Crawford v. Attorney General of the United States , 513 F. App'x 144 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •                                                             NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-2902
    ___________
    LLOYD SAMUEL CRAWFORD,
    a/k/a Lloyd Crawford, a/k/a Steve S. Russel
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    Lloyed Samuel Crawford,
    Petitioner
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Agency No. A035-597-547)
    Immigration Judge: Honorable Margaret Reichenberg
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    December 21, 2012
    Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: February 1, 2013)
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    PER CURIAM
    Lloyd Samuel Crawford, a native of Jamaica, petitions for review of a decision of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). For the reasons below, we will deny the
    petition for review.
    In 1979, Crawford was admitted to the United States and became a lawful
    permanent resident. In 1990, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
    with intent to distribute and, in 1997, aggravated assault. In 2011, Crawford was charged
    as removable as one convicted of an aggravated felony and for his two convictions for
    crimes involving moral turpitude. Proceeding pro se, Crawford denied removability. An
    Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that the government had shown by clear and
    convincing evidence that Crawford was removable as an aggravated felon for his
    conviction for a drug trafficking crime. The IJ also sustained the charge that Crawford
    was removable for his convictions for two crimes involving moral turpitude. The IJ
    noted that Crawford testified that he did not fear persecution or torture if removed to
    Jamaica and determined that, as an aggravated felon, he was not eligible for cancellation
    of removal. Crawford appealed.
    The BIA dismissed the pro se appeal. With respect to the drug trafficking charge,
    the BIA noted that it could not go beyond the record of conviction to examine Crawford’s
    claim that he was ―framed‖ by a police officer. In response to Crawford’s claim that his
    criminal attorneys were ineffective for failing to advise him of the immigration
    consequences of his pleas, the BIA observed that his convictions were valid as they had
    not been vacated or modified. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Crawford was not eligible
    2
    for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. It
    determined that while Crawford asserted that he was hard of hearing and ―slow in
    thinking,‖ he did not allege that he would be persecuted or tortured in Jamaica. The BIA
    noted that it did not have the authority to grant Crawford relief on humanitarian grounds.
    Still proceeding pro se, Crawford filed a petition for review.
    Because Crawford is an aggravated felon—a determination he does not contest—
    we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of his claims for relief except for legal and
    constitutional claims. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(C)&(D). Crawford argues that he was
    denied a fair hearing when the IJ failed to grant him a continuance despite the fact that he
    had pending a post-conviction petition challenging his convictions. The IJ did continue
    the hearing several times to give Crawford the opportunity to obtain a lawyer. Moreover,
    Crawford did not exhaust this issue before the BIA: he did not challenge the IJ’s refusal
    to continue the case. We lack jurisdiction to review unexhausted arguments. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
    330 F.3d 587
    , 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
    Alleyne v. INS, 
    879 F.2d 1177
    , 1182 (3d Cir. 2989)). Thus, regardless of whether this
    argument raises a constitutional issue, we lack jurisdiction to review it.
    Crawford also argues that the IJ erred in failing to allow him to apply for relief.
    He states that he repeatedly asked to apply for cancellation of removal. However,
    Crawford is not eligible for cancellation of removal as an aggravated felon. Rodriguez-
    Munoz v. Gonzales, 
    419 F.3d 245
    , 248 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing 
    8 U.S.C. § 1229
    (b)). He
    contends that his criminal attorneys were ineffective for failing to advise him of the
    3
    immigration consequences of his guilty pleas. However, as noted by the BIA,
    Crawford’s convictions are final for immigration purposes until they are overturned.
    Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 
    528 F.3d 196
    , 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008) ―(citing United States v.
    Garcia-Echaverria, 
    374 F.3d 440
    , 445–46 (6th Cir. 2004); Grageda v. INS, 
    12 F.3d 919
    ,
    921 (9th Cir. 1993); Okabe v. INS, 
    671 F.2d 863
    , 865 (5th Cir. 1982); Will v. INS, 
    447 F.2d 529
    , 533 (7th Cir. 1971)). To the extent these arguments raise constitutional or legal
    issues, they are without merit.
    For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. The Government’s
    motion to dismiss is denied.
    4