Spagnol-Bastos v. Garland ( 2021 )

Case: 20-60139 Document: 00516117005 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/03/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 3, 2021
No. 20-60139
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Manoel Jose Spagnol-Bastos,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A077 692 312
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Jones and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Border Patrol agents apprehended and detained Manoel Spagnol-
Bastos after he illegally entered this country. The next day, immigration
officials released Spagnol-Bastos on bond and ordered him to provide an
address at which the government could contact him regarding his removal
hearing. He provided a deficient address and, as a result, did not receive
notice of his removal hearing and failed to appear for it. An immigration
court ordered him removed in absentia. Almost eighteen years later, he filed
a motion to reopen the removal proceedings and to rescind the removal order
on the basis that he never received notice of the proceedings. The
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immigration judge denied his motion, holding that Spagnol-Bastos forfeited
his right to notice by failing to provide a viable address. The Board of
Immigration Appeals affirmed. This court DENIES the petition for review.
Background
Twenty years ago, Manoel Spagnol-Bastos, a Brazilian citizen, waded
across the Rio Grande into Texas. Border Patrol agents apprehended him
and took him into custody. Immigration and Naturalization Service officers
served him with a notice to appear (NTA), charging him as a removable alien
not admitted or paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
Among other things, the NTA advised Spagnol-Bastos that he must
provide immigration officials with a current mailing address so the
government could contact him regarding his impending removal hearing.
Failure to do so carried a heavy penalty: If Spagnol-Bastos did not keep the
government apprised of his mailing address, then the government need not
give Spagnol-Bastos notice of his removal hearing. And if he did not show
up, then the immigration court must order him removed in absentia. Spagnol-
Bastos acknowledged on the NTA that immigration officials gave him oral
notice, in his native language, of the consequences of failing to appear. The
NTA did not say when the hearing would occur, but it told Spagnol-Bastos
that he needed to appear at a time and date “to be set.”
Immigration officials released Spagnol-Bastos on bond the next day.
On his way out the door, Spagnol-Bastos allegedly told immigration officials
that his address would be “102-169 F Apt 3C, Manhaion N.Y. N.Y. 10029.”
A week later, an immigration official sent a Form I-830 with that information
to the immigration court so the court could send Spagnol-Bastos notice of his
hearing. Soon after, the immigration court mailed a notice of hearing to the
address. But Spagnol-Bastos had given the government a deficient address
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and, as a result, the United States Postal Service returned the hearing notice
as “unclaimed.” Spagnol-Bastos did not attend his hearing and the
immigration judge ordered him removed in absentia. The court also mailed
Spagnol-Bastos a copy of that removal order, but it, too, went undelivered.
About eighteen years later, Spagnol-Bastos moved to reopen his
removal proceedings and to rescind the in absentia removal order on the basis
that he did not receive actual written or oral notice of his removal hearing.
He supported his motion with an affidavit stating that he gave immigration
officials a different address than the one listed on the Form I-830, namely,
“169 East 102nd Street, #3C, New York, 10029.” He confirmed that he lived
at that address for several years and never received any communication from
the immigration court about his hearing. The immigration officer writing the
address on the Form I-830, he asserted, “made an error and mistook 169 East
102 Street for 102-169, and Manhattan for Manhaion.”
The immigration judge denied Spagnol-Bastos’s motion to reopen his
removal proceedings and to rescind his in absentia removal order. Critically,
the immigration judge rejected Spagnol-Bastos’s affidavit testimony as
untrustworthy and, citing the Form I-830, found that the “hearing notice was
mailed to [Spagnol-Bastos] at the address he provided for himself to DHS.”
Thus, the immigration judge concluded, any failure to receive notice is
attributable to Spagnol-Bastos’s failure to “keep the Court apprised of his
correct mailing address.” Moreover, the immigration judge found that there
was “no showing, or even contention, that [Spagnol-Bastos] notified” the
immigration court “of his correct address on or before” the hearing date.
Spagnol-Bastos appealed to the BIA. He argued that the immigration
judge erred by relying on the Form I-830 to find that Spagnol-Bastos had not
given his correct address to immigration officials because there was no
evidence indicating he was aware of the error. “The only rational and
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common-sense explanation” for the address on the Form I-830, he argued,
“is that the officer either misunderstood the address or else made a mistake
in the transcription (and if the address he was given was so plainly incorrect,
he should’ve asked [Spagnol-Bastos] to correct it by providing a correct
street address).” Furthermore, in light of Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105(2018), Spagnol-Bastos argued that his removal order should be vacated for
lack of jurisdiction because the NTA failed to specify the date and time of his
hearing and that he is therefore eligible for cancellation of removal.
The BIA dismissed the appeal, adopting the immigration judge’s
decision. It reasoned that “rescission of an in absentia order is not warranted
where the alien did not receive notice of a removal hearing due to the alien’s
failure to provide the Immigration Court with a correct address.” Moreover,
the BIA rejected Spagnol-Bastos’s new argument that he was eligible for
cancellation under Pereira, as it held that the notice of hearing sent to the
address Spagnol-Bastos provided triggered the stop-time rule, even if the
original NTA did not. Spagnol-Bastos now petitions this court for review.
Standard of Review
A motion to reopen removal proceedings is disfavored. Mauricio-
Benitez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 2018). This court applies “a
highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing” those motions.
Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 2017). Thus, this
court must affirm the BIA’s decision unless it is “capricious, irrational,
utterly without foundation in the evidence, based on legally erroneous
interpretations of statutes or regulations, or based on unexplained departures
from regulations or established policies.” Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder,
772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014). The court reviews questions of law de
novo and findings of fact using the substantial evidence test, under which the
court does not overturn factual findings “unless the evidence compels a
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contrary conclusion.” Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). Finally, this court focuses its review on the BIA’s
order but may also review the immigration judge’s underlying decision where
it influenced the BIA’s opinion. Hernandez-Castillo, 875 F.3d at 204.
Discussion
Spagnol-Bastos makes two arguments in his petition for review. He
contends that the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the immigration
judge’s order denying his motion to reopen, and the BIA erred in concluding
that he is prima facie ineligible for cancellation of removal. We consider each
argument.
A.
Spagnol-Bastos argues that the BIA abused its discretion by
concluding that he forfeited his right to notice of the court hearing because
he failed to correct an address error unknown to him and by failing to
adequately consider his affidavit testimony. Neither argument is persuasive. 1
An alien subject to removal proceedings is generally entitled to a
written notice that, among other things, specifies the time and place of the
removal proceedings and the consequences for failing to appear for those
proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). Failing to appear at removal
proceedings carries a severe penalty: An immigration court must order
removal in absentia of an absent alien who received written notice if the
government “establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
the written notice was so provided and that the alien is removable.”
1
The parties also dispute whether Spagnol-Bastos needed to notify the
immigration court of his new address independently of INS officials. To the extent that the
government’s position is that Spagnol-Bastos forfeited his right to notice by notifying INS
officials but not the immigration court, it lacks merit.
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§ 1229a(b)(5)(A). The government satisfies its burden of showing notice if
it mails notice to the “most recent address provided [by the alien] under
section 1229(a)(1)(F),” § 1229a(b)(5)(A), which is an address “at which the
alien may be contacted respecting” the removal proceedings,
§ 1229(a)(1)(F). If the alien fails to provide such an address, however, then
“[n]o written notice shall be required.” § 1229a(b)(5)(B).
After an immigration court orders an alien removed in absentia, the
alien may request that the removal proceedings be reopened to rescind the
removal order. Absent exceptional circumstances, an immigration court may
not rescind an in absentia removal order unless the alien “demonstrates that
[he] did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section
1229(a).” § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). An alien who forfeits his right to notice by
failing to provide a viable mailing address cannot seek to reopen the removal
proceedings and rescind the in absentia removal order for lack of notice. See
Mauricio-Benitez, 908 F.3d at 149; Hernandez-Castillo, 875 F.3d at 205.
Here, the immigration judge rejected Spagnol-Bastos’s affidavit
testimony as untrustworthy and found that Spagnol-Bastos provided
immigration officials with a deficient address. Substantial evidence supports
that factual finding and, as a result, this court may not disturb it. Because
Spagnol-Bastos failed to provide “an address . . . at which [he] may be
contacted respecting” the removal proceedings, § 1229(a)(1)(f), he forfeited
his right to notice under § 1229a(b)(5)(B) and therefore may not now seek to
reopen his removal proceedings and rescind the removal order. The
immigration judge and the BIA did not abuse their discretion by so
concluding.
Moreover, the immigration judge and the BIA did not abuse their
discretion by failing to adequately consider Spagnol-Bastos’s affidavit
testimony. Spagnol-Bastos concedes that the immigration judge
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acknowledged his affidavit testimony but argues that the judge simply
overlooked its contents, highlighting the judge’s statement that “there [was]
no showing, or even any contention, that [Spagnol-Bastos] notified [the
immigration court] of his correct address at any time on or before” the
removal hearing date. Spagnol-Bastos, however, misunderstands the import
of that statement. Before making it, the immigration judge implicitly rejected
Spagnol-Bastos’s affidavit testimony as not credible and concluded that the
NTA “was mailed to [Spagnol-Bastos] at the address he provided for himself
to DHS, which is 102-169 F Apt 3C, Manhaion, NY 10029.” The
immigration judge also noted that “there is proof of attempted delivery of the
hearing notice to the last address provided by” Spagnol-Bastos. Thus, when
the immigration judge said “there [was] no showing, or even any contention,
that [Spagnol-Bastos] notified this Court of his correct address,” the judge is
stating that Spagnol-Bastos failed to show that he provided the immigration
court with his correct address at any time after providing the faulty address.
The immigration judge and the BIA did not fail to consider Spagnol-Bastos’s
affidavit; they failed to find it credible.
B.
The BIA also did not err in concluding that Spagnol-Bastos is prima
facie ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Attorney General may cancel
the removal of “an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United
States” if, among other things, the alien “has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years.”
§ 1229b(b)(1). An alien’s continuous presence accrual is stopped “when the
alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” § 1229b(d)(1).
At the BIA, Spagnol-Bastos argued that his NTA was inadequate
under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), because it failed to mention
the date and time of his hearing. The BIA rejected that argument, reasoning
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that subsequent service of a document indicating the date and time of a
hearing cured any defect with the original NTA. In his opening brief to this
court, Spagnol-Bastos conceded that this court’s precedent foreclosed his
cancellation of removal argument and he did not present any affirmative
argument for why he is prima facie eligible for cancellation.
After the parties completed briefing in this court, the Supreme Court
decided Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), holding that the stop-
time rule is triggered only when the government serves the alien with a single
notice containing all of the information listed in § 1229(a). Id. at 1480. Six
months later, Spagnol-Bastos submitted a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter
drawing this court’s attention to the decision in Niz-Chavez and another
precedential decision from this court, Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F.4th 351 (5th
Cir. 2021), which addressed the effects of Niz-Chavez upon in absentia
removals. Relying on Niz-Chavez and Rodriguez, Spagnol-Bastos now
contends that he satisfies the continuous presence requirement for
cancellation of removal because the government never served him with a
single notice containing the information listed in § 1229(a). 2
Spagnol-Bastos failed to analyze the cancellation of removal theory in
a meaningful way in his opening brief. Thus, the argument is forfeited.
Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 776 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000). It is of no
consequence that then-valid Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed his
cancellation argument at the time he submitted his opening brief because that
argument was nonetheless available to him. Indeed, two sister circuits had
already rejected the two-step notice theory. Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
2
Spagnol-Bastos’s reliance on Rodriguez is misplaced because, unlike Spagnol-
Bastos, Rodriguez provided immigration authorities with a viable mailing address and
therefore did not forfeit his right to notice under § 1229a(b)(5)(B). Rodriguez, 15 F.4th at
353.
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935 F.3d 1148, 1152-53 (11th Cir. 2019); Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956,
962 (7th Cir. 2019).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Spagnol-Bastos’s petition for review is
DENIED.
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