Frank Brett v. Ken Brett , 503 F. App'x 130 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • CLD-031                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 12-3301
    ___________
    FRANK BRETT,
    Appellant
    v.
    KEN BRETT; NANCY SALTER;
    BILL NAULTY; NANCY NAULTY
    ____________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 1:12-cv-02929)
    District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Summary Action
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    November 2, 2012
    Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: November 8, 2012)
    _________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Frank Brett, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District
    Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will
    summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
    Because we primarily write for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary
    for our discussion. In his complaint, Brett alleges that Appellees opened his mail,
    obstructed his correspondence, “tipped off” various defendants in other lawsuits, and
    interfered with bank accounts at various banks. According to Brett, Appellees Bill and
    Nancy Naulty opened two letters addressed to Brett from the District Court, read the
    contents of these letters, and “tipped off” an insurance professional and various
    individuals who Brett alleges have been slandering him. He further argues that Appellee
    Nancy Salter opened his mail from Citizens Bank and Alliance Bank and then gave out
    his Social Security number. Finally, Brett alleges that Appellee Ken Brett opened his
    mail from a federal case pending in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and mail from various
    banks. 1
    Brett filed his complaint on May 16, 2012, asserting that the District Court had
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1702
    . On June 18, 2012, the District Court granted
    Brett permission to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered that Brett’s complaint be
    dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend within twenty days. On July 17, 2012,
    the District Court dismissed Brett’s complaint with prejudice because he had not filed an
    1
    Although Brett’s complaint is approximately forty-one pages long, only the first seven
    pages appear to contain any factual statements. The majority of the remaining thirty-four
    pages consist of a long list of a series of letters and numbers, interspersed with random
    2
    amended complaint pursuant to the District Court’s June 18, 2012 order. Brett then
    timely filed this appeal.
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and exercise
    plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir. 2000). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
    state a claim pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a
    complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See 
    id.
     To survive
    dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
    claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009)
    (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). We look for
    “‘enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’
    the necessary elements” of a claim for relief. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
    515 F.3d 224
    , 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 556
    ). We may summarily affirm
    on any basis supported by the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 
    650 F.3d 246
    , 247 (3d Cir.
    2011) (per curiam).
    We concur with the District Court’s conclusion that Brett’s complaint failed to
    establish subject matter jurisdiction. For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction
    over an action, the parties must be citizens of different states and the amount in
    controversy must exceed $75,000. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a)(1). Citizenship of a natural
    names of individuals, business, and vehicle makes and models. Like the District Court,
    we cannot discern any sufficient explanation for the necessity of these pages.
    3
    person is determined by the state of his or her domicile. See Swiger v. Allegheny
    Energy, Inc., 
    540 F.3d 179
    , 182 (3d Cir. 2008). However, complete diversity is lacking
    when the plaintiff is a citizen of one state and a defendant is a citizen of that same state.
    See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 
    592 F.3d 412
    , 420 (3d Cir. 2010). Here,
    Brett noted his domicile as Pennsylvania, and he listed Appellee Nancy Salter as a
    resident of Havertown, Pennsylvania. Therefore, we concur with the District Court’s
    observation that Brett’s complaint does not establish diversity jurisdiction.
    Federal courts also have subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising
    under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , but
    “federal courts have federal question jurisdiction only when a federal claim appears in the
    complaint,” Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 
    402 F.3d 156
    , 162 (3d Cir. 2005)
    (citation omitted). Here, Brett has alleged jurisdiction pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1702
    ,
    which states:
    Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or
    any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier,
    or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the
    custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the
    person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence,
    or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes,
    embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or
    imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
    However, criminal statutes do not give rise to civil liability. See Andrews v. Heaton, 
    483 F.3d 1070
    , 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 
    464 F.3d 1044
    , 1048
    (9th Cir. 2006). Brett does not allege any further violations of federal law for which he
    4
    can assert a civil action, and so we concur with the District Court that Brett’s complaint
    does not establish federal question jurisdiction. 2
    For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm
    the judgment of the District Court. See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Accordingly, we
    deny Brett’s motion to add District Judge Hillman as a defendant and to file this appeal
    under seal, 3 his motion to add evidence, and his amended motion to add District Judge
    Hillman as a defendant.
    2
    To the extent that Brett’s complaint alleged claims of slander, we further note that the
    District Court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See
    Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 
    261 F.3d 927
    , 935 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If there is no ‘original
    jurisdiction,’ there can be no supplemental jurisdiction either, for there is no jurisdiction
    to which supplemental jurisdiction can attach.”).
    3
    Under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 106.1, a motion to seal “must explain the basis for sealing and
    specify the desired duration of the sealing order.” Brett’s motion does neither;
    regardless, we discern no basis for ordering this appeal sealed.
    5