Shakur Gannaway v. Berks Cty Prison , 439 F. App'x 86 ( 2011 )

BLD-231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1933
___________
SHAKUR D. GANNAWAY,
Appellant
v.
BERKS COUNTY PRISON; QUIGLEY CHIEF DEPUTY WARDEN; BROWN AND
BERGIN DEPUTY WARDENS; WARDEN GEORGE WAGNER; JESSICA VERGER;
LT. CASTRO; SGT. RINGLER; VANVILLA, Hearing Officer; CO CUNNINGHAM;
CO WILT; CO LABATE; CO FERNANDEZ; CO SPOTTS; CO WILLIAMSON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 5:09-cv-04501)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 8, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 18, 2011 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
1
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Shakur Gannaway appeals orders of the
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying his
motions for appointment of counsel. We will affirm.
I.
Gannaway‘s civil rights complaint arose from a period of detention in the Berks
County Jail (BCJ),1 where he was incarcerated before trial on charges relating to a May
2009 armed robbery, and also pursuant to a probation/parole detainer attached to an
earlier offense. Written in a discursive, stream-of-consciousness fashion, the complaint
assailed a series of injustices perpetrated by the allegedly racist and abusive staff of
BCJ—outrages that Gannaway likened to ―modern-day slavery.‖ The offenses were
legion, and included: retaliating for filing grievances, committing racist acts, removing
his mattress from his cell, ―starving‖ him during the Muslim religious holiday of
Ramadan, instituting a ―Nutraloaf‖ diet (which made him sick and interfered with his
ability to swallow medicine), forcing him to occupy a cell with a suspected homosexual,
overpricing commissary items, and depriving him of medical treatment. Gannaway later
amended his complaint, elaborating upon his retaliation complaints, articulating
harassment by various guards, and describing the theft of funds from his inmate account.
The District Court ordered Gannaway deposed; following the deposition, the
defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion, finding
1
The BCJ was formerly known as the Berks County Prison.
2
―that [Gannaway]‘s claims [we]re either legally insufficient or unsupported by the
record.‖ Gannaway v. Berks Cnty. Prison, No. 09-4501, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35047,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2011).
Gannaway appealed. He has twice moved for the appointment of counsel.
II.
Deriving our jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we exercise plenary review over
a District Court‘s grant of summary judgment. Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181
(3d Cir. 2011). In reviewing the summary-judgment order, we apply ―the same standard
that the lower court should have applied.‖ Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d
271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (summary judgment is appropriate
if ―there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law‖). Our review of the facts and the inferences drawn from
them must be in the light most favorable to Gannaway, the non-moving party; and as
Gannaway is a pro se litigant, his filings are to be liberally construed. Tri-M Grp., LLC
v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011); Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180,
184 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Since appointment of counsel to an in forma pauperis plaintiff ―is discretionary, . .
. we review the district court‘s decision to deny counsel for an abuse of discretion.‖
Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 457 (3d Cir. 1997). We may summarily affirm on any
3
ground supported by the record if no substantial question is presented by the appeal.
Murray v. Bledsoe, No. 10-4397, ___ F.3d ___, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11702, at *3 (3d
Cir. June 10, 2011); see also Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
In rendering its decision, the District Court observed that Gannaway had not fully
exhausted the BCJ‘s administrative remedy process for at least some of his claims.
Despite this, it ―review[ed] the majority of these claims as if exhausted.‖ Gannaway,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35047 at *2 n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2)). The
remainder—those non-exhausted claims that were not resolved by the opinion, such as
the ―lack of access to the law library, lack of adequate material in the library, lack of
sanitary food, and alleged tampering with mail and untimely delivery of mail,‖ id. at
*6—were severed from the complaint and dismissed, with ―leave to pursue these claims
after exhausting administrative remedies.‖ Id. at *2 n.1.
We recognize that the style of Gannaway‘s complaint renders difficult the process
of determining proper exhaustion. However, at this late date, it is unlikely that he would
be able to exhaust remaining administrative remedies. According to the BCJ handbook,
an initial grievance must be filed within 30 days of the grievable incident. BCJ Inmate
Handbook § 9.3.6 (2005). The general turnaround time is 15 days, as is the timeframe for
filing appeals of adverse decisions. Id. § 9.3.7–3.8. Therefore, in order to simplify our
review and definitively address Gannaway‘s claims, we will analyze them under a
4
summary-judgment framework on the merits.
IV.
A) Disciplinary Segregation Claims
Many of Gannaway‘s complaints relate to prison policies—specific, written
policies, described at length in the prison handbook and in the ―Disciplinary and Security
Housing Unit‖ orientation materials—governing confinement in disciplinary segregation.
Developed in response to the problem of inmates seeking disciplinary segregation for its
benefits (such as single-cell status and delivery of meals), the programs were designed to
make residing in the segregation unit less appealing; according to the Warden, they are
behavioral modification plans and are not intended to be punitive. Decl. of George A.
Wagner. Penalties include a temporary mattress restriction during daylight hours (lifted
within seven days if the inmate displays appropriate behavior) and a diet consisting of
Nutraloaf.
It was these two aspects of disciplinary confinement that Gannaway attacked most
directly. He argued that the deprivation of a mattress exacerbated a prior back injury.
Gannaway also claimed that he was rendered physically ill by the Nutraloaf, which he
described as unpalatable and poorly prepared, but that ―they‖ refused to give him real
food, and he was therefore unable to take his medicine; moreover, he was ―entitle[d] to
know what he [was] eating.‖
5
Neither claim has merit under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. 2 Gannaway
did not inform prison officials of his difficulty keeping down the Nutraloaf, despite
complaining about the indignity of the meal on numerous occasions. He has therefore
not shown the requisite deliberate indifference needed to prevail on summary judgment
or at trial. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994); see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12
F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (―Because a temporary Nutraloaf diet does not deny ‗the
minimal civilized measure of life‘s necessities,‘ its use falls short of the threshold
deprivation necessary to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.‖) (citations
omitted).3
Gannaway‘s spare allegations regarding the unsanitary containers in which the
Nutraloaf was provided, as well as its undercooked or overcooked status, also do not state
2
Gannaway was detained in the BCJ both as a pretrial detainee and pursuant to a
probation/parole detainer that activated upon his arrest. The record fails to make clear
the resolution of that detainer, and case law has not definitively addressed whether a
prisoner awaiting a hearing on a detainer falls under the protection of the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments. See Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 592–93 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1133 (3d Cir. 1983) (―It is
established that pretrial detainees are protected by the due process clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment.‖ (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979))). But we need not
definitively decide the issue, either generally or pertaining exclusively to Gannaway‘s
status. The Fourteenth Amendment grants at least as much protection as does the Eighth
Amendment. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003).
At a bare minimum, then, Gannaway must meet the ―deliberate indifference‖ test of
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976), in order to succeed. Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
As shown repeatedly herein, he failed to do so.
6
a constitutional injury. Cf. Hamm v. De Kalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.
1985) (―The fact that [prison] food occasionally contains foreign objects or sometimes is
served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional deprivation.‖). And
Gannaway failed to highlight his back problems in objecting to the mattress restriction.
See Gannaway Dep. 146:4–7.
To the extent that Gannaway raised a facial attack on the validity of the
disciplinary unit restrictions as applied to pretrial detainees—who ―may not be punished
prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law,‖ Wolfish, 441
U.S. at 535—we must decide ―whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose.‖ Id. at 538; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (―[W]hen a prison
regulation impinges on inmates‘ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.‖). The restrictions pass muster.
They are moderate, limited in duration, and ―reward‖ good behavior—all consonant with
the behavioral-modification goals highlighted by the defendants.
B) Religious Restrictions
Gannaway claimed that the BCJ fails to ―acknowledge the Ramadan month,‖ and
that officials told him he ―couldn‘t practice[] [his] religious belief[s]‖ as a Muslim.
3
His claims of rapid weight loss, which might otherwise alert officials to the existence of
a serious medical issue, are not supported by the record.
7
Specific incidents he cited included an alleged failure to provide him with suitable fast-
breaking food for Ramadan and an episode where he was prevented from attending a
religious service, ostensibly for misbehavior.
These claims find no support in the record; indeed, the defendants submitted a
Ramadan-fast participant list, to which Gannaway was a signatory. Similarly, there is no
evidence that Nutraloaf was an unacceptable food for breaking the fast, or that being
deprived attendance at a single service constituted a substantial burden on Gannaway‘s
ability to practice his religion, see Hernandez v. Comm‘r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
Accordingly, Gannaway has failed to meet his burden under the First Amendment‘s Free
Exercise clause or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-2; Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2007).
C) Strip Search
Gannaway alleged that he was ―woken up at 5:45am in the morning‖ and forced to
strip for inspection in the prison gym. During his deposition, he clarified that he was, in
fact, wearing his shorts the entire time, and that the search was conducted due to a
problem elsewhere on the block. See Gannaway Dep. 218:8–219:8. He also said that the
length of time he was standing exacerbated his back injury, causing him some pain, but
that the Lieutenant he informed responded ―too bad.‖ Id. 220:9; see also id. 218:18–19.
This claim lacks viability under the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments.
Gannaway cannot show that this search was unreasonable, especially in the aftermath of
8
an actual incident to which authorities were responding. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011). Nor
has Gannaway met either the subjective or objective prongs required to demonstrate an
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation with regard to his back pain, Brennan, 511
U.S. at 834—and, regardless, the record demonstrates that he was on medication for pain
throughout the duration of his confinement.
D) Retaliation
Gannaway maintained that his periods in disciplinary confinement, and the
misconducts issued against him, were the result of retaliatory harassment. However, he
has shown no ―causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the
adverse action taken against him.‖ Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). To
the contrary, Gannaway repeatedly violated BCJ policies. See BCJ Inmate Handbook
§ 2.5 (prohibiting the possession of, and alteration of, items belonging to another); id.
§ 3.5.2 (―You are required to consume prescription medication in the presence of medical
personnel. Staff are permitted to examine your mouth to ensure compliance.‖); id. § 7.4
(describing various acts of misconduct, including ―harassment by communication,‖
encompassing abuse of the grievance and internal-communications processes).
Nothing in the record suggests that Gannaway‘s conduct, assuming arguendo its
constitutionality, was a ―‗substantial or motivating factor‘ in the decision to discipline
him.‖ Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (quoting Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
9
275, 287 (1977)).4 Lacking this essential connection, he cannot prevail.
E) Racial Comments
Gannaway contends that he was subjected to racial epithets by guards and other
prison personnel. But it is well settled that ―[t]he use of racially derogatory language,
while unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution. Standing alone,
simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a
prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.‖
DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). As Gannaway
has alleged nothing more than verbal harassment (and one occurrence of an undirected
racial epithet carved on a cell door by unknown parties), he cannot recover on this claim.
F) Legal Mail
Gannaway claimed that he was denied access to the courts due to limited law-
library availability; inadequate materials available therein; and instances of tampering
with, delaying, and disrupting his legal mail. He alleged that a habeas petition was
denied as untimely due to this inference with his ability to prepare a legal case.
Gannaway Dep. 119:19–20; see also Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 1997).
4
Other ―harassment‖ identified by Gannaway is simply too vague to support
constitutional relief. For example, he accused CO Castro of making sexual overtures, but
was only able to cite a single incident where Castro requested that Gannaway stand in his
cell while the latter was naked—too little to be considered a genuine issue of material
fact.
10
But to prevail on a First Amendment access argument, Gannaway must show the
underlying lost claim to have been nonfrivolous. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,
414–15 (2002). Gannaway‘s ―habeas‖ petition was filed pro se (despite his having
counsel), in state court, during the pendency of his state criminal trial. It does not appear
to have been denied on timeliness grounds, and Gannaway has not otherwise shown its
merit. Accordingly, his access claim must fail.5
To the extent that his legal mail claim is premised on his First Amendment free-
speech rights, he has not shown a pattern or practice concerning legal mail that is
unrelated to a legitimate penological interest. Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359–60 (3d
Cir. 2006). Nor does he point to any prison program or policy that would impinge on his
First Amendment right to expression with regard to mail or other communications of a
non-legal character. See Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 376–77 (3d Cir. 2003).
G) Medical Treatment
Gannaway insisted that he received inadequate medical treatment, assailing the
qualifications of various BCJ physicians. Gannaway Dep. 321:20–24. But evidence in
5
Moreover, Gannaway made clear in his deposition that he was not denied access to the
law library; rather, his time was simply limited in a way that he personally found to be
unacceptable, and which compared unfavorably to the policies of other county jails.
Gannaway Dep. 187:23–188:4. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996)
(emphasizing that prisons must provide tools ―that the inmates need in order to attack
their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their
11
the record demonstrates that he received continuous medical treatment for a variety of
ailments, and ―mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment,‖ without more,
cannot support a claim of unconstitutional wrongdoing. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).
H) Financial Deductions
Gannaway accused the BCJ of taking money from his prison account without his
permission and without notice. Inmates have a property interest in funds held in prison
accounts, and therefore are entitled to due process with respect to those funds. Reynolds
v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997). But all of the deductions about which he
complains were explained to him by the BCJ. For example, he didn‘t ―see the relevance‖
of why he was charged for a disciplinary hearing, Gannaway Dep. 161:21–23, ignoring
the clear warning in the prison handbook regarding disciplinary hearing penalties, see
BCJ Inmate Handbook § 4.3. Gannaway also fails to realize that many other deductions
derive from the filing fees he currently owes this Court (and others) for proceeding in
forma pauperis in earlier civil suits. Other complaints involve failure to issue prompt
receipts, a claim that is at best ancillary to any actual constitutional harm. The record
supports summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
To the extent that Gannaway raised a claim regarding overpriced items in the
confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental
(and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration‖).
12
prison commissary, his allegations were entirely conclusory and devoid of factual support
and, as such, could not sustain the charge.
I) Clogged Toilet
To the extent that Gannaway‘s complaint can be read to assert a constitutional
violation in connection with a clogged toilet in his cell, the record shows that the toilet
was partly functional; it simply required frequent plunging. Gannaway decided that he
no longer wished to plunge the toilet during the period while the BCJ awaited the arrival
of an available plumber. The result cannot fairly be attributed to the BCJ.
J) Destruction of Property
To the extent that Gannaway complained that his property was damaged,
confiscated, or destroyed by BCJ employees, he cannot prevail, as adequate state post-
deprivation remedies were available. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984);
Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000).
K) Conspiracy
Throughout these proceedings, Gannaway has insisted on the conspiratorial nature
of the actions taken against him. He termed the prison a ―corrupted body,‖ one that
―stick[s] together.‖ Gannaway Dep. 176:2–3. ―In order to prevail on a conspiracy claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law conspired
to deprive him of a federally protected right.‖ Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel.
13
M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in P.P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 730 (3d Cir. 2009). But ―the
linchpin for conspiracy is agreement,‖ Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs, 956 F.2d 1112,
1122 (11th Cir. 1992), and Gannaway has shown no agreement, implicit or otherwise, in
connection with the actions he cites.
V.
Since Gannaway‘s claims were neither complex nor meritorious, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in denying his requests for counsel. See Tabron v. Grace, 6
F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).
VI.
Gannaway‘s complaint and amended complaint pose challenges to judicial
analysis; nevertheless, we are satisfied that we (with the able assistance of the District
Court) have identified, entertained, and discussed all of the major issues Gannaway
attempted to raise. Having found them wanting, and encountering no substantial issue on
appeal, we will summarily affirm. Gannaway‘s motions for counsel are denied. Id.14