Johnson v. Blaine , 114 F. App'x 521 ( 2004 )

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-13-2004
Johnson v. Blaine
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-3244
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Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. Blaine" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 86.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 03-3244
TERRELL B. JOHNSON,
Appellant
v.
CONNER BLAINE, Superintendent of the State Correctional
Institute of Greene; *GERALD J. PAPPERT, Attorney General
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
*(Amended Pursuant to Rule 43(c), F.R.A.P.)
_____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of PA
(D.C. No. 02-cv-00385)
Trial Judge: Francis X. Caiazza, Magistrate
Argued on September 28, 2004
Before: ROTH, BARRY and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2004)
Thomas N. Farrell, Esquire (Argued)
210 Grant Street, Suite 401
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellant
Ronald M. Wabby, Jr., Esquire (Argued)
Office of District Attorney
401 Allegheny County Courthouse
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellees
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge.
In June 1995, Terrell B. Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and he was
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied allocatur. Johnson filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Court of
Common Pleas for Allegheny County under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”). 42 P A. C ONS. S TAT. § 9541 (2004) (last amended Apr. 13, 1988). In his
petition, Johnson claimed that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment because his trial counsel failed to call several witnesses
at trial. Johnson also claimed that counsel did not adequately cross-examine the
prosecution’s main witness. The Court of Common Pleas granted Johnson’s petition and
ordered a new trial. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed, and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court reversed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again denied Johnson’s
petition for allocatur.
2
Johnson then filed a writ of federal habeas corpus in the District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the writ, Johnson
made similar ineffective assistance of counsel claims.1 Pursuant to the Magistrate’s Act,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2004), the District Court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge
for a Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge, in his Report and
Recommendation, found that Johnson did not meet the burdens created by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and
required federal habeas courts to give great deference to state court decisions. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation and denied Johnson’s writ. Johnson appealed.
The District Court had jurisdiction over the initial writ of federal habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241, and 2254. Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294,
303 (3d Cir. 2004). We have jurisdiction over the appeal by virtue of its grant of the
certificate of appealability and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Id.For substantially the reasons articulated in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
1
Specifically, Johnson claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed
to call witnesses, failed to adequately cross-examine the prosecution’s main witness, and
failed to adequately investigate the crime scene, and that even if these trial counsel errors
individually did not amount to ineffectiveness of counsel, the cumulative effect of these
errors considered together did amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
3