Barbara A. Griffin v. United States Postal Service , 480 F. App'x 168 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-1371
    ___________
    BARBARA A. GRIFFIN,
    Appellant
    v.
    U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-01871)
    District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    May 7, 2012
    Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and BARRY, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: May 8, 2012)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    It appears from her complaint and the accompanying documents that Barbara
    Griffin was hired in the 1980s to work as a “manual clerk” in the United States Postal
    Service (“USPS”). About twenty years into Griffin’s employment, USPS directed her to
    begin “working the letter sorting machines on the evening shift.” Griffin felt this new
    position was incompatible with her disability. On the advice of her labor union, Griffin
    stopped reporting to work and requested that USPS provide her with a “light duty”
    position. Because no such position was available, Griffin’s union advised her to seek
    unemployment compensation. The State of New Jersey denied Griffin’s application for
    unemployment benefits because she left USPS voluntarily and without documentation
    that her job “either caused or aggravated [her] medical condition.”
    In April 2011, Griffin, proceeding pro se but not in forma pauperis, filed suit
    against USPS in federal court. The complaint contained two allegations: (1) “When the
    Post Office told the union to tell the employees to go home if they could not comply that
    was out of line”; and (2) “I had a bid job that I was removed from and was to request a
    light duty position, knowing there weren’t any L.D. positions available.” For relief
    Griffin demanded “reinstatement” and “backpay.” Griffin paid the required filing fee and
    was provided with a summons to fill out and serve on USPS. While it appears from
    tracking information provided to the District Court that Griffin mailed something to
    USPS in July 2011, it is not clear that it was her complaint and summons.
    The next entry on the District Court’s docket is a January 6, 2012 order of the
    Clerk, titled “NOTICE OF CALL FOR DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO LOCAL RULE
    41.1(a).” The order explained that, since it had “been pending for more than 120 days
    without any proceeding having been taken therein,” Griffin’s lawsuit would “be
    dismissed on 1/12/2012 AT 10:00 A.M. unless good cause is shown with the filing of an
    affidavit before the return date.” The order explained further that “[i]f said affidavit has
    2
    not been filed before the return date, counsel are required to appear before the Court, to
    show good cause why this action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.”
    Griffin did not comply with the Clerk’s order, and her suit was dismissed without
    prejudice by the District Court on January 24, 2012. The following day, Griffin
    submitted essentially three versions of the same letter (one typed, one hand-written, and
    one a combination of both) to the District Court. She did not acknowledge that her case
    had been dismissed. Instead, she stated that she had returned to work with USPS in
    September 2011. Despite getting her job back, Griffin made clear that her “wish is to be
    made whole,” which, she explained, meant that USPS should compensate her for “All
    wages lost,” “All annual,” and “All holidays.” She also asked that her “401k [be]
    brought up to par.” Two weeks after submitting the letter to the District Court, Griffin
    filed a notice of appeal.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . See Wynder v. McMahon, 
    360 F.3d 73
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We have jurisdiction to consider [a challenge to a Rule 41(b)
    dismissal] because a dismissal without prejudice that does not give leave to amend and
    closes the case is a final, appealable order . . . .”). We review for abuse of discretion a
    District Court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) or, as was the case here, one of its
    local counterparts. See Doe v. Megless, 
    654 F.3d 404
    , 411 (3d Cir. 2011).
    We will uphold the District Court’s decision on the ground that Griffin “refused to
    proceed in accordance with the District Court’s orders.” 
    Id. at 411
    ; cf. Guyer v. Beard,
    
    907 F.2d 1424
    , 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[Plaintiff’s] position made adjudication of the case
    3
    impossible. Therefore, any lesser sanction would not have furthered the interests of
    justice.”). The District Court’s docket reveals that Griffin made no effort to prosecute her
    case between the time she filed her complaint and the date her case was dismissed, a span
    of almost ten months. In Griffin’s pro se brief she states that she “was not aware of the
    fact that after winning my case I was suppose[d] to notify the courts.” Griffin does not
    explain what case she “won” and we thus fail to grasp the significance of her statement.
    In any event, Griffin does not claim that she never received the January 6, 2012
    order of the District Court Clerk, which should have put her on notice that her lawsuit
    was in jeopardy of being dismissed. Griffin did not file an affidavit with the District
    Court in order to excuse her failure to prosecute, nor did she appear before the District
    Court on January 12, 2012, to do so. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 
    538 F.3d 252
    , 258 (3d Cir.
    2008) (“[A] pro se plaintiff is responsible for his failure to attend a pretrial conference or
    otherwise comply with a court’s orders.”). There is also no clear evidence that Griffin
    ever served her complaint on USPS.
    Given these particular facts, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court
    to dismiss Griffin’s case without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Accordingly, the
    judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1371

Citation Numbers: 480 F. App'x 168

Judges: Barry, Chagares, Per Curiam, Vanaskie

Filed Date: 5/8/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023