de minimis cost to valid penological objectives.” Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d
173, 177-78 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Throughout the analysis,
“[w]e afford substantial deference to the DOC’s professional judgment.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, as the District Court concluded, Warden Zickefoose has asserted a valid
reason for her decision. Solan has both the knowledge (based on his history with
computers) and the apparent inclination (based on his previous prison misconduct) to use
e-mail for improper purposes, and thus threaten the privacy of other prisoners and
jeopardize the security of the prison. Warden Zickefoose’s response directly addresses
this danger, while also leaving Solan free to communicate with friends and family
through the phone, in-person visits, and the regular-mail system. Solan has not offered
any meaningful alternatives to this arrangement, and in light of the substantial deference
to which the prison’s judgments are entitled, see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725
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n.13 (2005), we discern no error in the District Court’s order granting summary judgment
to Warden Zickefoose.2
Solan fares no better on his due process claim. The protections of the Due Process
Clause are triggered only if there is a deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or
property. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 531 (3d Cir. 2003). We agree with the
District Court that Solan has not identified any property or liberty interest implicated by
Warden Zickefoose’s refusal to give him access to e-mail. See Beaulieu v. Ludeman,
690 F.3d 1017, 1047 (8th Cir. 2012); Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1045. Accordingly, Solan’s
procedural-due-process claim necessarily fails.
Likewise, we agree with the District Court’s disposition of Solan’s equal
protection claim. Solan sought to present a “class of one” claim, which required him to
show “that []he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” PG Publ’g Co. v.
Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 114 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Solan
has failed to identify any other prisoner who has computer expertise and has been
sanctioned for computer misuse while incarcerated who has nevertheless been permitted
2
Solan acknowledges that he was disciplined in his previous prison, but claims that he
was innocent of the charges, raising the same arguments that were rejected in that
disciplinary proceeding. However, Solan has presented no evidence that Warden
Zickefoose’s reliance on this disciplinary action was pretextual, cf. Abu–Jamal v. Price,
154 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1998), and under the deferential standard that we apply here,
we conclude that it was reasonable for Warden Zickefoose to accept the validity of this
citation. See generally DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
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to use prison e-mail; therefore, the District Court properly granted judgment to Warden
Zickefoose on this claim.
Finally, we will affirm the District Court’s resolution of Solan’s claims under the
Administrative Procedure Act. As an initial matter, Solan cannot state a valid claim
concerning Warden Zickefoose’s application of Program Statement 5265.13 to his
circumstances. Program Statements are “internal agency guidelines,” rather than
“published regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedure Act,” Reno
v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal quotation marks, alteration omitted), and thus
“do not create entitlements enforceable under the APA,” Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d
839, 842 (7th Cir. 2011). To the extent that Solan contends that Program Statement
5265.13 is contrary to the enabling statute, his claim likewise fails. Program Statements
are “entitled to some deference,” Reno, 515 U.S. at 61, and will be upheld unless they are
“inconsistent with the clear language of the statute,” Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159,
164 (3d Cir. 1997). The enabling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2), authorizes the BOP to
“provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence” of Federal prisoners. We conclude
that the Program Statement is entirely consistent with § 4042. See generally Bunn v.
Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002).3
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
3
We assume for purposes of this case that this statute is not so broad as to render the
Program Statement unreviewable. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
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