JILL PARDES, etc. v. ANDRIA PARDES ( 2021 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed October 27, 2021.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D19-2406
    Lower Tribunal No. 14-10507
    ________________
    Jill Pardes, etc.,
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
    vs.
    Andria Pardes,
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Stanford
    Blake, Voluntary Trial Resolution Judge.
    Law Offices of Paul Morris, P.A., and Paul Morris; Law Offices of
    Kornreich & Assoc., and Gerald Kornreich and Amber Kornreich; Cotzen
    Law, P.A., and Michael Cotzen, for appellant/cross-appellee.
    Barry S. Franklin & Associates, P.A., and Barry S. Franklin, for
    appellee/cross-appellant.
    Before EMAS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ.
    EMAS, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    Jill Pardes, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael
    Pardes (“Former Husband”)1 appeals the amended final judgment of
    dissolution of marriage. Andria Pardes (“Former Wife”) cross-appeals the
    same final judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse
    in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The parties, who have no minor children, were married for thirty-three
    years and, during the course of the marriage, separated several times and
    twice filed petitions for dissolution. During their separations, the parties
    entered into several postnuptial agreements addressing their substantial
    assets. Following a five-day nonjury trial held before voluntary trial resolution
    judge Stanford Blake, 2 the trial court issued the final judgment which is the
    subject of this appeal and cross-appeal.
    1
    During the pending appellate proceedings Michael Pardes passed away.
    On August 4, 2021, Mr. Pardes’ daughter, Jill Pardes, was substituted as the
    party-appellant in this appeal.
    2
    More commonly referred to as a “private judge,” Florida law recognizes that
    “parties who are involved in a civil dispute may agree in writing to submit the
    controversy to voluntary binding arbitration, or voluntary trial resolution, in
    lieu of litigation of the issues involved, prior to or after a lawsuit has been
    filed, provided no constitutional issue is involved.” § 44.104(1), Fla. Stat.
    (2019) (entitled “Voluntary binding arbitration and voluntary trial resolution”).
    For ease of reference, we refer throughout the opinion to voluntary trial
    resolution judge Stanford Blake as “the trial court.”
    2
    Former Husband asserts the trial court erred in: 1) failing to reimburse
    him for monies paid toward monthly household expenses, which Former
    Wife was contractually obligated to pay; 2) finding Former Husband
    breached one of the postnuptial agreements by failing to disclose to Former
    Wife an investment in a company called Crystal Bay (the “Crystal Bay
    Investment”); and 3) determining the residence at 584 Ocean Boulevard
    (“the Ocean Boulevard Residence”) was nonmarital property of Former Wife.
    Former Wife asserts the trial court erred in: 1) failing to include, in the
    calculation of Former Husband’s net worth, an investment known as the
    “Stargate Mobile Investment”; 2) reimbursing Former Husband for monies
    he spent improving the Ocean Boulevard Residence; and 3) awarding
    certain artwork (“the Tremblay artwork”) to Former Husband.
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s final judgment in
    all respects, except for the award of the Tremblay artwork to Former
    Husband.
    ANALYSIS
    A. Former Husband’s Claims
    1. Did the trial court err in failing to credit Former Husband for monies
    he paid toward monthly household expenses which Former Wife
    was contractually obligated to pay?
    3
    According to Former Husband, the parties entered into a postnuptial
    agreement in 2002 (the “2002 House Agreement”), which required Former
    Wife to pay $2800 monthly toward household expenses on the couple’s
    marital home in Golden Beach (the “Golden Beach House”).                 Former
    Husband contends that because Former Wife failed to pay those expenses
    (thus requiring Former Husband to do so), the trial court erred in failing to
    credit Former Husband for those amounts.
    Former Wife countered that 1) the parties subsequently agreed she
    would not have to pay the monthly household expense amount; and 2) the
    2002 House Agreement was superseded by the couple’s subsequent 2006
    postnuptial agreement (“the 2006 Agreement”). The trial court found the
    greater weight of the evidence supported Former Wife’s version of the
    events, and accordingly, did not credit Former Husband for the amount he
    claimed to be owed.
    In reviewing a judgment rendered after a bench trial, any questions of
    law, including construction of the postnuptial agreements in the instant case,
    are reviewed de novo. Katz v. Riemer, 
    305 So. 3d 663
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2020).
    In addition, typically, “the trial court’s findings of fact come to the appellate
    court with a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless they
    are clearly erroneous. Thus, they are reviewed for competent, substantial
    4
    evidence.” Underwater Eng’g Servs., Inc. v. Utility Bd. of City of Key West,
    
    194 So. 3d 437
    , 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (additional citations omitted).
    This case, however, is atypical in one important respect: It was tried
    before a voluntary trial resolution judge, pursuant to section 44.104, Florida
    Statutes. As such, the parties are bound by the provisions of that law,
    including section 44.104(11), which provides:
    (11) Any party may enforce a final decision rendered in a
    voluntary trial by filing a petition for final judgment in the circuit
    court in the circuit in which the voluntary trial took place. Upon
    entry of final judgment by the circuit court, any party may appeal
    to the appropriate appellate court. Factual findings determined in
    the voluntary trial are not subject to appeal.
    (Emphasis added). See also Witt v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc., 
    35 So. 3d 1033
    , 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that, pursuant to section 44.104(11),
    an appellate court is “bound by the factual findings of the trial resolution
    judge”).
    As such, the trial court’s factual determinations—that the parties
    agreed Former Wife would no longer be responsible for the monthly
    household expenses, and that Former Husband never expected to be paid—
    are not subject to review by this court. 3
    3
    We note, however, that even if we were reviewing such a claim under our
    traditional standard of review, we would hold that the trial court’s factual
    determinations are supported by competent substantial evidence.
    5
    In addition, and upon our de novo review, we conclude that the plain
    language of the 2006 Agreement modified the requirement (contained in the
    2002 House Agreement) that Former Wife contribute to household
    expenses. The 2006 Agreement provided that the 2002 House Agreement
    would remain in effect “except to the extent it is modified by or inconsistent
    with the terms of this Agreement.” This exception was triggered because, in
    that 2006 Agreement, the parties expressly agreed that Former Husband
    “shall pay all expenses attendant to and associated with” the marital home,
    thereby modifying the conflicting provision in the parties’ 2002 House
    Agreement.
    As a result of this modification, Former Wife was no longer obligated
    to pay the monthly household expenses. “When a contract is clear and
    unambiguous, ‘the actual language used in the contract is the best evidence
    of the intent of the parties, and the plain meaning of that language controls.’”
    Anthony v. Anthony, 
    949 So. 2d 226
    , 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Maher
    v. Schumacher, 
    605 So. 2d 481
    , 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)). See also City of
    Florida City v. Public Risk Mgmt. of Fla., 
    307 So. 3d 135
    , 138 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2020) (same). 4
    4
    To the extent Former Husband argues that he was entitled, as a matter of
    law, to reimbursement for the monthly expenses which predated the 2006
    Agreement, we note that Florida law does recognize the concept of
    6
    2.    Did the trial court err in finding Former Husband breached the
    2006 Agreement by failing to disclose to Former Wife the Crystal Bay
    Investment?
    Former Husband contends the trial court erred in finding he breached
    the 2006 Agreement by failing to disclose to Former Wife the Crystal Bay
    Investment.    As a result of this finding, the trial court ordered that the
    $1,618,555 Former Husband lost in this investment—a loss which Former
    Husband included in his net worth calculation—be removed as a liability in
    his net worth calculation.
    Former Husband contends that the evidence at trial established that
    Former Wife was aware of the Crystal Bay investment, and thus there had
    been no breach of the 2006 Agreement. However, the 2006 Agreement
    abandonment by the conduct of the parties to a contract. See Gustafson v.
    Jensen, 
    515 So. 2d 1298
    , 1300 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (holding: “In Florida, an
    antenuptial agreement may be abandoned by mutual consent without
    consideration”); McMullen v. McMullen, 
    185 So. 2d 191
    , 193 (Fla. 2d DCA
    1966) (same and noting: “The abandonment of a contract may be effected
    by the acts of on one of the parties thereto where the acts of that party are
    inconsistent with the existence of the contract and are acquiesced in by the
    other party”). See also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 
    172 So. 2d 499
     (Fla.
    3d DCA 1965); Painter v. Painter, 
    823 So. 2d 268
    , 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
    (noting “abandonment of a contract . . . may be proved by showing that the
    acts of one party are inconsistent with the existence of the contract and that
    the other party acquiesced in those acts.”) The trial court committed no error
    in applying these principles of contract law and we affirm this aspect of the
    final judgment.
    7
    plainly required Former Husband to obtain Former Wife’s written consent
    before investing in the Crystal Bay Investment. Former Husband argues the
    parties’ course of conduct was such that Former Wife’s written consent was
    not required, only her knowledge and agreement to same. While Former
    Husband’s premise may be correct (indeed, as we have already observed
    supra at note four, contracting parties may, by a course of conduct, abandon
    a contract), the trial court found as a matter of fact that Former Wife had no
    knowledge of the Crystal Bay Investment at the time Former Husband made
    the investment.
    We hold the trial court committed no error of law, and Former Husband
    is bound by the trial court’s findings of fact, which “are not subject to appeal
    by the parties.” § 44.104(11), Fla. Stat. (2019). 5
    3. Did the trial court err in determining the Ocean Boulevard
    Residence was nonmarital property of Former Wife?
    5
    Even if we were to review the challenged findings for competent substantial
    evidence, we would affirm the trial court’s finding that Former Wife did not
    know of or approve the Crystal Bay Investment before that investment was
    made, and that Former Husband therefore breached the 2006 Agreement in
    this regard. See Corrales v. Corrales, 
    320 So. 3d 217
    , 220 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2021) (“Recognizing ‘the trial court’s superior vantage point in assessing the
    credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact,’ we conclude the
    challenged findings are well-supported by competent, substantial evidence”)
    (quoting Porter v. State, 
    788 So. 2d 917
    , 923 (Fla. 2001)).
    8
    Finally, Former Husband contends the trial court erred in determining
    the Ocean Boulevard Residence was nonmarital property of Former Wife.
    Although Former Husband acknowledges that Former Wife purchased the
    residence during the time of their prior separation, Former Husband asserts
    that the parties thereafter reconciled and lived at that residence together as
    a couple, and that it was their marital home for several years prior to Former
    Wife filing for divorce. Additionally, Former Husband asserts, he contributed
    monies to make several improvements to the Ocean Boulevard Residence.
    Relying on Hooker v. Hooker, 
    220 So. 3d 397
     (Fla. 2017), Former Husband
    asserts that the trial court should have found the Ocean Boulevard
    Residence was a marital asset.
    Section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes (2019), sets forth what is to be
    considered marital property in Florida:
    (6) As used in this section:
    (a) 1. “Marital assets and liabilities” include:
    a. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage,
    individually by either spouse or jointly by them.
    b. The enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital
    assets resulting from the efforts of either party during the
    marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of
    marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both.
    c. The paydown of principal of a note and mortgage secured by
    nonmarital real property and a portion of any passive
    appreciation in the property, if the note and mortgage secured by
    the property are paid down from marital funds during the
    marriage. The portion of passive appreciation in the property
    9
    characterized as marital and subject to equitable distribution is
    determined by multiplying a coverture fraction by the passive
    appreciation in the property during the marriage.
    ...
    d. Interspousal gifts during the marriage.
    e. All vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued
    during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing,
    annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and
    programs.
    2. All real property held by the parties as tenants by the entireties,
    whether acquired prior to or during the marriage, shall be
    presumed to be a marital asset. If, in any case, a party makes a
    claim to the contrary, the burden of proof shall be on the party
    asserting the claim that the subject property, or some portion
    thereof, is nonmarital.
    3. All personal property titled jointly by the parties as tenants by
    the entireties, whether acquired prior to or during the marriage,
    shall be presumed to be a marital asset. In the event a party
    makes a claim to the contrary, the burden of proof shall be on the
    party asserting the claim that the subject property, or some
    portion thereof, is nonmarital.
    4. The burden of proof to overcome the gift presumption shall be
    by clear and convincing evidence.
    (b) “Nonmarital assets and liabilities” include:
    1. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred by either party prior to
    the marriage, and assets acquired and liabilities incurred in
    exchange for such assets and liabilities;
    2. Assets acquired separately by either party by noninterspousal
    gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and assets acquired in
    exchange for such assets;
    3. All income derived from nonmarital assets during the marriage
    unless the income was treated, used, or relied upon by the
    parties as a marital asset;
    4. Assets and liabilities excluded from marital assets and
    liabilities by valid written agreement of the parties, and
    10
    assets acquired and liabilities incurred in exchange for such
    assets and liabilities; . . . .
    (Emphasis added). Relevant to this discussion, the parties’ 2006
    Agreement provides:
    Subject only to the terms of this Agreement and the [2002] House
    Agreement, each party hereto shall, during his or her lifetime, be
    the sole and exclusive owner of all of his or her respective
    separate property and shall have the sole and exclusive right to
    dispose of any and all such separate property during his or her
    lifetime, . . . as if the parties were never married.
    It is undisputed the Ocean Boulevard Residence was purchased solely
    by Former Wife, using her own funds, during a period of separation from
    Former Husband (while dissolution proceedings were pending). Pursuant to
    the above provision of the 2006 Agreement, the Ocean Boulevard Residence
    would appear to be properly designated as Former Wife’s “separate
    property.” Nonetheless, Former Husband argues that because they lived
    there as a couple, made it their “marital home,” and Former Wife allowed him
    to spend his own funds to improve the property, the residence should have
    been deemed marital property pursuant to Hooker.
    In Hooker, the trial court determined that certain nonmarital property
    was (pursuant to the terms of a prenuptial agreement), in fact, marital
    property, because the titled spouse intended it to be an interspousal gift. On
    appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court’s determination. See
    11
    Hooker v. Hooker, 
    174 So. 3d 507
     (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).            The Florida
    Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to review the Fourth District’s decision
    based upon our sister court’s pronouncement that the proper appellate
    standard of review was a preponderance of the evidence. The Florida
    Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the proper standard of review on
    appeal when reviewing a trial court’s determination, in a dissolution of
    marriage, of whether a spouse had donative intent to establish that property
    was an interspousal gift subject to equitable distribution is ‘competent
    substantial evidence.’” Hooker, 220 So. 3d at 407.
    Accordingly, the precedential heft of Hooker must necessarily be
    viewed in light of the impetus for the court’s granting review, which was to
    reaffirm the proper standard of review in such cases. We acknowledge that,
    having reaffirmed that proper standard of review, the Court then evaluated
    the factual circumstances of the case and concluded that there was
    competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that
    there was donative intent on the part of the titled spouse. Ultimately, the
    Court held that the Fourth District erred in reversing the trial court’s
    determination that the property was marital property.
    Former Husband relies on Hooker for the proposition that the trial court
    erred in the instant case in designating the property as nonmarital. Former
    12
    Husband’s reliance on Hooker, however, is misplaced.          Hooker did not
    establish any bright-line rule for when property must be designated as marital
    or nonmarital. Such a determination was (before Hooker) and remains (after
    Hooker) a fact-intensive determination. What Hooker did do is reaffirm that
    a trial court’s factual determination on such an issue is to be reviewed for
    competent substantial evidence.
    To that end, and as Former Wife correctly notes, Hooker actually
    undermines Former Husband’s position, because the Florida Supreme Court
    did not “determine” that the property at issue was marital. Instead, the Court
    simply applied the proper standard of review to the facts as found by the trial
    court, concluding the trial court’s findings were supported by competent
    substantial evidence, and held that the Fourth District should have affirmed
    the trial court’s factual finding. This is precisely what Former Wife is urging
    this court to do—to affirm the trial court’s factual findings because they are
    supported by competent substantial evidence presented at trial. Former
    Wife is correct. We note the trial court’s determinations are supported by
    Florida law.
    Hooker is further distinguishable because the “donative intent” on the
    part of the husband in Hooker was not the same as the intent of Former Wife
    in the instant case. While there was evidence presented in support of
    13
    Former Husband’s position, there was also competent substantial evidence
    presented by Former Wife to support the trial court’s finding that Former Wife
    did not intend to gift this property to Former Husband as a marital asset.
    Once again, this court is bound by, and Former Husband is statutorily
    precluded from appealing, the factual findings made by the trial court. Witt,
    
    35 So. 3d at 1040
     (holding that, pursuant to section 44.104(11), an appellate
    court is “bound by the factual findings of the trial resolution judge”). 6
    Former Wife’s Claims
    1) Did the trial court err in failing to include the Stargate Mobile
    Investment in Former Husband’s net worth?
    6
    Even if we were to review this claim under a standard of competent
    substantial evidence, the same result would follow: The couple had marital
    problems for years, and each had their own money and assets. They
    entered into several agreements to deal with the disposition of their property
    and one of those agreements (as discussed supra) expressly defined
    nonmarital property, which definition encompasses the Ocean Boulevard
    Residence. The evidence established that Former Wife bought the Ocean
    Boulevard Residence and title was always held in a land trust, upon the
    advice of her attorney during the prior divorce proceedings. Former Wife
    also spent substantial amounts of her own money on renovations and
    improvements, which she arranged and worked on with the contractors, and
    which were designed to suit her own personal tastes and preferences. There
    was also evidence that Former Husband had offered to buy a one-half
    interest in the Ocean Boulevard Residence while living there, an offer that
    Former Wife rejected. The Florida Supreme Court in Hooker minced no
    words in characterizing an appellate court’s role in these cases: “It is clear,
    due to the trial court’s ‘superior vantage point’ in reviewing and weighing
    testimony and evidence presented at trial, that appellate courts are to defer
    to trial courts’ findings of whether disputed property is marital or nonmarital.”
    Hooker, 220 So. 3d at 404.
    14
    This issue is similar to the one raised by Former Husband and
    discussed supra (Former Husband failed to disclose to Former Wife an
    investment in the Crystal Bay Investment). Here, however, the trial court
    made a factual finding that Former Husband did obtain Former Wife’s oral
    consent before investing money in Stargate Mobile. The parties, and this
    reviewing court, are bound by this factual finding of the trial court.
    Nevertheless, Former Wife contends that a factual finding that she
    orally consented to this investment is insufficient, because the unambiguous
    language of the 2006 Agreement required her prior written consent. As part
    of the 2006 Agreement, the parties agreed that in the event of their divorce,
    Former Husband would pay Former Wife a lump sum of $5.7 million, subject
    to an annual upward or downward adjustment tied to Former Husband’s net
    worth at the time, to be calculated by a financial statement provided to
    Former Wife each year. That same section provides:
    10.3 It is specifically understood that the Husband may utilize
    and liquidate his assets, from time to time, if necessary because
    his income is insufficient, to provide and pay for the ordinary and
    customary support and living expenses of the parties during their
    marriage. However, without the Wife’s prior written consent,
    the Husband shall not transfer, convey, sell, pledge,
    hypothecate, encumber, dissipate, or gift any of his assets unless
    he replaces or substitutes such assets (or lost net value in the
    event, e.g., of an encumbrance) with other assets of equal or
    greater value.
    15
    10.3.1 The foregoing restriction is not intended to deprive the
    Husband from making what he considers to be prudent
    investment decisions. To illustrate, this Agreement is not
    intended to preclude the Husband’s unilateral right to sell, e.g.
    100 shares of stock in a corporation and use the proceeds from
    the sale thereof to purchase stock in another corporation having
    a then equal value. He may not, however, without the Wife’s
    prior written consent, transfer those 100 shares of stock to
    anyone – not a child, not a friend, not in trust or otherwise – as a
    gift. Similarly, if the Husband were to borrow funds encumbering
    one or more of his assets as security therefor, he can unilaterally
    do so provided he uses the borrowed funds to purchase assets
    of equal value to the funds borrowed.
    (Emphasis added).
    Former Husband counters that written consent was not required
    because the terms of the parties’ agreement were altered through their
    course of conduct: Former Wife never provided written consent, preferring
    to defer to her father’s financial acumen and his blessing with regard to
    Former Husband’s choice of investments. In its amended final judgment, the
    trial court found
    the wife had at least tacit knowledge of the investment and while
    her Father didn’t think it was a good investment, there was
    nothing sent to the Husband telling him not to do that investment.
    The Wife even testified that Stargate Mobile was like a Life Alert
    and thought it was a good idea if it could help find dogs.
    Therefore, the $1,700,000 investment will not be added back in
    the Husband’s net worth.
    Thus, the question for this court is whether the trial court properly
    considered the parties’ course of conduct relative to investments by Former
    16
    Husband, or whether it should have followed the plain language of the 2006
    Agreement, which required prior written consent. To the extent this issue
    involves a question of law, such as the interpretation of the contract itself,
    we apply a de novo standard of review. Katz, 305 So. 3d at 663, 666 (Fla.
    3d DCA 2020) (holding that “‘[a] postnuptial agreement is subject to
    interpretation like any other contract,’ and a court's interpretation of a
    contract is subject to de novo review”). Also like any other contract, and as
    previously discussed, “contractual terms may be waived, both expressly and
    implicitly, by the party to whom the term benefits.” Hammond v. DSY Dev.,
    LLC, 
    951 So. 2d 985
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). This includes a contractual
    provision requiring that certain contemplated action first be approved in
    writing. See e.g., Doral Country Club, Inc. v. Curcie Bros., Inc., 
    174 So. 2d 749
     (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Bio-Mass Tech, Inc.,
    
    136 So. 3d 698
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); American Ideal Mgmt., Inc. v. Dale
    Village, Inc., 
    567 So. 2d 497
     (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Holman v. Halford, 
    518 So. 2d 442
     (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
    We conclude that the trial court committed no error of law and that,
    pursuant to section 44.104(11), Former Wife is precluded from appealing the
    trial court’s factual findings underlying this claim. We further note that, under
    17
    our traditional standard of review, the record contains competent substantial
    evidence to support those findings of fact.
    2) Did the trial court err in reimbursing Former Husband for monies he
    spent improving the Ocean Boulevard Residence?
    Although Former Husband claimed an entitlement to much more, the
    trial court awarded him $105,183.18 for monies he spent to improve the
    Ocean Boulevard Residence, expenditures for which he was not obligated
    to pay, and which were not contemplated under the 2006 Agreement.
    Former Wife asserts that the trial court should not have awarded Former
    Husband this amount because she objected to the work he paid for, and
    because the work—which she describes as “landscape improvements”—did
    nothing to increase the value of the home. However, the amount awarded
    by the court was based on calculations made by Former Wife’s own expert,
    and included landscaping, installation of air conditioning, tile, and
    appliances. The Former Wife’s expert testified that these items were “home
    improvements.”
    Although the 2006 Agreement required Former Husband to pay for “all
    the expenses attendant to and associated with such residence(s),” he was
    not required to pay for improvements to her separate property, including the
    Ocean Boulevard Residence. Accordingly, there was no error of law, and
    Former Wife (and this court) are bound by the factual findings of the trial
    18
    court (which are independently supported by competent substantial
    evidence).
    3) Did the trial court err in awarding the Tremblay artwork to Former
    Husband?
    In the 2002 House Agreement, the parties agreed that a particular
    piece of artwork purchased by Former Husband, (“the Tremblay artwork”),
    would be retained as Former Husband’s separate property. However, in the
    2006 Agreement, the parties agreed that Former Wife’s “separate property
    shall include, but not be limited to, all of the artwork, jewelry (excluding the
    Husband’s jewelry), furniture, furnishings, personal property and contents
    currently located in the parties’ marital residence.          It is specifically
    understood that the Wife shall have the sole option to remove any or all of
    the foregoing from the said marital residence upon her vacating the marital
    residence.” (Emphasis added).
    Nonetheless, the trial court awarded the Tremblay artwork to Former
    Husband, finding it was his nonmarital property.        Because this issue is
    resolved upon the plain and unambiguous terms of the 2006 Agreement
    (which superseded the 2002 House Agreement to the extent it modified, or
    was inconsistent with, the 2002 House Agreement) we apply a de novo
    standard in reviewing this claim. Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 
    174 So. 3d 983
    , 986 (Fla. 2015).
    19
    Former Husband contends the Tremblay artwork is his separate
    property under paragraph 7.1.1 of the 2006 Agreement, which provides the
    general definition of “separate property” as “[a]ll property, whether real or
    personal, tangible or intangible, heretofore or now owned by each party.”
    However, such a contention ignores the more specific provision found in
    paragraph 7.3 of that same Agreement, which provides with particularity:
    “The Wife’s separate property shall include, but not be limited to, all of the
    artwork . . . currently located in the parties’ marital residence.”
    It is apodictic that, under contract law, the more specific contractual
    provision controls over the general provision. Papunen v. Bay Nat’l Title Co.,
    
    271 So. 3d 1108
    , 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (observing: “[I]t is a general
    principle of contract interpretation that a specific provision dealing with a
    particular subject will control over a different provision dealing only generally
    with that same subject”) (quoting Kel Homes, LLC v. Burris, 
    933 So. 2d 699
    ,
    703 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Idearc Media Corp. v. M.R. Friedman and G.A.
    Friedman, P.A., 
    985 So. 2d 1159
    , 1161 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (same). Based
    upon this specific provision in the 2006 Agreement, the trial court erred in
    awarding the Tremblay artwork to Former Husband.
    20
    CONCLUSION
    We reverse only that portion of the Final Judgment with directions to
    amend the Final Judgment and award the Tremblay artwork to Former Wife.
    In all other respects, we affirm the thorough Final Judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
    21