Faouzi Amaouche v. Atty Gen USA ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 10-2920
    _____________
    FAOUZI AMAOUCHE,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    _____________
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
    BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Agency No. A095-479-004
    ____________
    Argued: September 13, 2011
    ____________
    Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: October 7, 2011)
    ____________
    Joseph C. Hohenstein, Esq. (Argued)
    Orlow, Kaplan & Hohenstein
    620 Chestnut Street
    Suite 656
    Philadelphia, PA 19106-0000
    Counsel for Petitioner
    Papu Sandhu, Esq. (Argued)
    Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq.
    Thomas W. Hussey, Esq.
    Paul F. Stone, Esq.
    Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
    P.O. Box 878
    Ben Franklin Station
    Washington, DC 20044
    Counsel for Respondent
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    BARRY, Circuit Judge
    Faouzi Amaouche seeks review of a 2005 deportation order of U.S. Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), even though he was removed pursuant to a new
    deportation order issued in 2010, an order he has not appealed. We note that, in this not
    precedential opinion, we are writing primarily for the parties, who well understand the
    facts of the case. We, nonetheless, will set forth the facts relevant to the issues we see
    before us, anticipating that a non-party reader might wonder at what may appear to be our
    rather summary disposition of the case.
    Amaouche, a native and citizen of Algeria, was admitted to the United States on
    May 1, 2001 under the Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”), 8 U.S.C. § 1187, whereby
    qualifying visitors from specific countries may enter the United States without a visa and
    legally remain for 90 days. Algeria was not and is not a specified country under the
    VWP, but Amaouche presented a fraudulently altered French passport upon his entry, and
    2
    France was a specified country. An integral part of the VWP is the requirement that
    aliens arriving in the United States sign and submit a waiver forfeiting any right to contest
    removal, other than on the basis of an application for asylum. 
    Id. § 1187(b)(1).
    Amaouche contends that the government has not produced proof of his signed waiver,
    and that the waiver form was available only in English, a language that he did not speak,
    making any signed form invalid as to him. In any event, Amaouche overstayed the
    VWP’s 90-day limit.
    In 2002, Amaouche requested asylum based on a fear of returning to Algeria, and
    was granted an asylum hearing. An immigration judge denied his application for asylum,
    and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. The denial of asylum is not at
    issue here.
    On August 2, 2005, the same day that the BIA affirmed the denial of asylum, a
    deportation order issued based on Amaouche’s violation of the terms of the VWP and
    naming Algeria as the country of removal, but Amaouche was not then removed. He
    subsequently married an American citizen, and on February 24, 2010, filed an application
    with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for adjustment of status.
    When he appeared for his adjustment of status interview, he was taken into custody based
    on the August 2, 2005 order, and on that same day USCIS denied the adjustment
    application.
    On June 25, 2010, Amaouche filed a petition for review of the 2005 deportation
    3
    order in this Court, claiming that he had not received notice of the order until May 27,
    2010, the date of his arrest. We denied Amaouche’s petition for a stay of removal, as
    well as his motion to reconsider. On October 14, 2010, ICE issued a new deportation
    order based on the fact that Amaouche stayed beyond the 90-day limit permitted under the
    VWP, and he was removed on October 25, 2010.
    It should be apparent from even this brief recitation that Amaouche fraudulently
    entered this country and that he has, at every turn, invoked its procedures in his effort to
    remain here, while complaining of what the government should have done better when it
    admitted him from a country from which he could not have legally entered in the first
    place and when it returned him there. His various complaints prompt the three issues we
    see before us:
    First, was the 2005 order, the only order challenged here, a final order of removal?
    It is, of course, settled law that we have jurisdiction to hear appeals only from final orders
    of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Second, was Amaouche’s appeal from the 2005
    order timely? Although the government concedes timeliness, suggesting that the time
    limitation can be tolled because the record does not establish that Amaouche received
    notice of the 2005 order until 2010, we have held that jurisdictional time limitations
    cannot be equitably tolled, Borges v. Gonzales, 
    402 F.3d 398
    , 405 (3d Cir. 2005), and that
    the 30-day limitation for filing a petition for review of a final order of removal is a
    jurisdictional limitation, Vakker v. Att’y Gen., 
    519 F.3d 143
    , 146 (3d Cir. 2008). And,
    4
    third, even if the appeal is from a final order and is timely, is Amaouche’s petition moot?
    In other words, does the new deportation order of October 14, 2010 and Amaouche’s
    subsequent, unchallenged removal under that order render review of the 2005 order
    moot?
    We need not and, thus, will not, discuss the first two jurisdictional issues, but,
    rather, will assume the finality and timeliness of the order under review. As the Second
    Circuit put it:
    We need not address the jurisdictional issue. Our assumption of jurisdiction
    to consider first the merits is not barred where the jurisdictional constraints
    are imposed by statute, not the Constitution, and where the jurisdictional
    issues are complex and the substance of the claim is, as here, plainly
    without merit.
    Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
    433 F.3d 332
    , 338 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Marquez-
    Almanzar v. INS, 
    418 F.3d 210
    , 216 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005)).
    Because, however, mootness is a jurisdictional constraint imposed by the
    Constitution, we cannot dispose of it so easily. In re Surrick, 
    338 F.3d 224
    , 229 (3d Cir.
    2003). Rather, we must address mootness, and do so, albeit briefly. The case is moot for
    a very simple reason: Amaouche was removed pursuant to the order of deportation filed
    on October 14, 2010 and not pursuant to the August 2, 2005 order that is the subject of
    this appeal. Accordingly, even if Amaouche’s challenge to the 2005 order was
    meritorious, it could not affect the 2010 order, which he has not appealed and, because
    5
    more than thirty days have elapsed since the order issued, he is too late to do so now.1
    Stated somewhat differently, the 2010 order necessarily vacated the 2005 order and no
    ruling we make on the 2005 order will affect the 2010 order.2 See Thomas v. Attorney
    General, 
    625 F.3d 134
    , 140-41 (3d Cir. 2010).
    Amaouche, we note, will not be prejudiced by our dismissal of this appeal as moot
    for the reasons we have discussed and because the arguments he has made as to the
    waiver form are foreclosed by Bradley v. Attorney General, 
    603 F.3d 235
    (3d Cir. 2010).
    In Bradley, virtually identical arguments were raised and we found no prejudice because
    “the consequence he now faces – summary removal – is the same consequence he would
    have faced had he known of the waiver and refused to sign.” 
    Id. at 240.3
    The petition for review will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
    1
    Amaouche urges that the government should not be permitted to cure a previously
    deficient attempt at a removal order by filing and serving a later order. That argument
    could have been made by appealing the later issue, but Amaouche did not do so.
    2
    By separate order we will grant the government’s motion, opposed by Amaouche, to
    supplement the record with six documents relevant to Amaouche’s removal but post-
    dating his petition for review. See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 
    979 F.2d 965
    , 967 (3d Cir.
    1992) (en banc) (“[B]ecause mootness is a jurisdictional issue, we may receive facts
    relevant to that issue; otherwise there would be no way to find out if an appeal has
    become moot.”).
    3
    Given the foregoing, it should go without saying that even were this appeal not moot,
    Amaouche would lose, and resoundingly lose, on the merits.
    6