United States v. Rideout , 437 F. App'x 86 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 07-4567
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMAL RIDEOUT
a/k/a DUB,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-00680-07)
District Judge: Honorable Jan E. DuBois
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 24, 2011
Before: BARRY, AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 13, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Jamal Rideout of conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of
cocaine and substantive cocaine distribution offenses. Rideout argues that the evidence was
insufficient to prove the conspiracy charge and that the District Court improperly admitted
evidence at trial. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
On April 13, 2005, a Grand Jury returned a Fifty-Three Count Superseding Indictment
against Rideout and eight other co-defendants.1 Count One charged all defendants with
conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in Philadelphia and Delaware
Counties from July 2003 through October 2004, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A). Additionally, Rideout was charged with distribution of cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and distribution of cocaine within 1,000 of a school in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C) and 860(a).
The Superseding Indictment alleged a large-scale cocaine distribution conspiracy. At the
top of the conspiracy was defendant Tyrone Smith, who obtained large quantities of cocaine and
distributed it to defendant William Green, who in turn redistributed it to defendant Louis Stillis.
Stillis then distributed the cocaine to street-level cocaine sellers like Rideout. Rideout and other
street-level dealers then sold then cocaine to street-level buyers in the Toby Farms neighborhood
of Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
Rideout and three co-defendants went to trial on January 3, 2007. At the close of the
Government‟s case, Rideout moved for judgment of acquittal, but the District Court denied the
motion. The jury then convicted Rideout on all counts. The District Court denied Rideout‟s pro
se motion for judgment of acquittal, and, on December 4, 2007, the District Court sentenced
Rideout to 121 months‟ imprisonment. Rideout timely appealed.2
II.
1
Five co-defendants pled guilty. Rideout and three co-defendants – Louis Stillis, Tyrone Trader,
and Larry Davis – were convicted at trial.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
On appeal, Rideout argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his membership in
the conspiracy and that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence.
We reject Rideout‟s arguments.
A.
Rideout first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove his membership in the
conspiracy. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e must sustain
the verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Rawlins, 606 F.3d 73, 80 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations and citation omitted).
“The elements of a charge of conspiracy are: (1) „a unity of purpose between the alleged
conspirators;‟ (2) „an intent to achieve a common goal;‟ and (3) „an agreement to work together
toward that goal.‟” United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). Moreover, “[a] conspiratorial agreement can
be proved circumstantially based upon reasonable inferences drawn from actions and statements
of the conspirators . . . .” United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 238 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove Rideout‟s membership in the conspiracy. At
the conspiracy‟s inception in the summer of 2003, Rideout went with co-conspirators Stillis,
Trader, and William Green to purchase a half-kilogram of cocaine from Tyrone Smith.
Additionally, Kenneth Wilson, a co-conspirator who pled guilty and testified at trial, testified
that he delivered cocaine to Rideout for Stillis. Finally, the jury heard a wiretapped phone
conversation between Rideout and Stillis discussing a large drug deal. In that conversation,
Stillis and Rideout discussed acquiring more cocaine and diluting the cocaine they already had.
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From this evidence, a rational juror could have determined that Rideout was a member of the
conspiracy.
B.
Rideout‟s second argument is that the District Court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence seized from Tyrone Smith‟s residence, including kilogram wrappers, a money counter,
drug scales, and other paraphernalia. At opening argument, the Government stated that Smith
was the conspiracy‟s cocaine supplier, and the District Court permitted Pennsylvania State
Trooper Michael Skahill to testify about the evidence from Smith‟s residence. Rideout contends
the evidence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The Government responds that the District
Court properly admitted the evidence to corroborate Green‟s testimony that Smith supplied him
with large quantities of cocaine. We agree with the Government.
We review the District Court‟s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 2006). First, the evidence obtained from Smith‟s
residence was relevant. “„Relevant evidence‟ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable . . . .” Federal Rule of Evidence 401. This threshold is “not high.” United States
v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, the evidence
from Smith‟s residence was relevant to the Government‟s alleged chain of distribution from
Smith to Green and tended to make the existence of the conspiracy more probable.
Nor did the evidence unfairly prejudice Rideout. “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . .
.” Federal Rule of Evidence 403. As we stated in United States v. Starnes, “[T]he prejudice
against which [Rule 403] guards is unfair prejudice – prejudice of the sort which clouds
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impartial scrutiny and reasoned evaluation of the facts, which inhibits neutral application of
principles of law to the facts as found.” 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotations and
citations omitted). The evidence seized from Smith‟s residence was admitted for the limited
purpose of proving the conspiracy‟s chain of distribution. The Government then presented
extensive direct evidence of Rideout‟s culpability, including Wilson‟s testimony that Rideout
went with Stillis, Trader, and Green to purchase cocaine from Smith and a wiretapped phone
conversation in which Rideout discussed a large-scale drug deal with Stillis. Considering this
direct evidence of Rideout‟s role in the conspiracy, the limited evidence seized from Smith‟s
residence did not unfairly prejudice Rideout. The District Court did not abuse its discretion.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly denied Rideout‟s motion for
judgment of acquittal on Count One and for a new trial on all counts. Accordingly, we will
affirm Rideout‟s conviction and sentence.
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