Jose Raul Reyna v. the State of Texas ( 2021 )

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed October 22, 2021
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-20-00505-CR
JOSE RAUL REYNA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F15-18250-J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Smith
Appellant Jose Raul Reyna pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm.
The trial court deferred adjudication and place him on three years’ community
supervision and assessed a $1,500 fine. The State subsequently filed a motion and
an amended motion to proceed with adjudication. The trial court found two
allegations true, granted the motion, and sentenced Reyna to ten years’
imprisonment.
Appellant raises four issues on appeal. In his first issue, he asserts the trial
court erred by not considering whether the police illegally searched his car. In his
second and third issues, appellant asks that in the event we sustain his first issue, we
remand to the trial court to decide the legality of the search and reconsider his
sentence. Lastly, appellant argues the original deferred adjudication order was
defective because the trial court did not follow the original plea agreement. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
On December 8, 2015, appellant pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon. The trial court placed him on community supervision for three
years and assessed a fine. The State subsequently filed a motion and an amended
motion to revoke community supervision alleging appellant did not pay community
supervision fees1 and committed two new offenses: (1) driving while intoxicated in
Tarrant County in March 2017 and (2) felony possession of a firearm in December
2017 in Leon County.
On March 27, 2020, the trial court held a revocation hearing. Officer Olimpo
Hernandez testified to the following facts regarding the DWI offense: In March
2017, a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed on I-30 in downtown Fort Worth
caught his attention. Officer Hernandez estimated the vehicle was going ninety
miles per hour in a sixty miles per hour speed limit. He activated his lights, and
appellant pulled over.
1
The trial court did not find this violation to be true; therefore, it is not pertinent to this appeal.
–2–
Appellant did not make eye contact and rolled his window down just enough
to give Officer Hernandez his driver’s license. Officer Hernandez smelled alcohol
coming from the window, and he noticed appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and heavy.
He described appellant’s behavior as uncooperative but respectful. Appellant
refused to answer when asked if he had been drinking. Officer Hernandez agreed
that such behavior could be described as a loss of inhibitions, which could be a sign
of intoxication.
When appellant exited the car, Officer Hernandez confirmed the smell of
alcohol was coming from appellant. He conducted a horizontal and sustained gaze
nystagmus test and confirmed four signs of intoxication. Based on the totality of
circumstances, Officer Hernandez believed appellant was impaired due to
consuming alcohol. He arrested appellant for DWI.
Trooper Joel Smith then testified to the following facts regarding appellant’s
2017 arrest for felony possession of a firearm: Trooper Smith noticed a car driving
with an obscured license plate. He made a traffic stop and noticed three people in
the car. Appellant was in the driver’s seat. Trooper Smith approached the front
passenger window and when the occupant rolled it down, Trooper Smith
immediately smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana. He explained raw, fresh,
unsmoked marijuana has a very strong, potent smell different from smoked
marijuana. His investigation then turned from a stop for an obscured license plate
to a criminal investigation.
–3–
He ran appellant’s license and discovered he was a known gang member.
Appellant admitted he used to be in a gang, but said he left that life behind.
Appellant admitted to smoking marijuana in the car, but denied that any drugs or
anything else illegal was inside the car. However, appellant told Trooper Smith that
he might find a smoked joint. Appellant denied having any weapons in the vehicle
but based on body language, Trooper Smith thought he was lying.
Appellant denied Trooper Smith’s request to search the car. Trooper Smith
explained to appellant that the smell of marijuana gave him probable cause to search
the car and he then began his search. The smell of marijuana become stronger
indicating marijuana was either in the car or someone recently smoked it. He found
a smoked joint in the front seat. He tried to open the glovebox, but it was locked.
Appellant denied having a key to open it.
Trooper Smith continued his search and found four shell casings from a 9mm
gun in the windshield cowling. He asked appellant again to open the glovebox, but
he would not. Trooper Smith then used an upholstery tool to pry it open. Inside, he
found a loaded 9mm gun. The bullets matched the shell casings in the windshield
cowling. Trooper Smith arrested appellant.
At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial judge found that “based
upon the evidence” presented, appellant violated his probation by both intentionally
and knowingly operating a motor vehicle in a public roadway while intoxicated and
–4–
by unlawfully possessing a firearm at a location other than his premises. The trial
court further commented:
The Court took into consideration the fact that this is not a trial
on these cases. This is a motion to proceed to adjudication of guilt. I
did have some concerns about the second offense, specifically the
officer going into a locked glove compartment. I had some concerns
about that; and if this was a trial, I may have ruled differently.
This is a motion to proceed to adjudication of guilt, seeing that
he had violated his probation. I believe very clearly that he was in
possession of a weapon that day. However, I don’t necessarily believe
that the officers had the right to go into the glove compartment.
Despite the trial judge’s comments, she stated again she was finding appellant in
violation of the terms of his probation. The court revoked appellant’s community
supervision and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. This appeal followed.
Trial Court’s Consideration of the Search
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by not considering
the validity of Trooper Smith’s warrantless search of the glovebox after the trial
judge sua sponte raised the issue. Appellant relies on the statements quoted above
at the end of the revocation hearing to argue that the trial court was incorrect in
stating she could not consider the legality of the search because it was “only” a
revocation hearing. The State responds, in part, that appellant waived any argument
regarding the search of the glovebox because he did not file a motion to suppress or
object to the evidence when it came in during the revocation hearing.
Appellant concedes he did not file a motion to suppress or object to the
admission of the gun into evidence during the revocation hearing. However, he
–5–
urges the Court to disregard the traditional rules of preservation and instead
encourages review under Texas Rule of Evidence 103e. See TEX. R. EVID. 103e (“In
criminal cases, a court may take notice of a fundamental error affecting a substantial
right, even if the claim of error was not properly preserved.”). We reject his
invitation.
Courts have consistently held the failure to object in a timely and specific
manner forfeits complaints about the admissibility of evidence. See Saldano v. State,
70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Lamar v. State, No. 05-04-
00741-CR, 2005 WL 1871024, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2005) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (concluding alleged illegal arrest and search not
preserved for review when record contained no objection). This is true even though
the error may concern a constitutional right of the defendant. Saldano, 70 S.W.3d
at 889. Moreover, as a procedural safeguard, a defendant has at least two
opportunities to seek redress for alleged illegal searches. A defendant may file a
motion to suppress evidence and have it ruled upon before trial, and a defendant may
always object to the admission of evidence at the time it is offered. See, e.g., Reyes
v. State, 361 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d). Because
appellant did neither, he failed to preserve his issue for review.
In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by appellant’s reliance on
Rushing v. State, 500 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (concluding the only
evidence upon which the revocation could proceed was obtained as a result of the
–6–
illegal search; therefore, trial court abused its discretion). Appellant cites this case
for the proposition that “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable” regardless of
whether evidence of the search is presented at a revocation hearing or trial. While
Rushing involved the consideration of an illegal search during a revocation hearing,
it is silent as to whether the defendant filed a motion to suppress or objected to the
evidence. Id. Thus, the case does not alter the well-established rules of error
preservation.
Finally, the trial judge’s commentary at the end of the hearing does not alter
our conclusion. The trial judge made the statements after stating that “based upon
the evidence” appellant violated his probation by driving while intoxicated and
possessing a firearm. Moreover, to the extent appellant argues he had no reason to
object until the judge made her sua sponte opinions known, the record still does not
indicate he then objected. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (party must make a timely and
specific objection giving the trial court time to remedy any alleged error).
We conclude appellant failed to preserve his issue for review; therefore, it is
overruled. Having overruled appellant’s first issue, we need not consider issues two
and three in which he asks the Court to remand for reconsideration of the legality of
the search and for punishment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Failure to Follow Original Plea Agreement
In his final issue, Reyna argues the original order for deferred adjudication is
defective and should be set aside because the trial court failed to follow the plea
–7–
agreement. Specifically, he asserts the executed plea agreement shows he was to be
admonished for a punishment range consistent with a state jail felony, not a third
degree felony. The State responds the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
his issue. We agree.
Unless an order placing a defendant on deferred adjudication community
supervision is void, that defendant may not raise issues related to the original plea
proceeding in an appeal from a subsequent adjudication proceeding. Manuel v.
State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Robinson v. State, No. 02-17-
00054-CR, 2018 WL 1095793, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 1, 2018, no pet.).
Appellant did not file an appeal challenging the range of punishment of the pled-to
offense at the time community supervision was imposed. Rather, he waited until
March 17, 2020, and filed a pro se “motion to withdraw guilty plea.” By that time,
it was too late to raise the issue. See Webb v. State, No. 05-15-00478-CR, 2015 WL
7720469, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (denying review of whether trial court incorrectly
admonished defendant on punishment range when he waited to raise issue in appeal
from adjudication). Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to consider appellant’s
issue. Id.–8–
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
/Craig Smith/
CRAIG SMITH
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
200505F.U05
–9–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JOSE RAUL REYNA, Appellant On Appeal from the Criminal District
Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-20-00505-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F15-18250-J.
Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Schenck and Garcia
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered October 22, 2021
–10–