United States v. Basheer ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 07-3537
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MUMIN BASHEER,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Crim. No. 2-05-cr-00616-001)
District Judge: Hon. Curtis Joyner
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 25, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Circuit Judge, SLOVITER and RENDELL, Circuit Judges,
(Filed December 7, 2010)
OPINION
McKee, Chief Judge
Mumin Basheer appeals the district court's judgment of conviction and sentence.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I.
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Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts and
procedural history that are necessary for the disposition of this appeal. A jury found
Basheer guilty of: possession of 50 grams or more of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to 252
months‟ imprisonment with 192.
Basheer raises four arguments on appeal: (1) his conviction was against the weight of
the evidence because a reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Basheer constructively possessed drugs and firearms; (2) the court erred by granting the
government‟s motion to include evidence of his prior conviction under Rule 609; (3) the
court erred in permitting the testimony of a narcotics expert in violation of Rule 704(b);
and (4) the court erred in several respects in imposing sentence.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and have
jurisdiction to review the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review a district
court‟s evidentiary rulings and sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2002) (evidentiary rulings); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (sentencing). Where an objection was not preserved at
trial, we review for plain error. United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 380 (3d Cir.
2005). When considering challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of
the evidence on the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
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whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the available evidence.” United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 261 (3d
Cir. 2001). Insufficiency of the evidence claims place “a very heavy burden” on an
appellant. United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990).
III.
A.
Basheer argues that the government failed to prove even constructive possession
of drugs or firearms beyond a reasonable doubt. Constructive possession “requires both,
„dominion and control‟ over an object and knowledge of that object‟s existence.” United
States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 1992). Like any other fact, it can be proven by
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 97. However, “mere proximity to the drug, or mere
presence on the property where it is located” is not enough to find constructive
possession. United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1036 (3d Cir. 1972).
When police first saw Basheer in an abandoned house he was alone in the same
room with the drugs and weapons, and he immediately fled as the officers approached.
Such flight has long been held as circumstantial evidence of guilt. See United States v.
Miles, 468 F.2d 482, 489 (3d Cir. 1972). Before police entered the vacant house, they
observed a juvenile selling cocaine from that location, and they saw him frequently
entering and leaving that property as he sold cocaine outside. Yet, when arrested, the
juvenile only had three dollars on his person. The government introduced expert
testimony at trial to establish that drug dealers often employ juveniles as street sellers to
minimize risk. That witness also testified that a seller would not leave drugs and firearms
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unattended. The jury could therefore conclude that someone else was in the house that
was being used to “stash” the cocaine that the juvenile was selling. The jury could also
have concluded someone else was in the house who was involved in the sales because the
juvenile only had $3.00 in his possession when arrested even though he had made several
sales of cocaine immediately prior to the arrest. When viewed in the light most favorable
to the government as verdict winner, we have no trouble concluding that the evidence
was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Basheer was in constructive possession of the
drugs and firearms found in the vacant property that was clearly being used to “stash”
drugs that the juvenile was selling.
Basheer also challenges the credibility of police testimony based on either
inconsistencies or implausibility. Assessing witness credibility is the sole province of the
jury and “[i]t is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of
witnesses.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1990). The jury clearly
resolved the alleged inconsistencies and implausibilies against Basheer, and we see
nothing in the record that would allow us to conclude that it acted improperly in doing so.
B.
Basheer argues that the district courted erred in granting the government‟s pre-trial
motion to include evidence of his prior conviction for possession of a firearm without a
license for purposes of impeachment pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609.
However, since Basheer did not take the stand in his own defense, he has waived his right
to raise that issue now. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984).
C.
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Basheer also claims that admitting expert testimony relating to the purpose of the
crack cocaine or money recovered in this case was contrary to Federal Rule of Evidence
704(b). Having failed to preserve an objection during trial on this issue, we review the
district court‟s ruling for plain error. Mornan, 413 F.3d at 380.
Rule 704(b) prohibits expert witnesses from opining or inferring that the defendant in
a criminal case had the requisite mental state for the crime charged. However, Rule
704(b) allows opinion testimony as long as “the expert does not draw the ultimate
inference or conclusion for the jury and the ultimate inference or conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the testimony.” United States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 308 (3d
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998)). Thus,
experts may testify about common practices of drug dealers without violating this rule.
Id.We have previously ruled that expert testimony inferring intent to distribute based on
a hypothetical involving the same circumstances of the case at issue does not violate Rule
704(b). See United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2005). The testimony was
permissible here because it was not given in response to specific questions about the
particular defendant‟s intent. Id. Furthermore, in Davis, as here, the expert witness had
no direct connection to the investigation, and thus, “there was no potential for the jury to
conclude that [the] Officer … had any special insight into the thoughts or intent of the
defendants.” Id. The narcotics expert here never referred to either Basheer or his intent in
any way. Consequently, the district court did not commit plain error in admitting this
testimony.
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D.
Basheer challenges his sentence on several grounds. He argues first that the district
court erred during sentencing by not considering the crack/powder sentencing disparity in
the guidelines. Basheer did not however, raise this issue before the district court at the
time of sentencing, and thus, “our review is confined by the exacting plain error
standards.” United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2006). Not only must the
error be plain, it must affect substantial rights and seriously affect the integrity and
fairness of judicial proceedings. United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 404 (3d Cir.
2010).
The district court does have the discretion to consider the sentencing disparity
between crack and cocaine powder offenses, but is “under no obligation to impose a
sentence below the applicable Guidelines range solely on the basis of the crack/powder
cocaine differential.” United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2006). Since
the court is not required to adjust a sentence based on the crack/cocaine disparity, the
district court did not plainly err by sentencing Basheer within the applicable guideline
range for crack cocaine based offenses.
Basheer also claims that the court did not meaningfully address several mitigating
factors such as his history of mental illness, his relationship with his young daughter, or
his childhood in a home where his father and uncle used drugs. When considering the §
3553(a) sentencing factors, the court found the nature and circumstances of the offense to
be significant, his criminal history demonstrates no respect for law, his sentence would
deter others, and that he posed a sufficient danger to the public to require substantial
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incarceration. App. 433. Although Basheer‟s history of mental illness and his childhood
were not directly addressed by the court during sentencing, it is clear from the record that
the court heard and considered these mitigating factors. A sentencing judge need not
“discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear
the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d
324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).
Moreover, Basheer‟s claim that his sentence was substantively unreasonable is
meritless. We “affirm [a sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court
provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009). The record reflects
that the district court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and reasonably applied
them when imposing the sentence. Accordingly, we find that this sentence was
reasonable, and we reject Basheer‟s claim that the court considered the sentencing
guidelines to be mandatory.
Finally, direct appeal is not the proper method to address the subsequent amendments
to the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. Therefore, our rejection of Basheer‟s
arguments here does not preclude him from raising that issue before the district court in
an appropriate motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)(2).
III.
For the foregoing reasons the district court‟s judgment will be affirmed.
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