Bhagat v. Hettche , 137 F. App'x 507 ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-30-2005
Bhagat v. Hettche
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-2056
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Recommended Citation
"Bhagat v. Hettche" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 939.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/939
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-2056
________________
RAM B. BHAGAT,
Appellant
v.
*L. RAYMOND HETTCHE; THOMAS DONNELLAN;
MAURICE AMATEAU; PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY
*(Amended per Clerk's Order of June 17, 2004)
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 02-cv-02256)
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
JUNE 22, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY AND FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: June 30, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Ram B. Bhagat, appeals from the District Court’s order granting the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will
affirm.
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we will only briefly revisit them here.
Bhagat was employed as a research scientist by The Pennsylvania State University (“Penn
State”) at the Applied Research Laboratory (“ARL”) from March 1, 1984 until March 21,
2001, when his employment was terminated. In December 2002, he filed a complaint,
which was later amended, against ARL Director Raymond Hettche; ARL Associate
Director of Materials and Manufacturing, Dr. Thomas Donnellan; his immediate
supervisor, Dr. Maurice Amateau; and Penn State. Bhagat alleged that the Defendants
violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(“Title VII”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 955
(“PHRA”), by creating a hostile work environment and terminating his employment
because of his national origin or in retaliation for his discrimination complaints. He also
claimed his termination was a violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted.
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s order granting the motion for summary judgment. See
Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir.
1993). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if our review reveals that “there is
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no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “We review the facts in the light
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered.” Coolspring,
10 F.3d at 146.
National origin discrimination claims are analyzed under the framework set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).1 A plaintiff is first required
to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med.,
Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000). If a prima facie case is established, the defendant
can provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
See id. at 319. If the defendant proffers such a reason, the plaintiff is required to show
that it was a pretext for unlawful discrimination in order to prevail. See id.
Here, the Defendants asserted that they had a non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action, and they submitted several affidavits that supported their
assertion that Bhagat’s employment was terminated as a result of his insubordination and
failure to report to his supervisors. Although Bhagat disputed the Defendants’ allegations
and submitted his own affidavit, he failed to provide any evidence that would show that
the Defendants’ explanations were pretextual. We agree with the District Court that
Bhagat failed to show that he could satisfy his burden of proving discrimination.
Defendants thus were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims.
1
The analysis for adjudicating a claim under the PHRA is identical to a Title VII
inquiry. Jones v. School Dist. Of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).
3
The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants
as to the hostile work environment claim, as well; Bhagat failed to provide evidence of
pervasive and regular discrimination based on national origin. See Abramson v. William
Paterson College, 260 F.3d 265, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2001). Defendants were entitled to
judgment as to the claim of retaliation because Bhagat failed to submit evidence that
could establish a causal connection between his prior discrimination complaints and
Defendants’ decision to terminate his employment. See Abramson, 260 F.3d at 286.
Bhagat’s First and Fourteenth amendment claims lack merit for the reasons stated by the
District Court.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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