Thomas Gage v. State of NJ , 408 F. App'x 622 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-2889
___________
THOMAS I. GAGE,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-02603)
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 24, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 26, 2010 )
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OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
The District Court sua sponte dismissed Thomas I. Gage’s complaint as
deficient under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Concluding that the
District Court’s dismissal was not an abuse of its discretion, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court.
I.
On May 20, 2010, Gage paid the $350 filing fee to initiate this civil action
against the State of New Jersey in federal court. Gage’s complaint contained generalized
allegations of corruption and treason against various local and state government officials.
In addition, Gage alleged that his real property was slated to be sold at a sheriff’s auction,
in violation of his federal due process rights. He thus requested, inter alia, that the
District Court “enforce a void on all of Judge Fred H. Kumpf’s unlawful court orders
against me, our property and my business company, Infinity Builders, Inc,” and that “all
the state authorities who have warred [sic] against the United States Constitution in this
case . . . be punish[ed] by a sentence of incarceration.” Gage attached to his complaint
the sheriff’s sale notice, indicating that Wells Fargo (the mortgagee) was going to
effectuate the sale of Gage’s property on June 8, 2010. 1
On June 11, 2010, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Gage’s complaint
without prejudice, concluding that it did not comply with the pleading requirement of
Rule 8(a)(2). Specifically, the District Court stated that the complaint’s allegations “are
the typical ‘unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations[s]’ not
permitted under the federal pleading standards,” (Dist. Ct. order at 2) (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)), and that “in light of Plaintiff’s allegations, it
appears that Defendant State of New Jersey is not the proper defendant.” Id. Gage
1
According to Gage, the sale did not take place until July 6, 2010, and he was
given until July 16, 2010, to lodge formal objections.
1
appealed and sought a temporary restraining order to block the sheriff’s sale of his real
property. 2
II.
We must first consider our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The District
Court dismissed Gage’s complaint without prejudice, and the general rule is that “an
order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor appealable.”
Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). However,
“[i]f the plaintiff cannot cure the defect that led to dismissal or elects to stand on the
dismissed complaint . . . we have held that the order of dismissal [without prejudice] is
final and appealable.” Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1991); see also
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995). Since Gage has elected to
stand on his complaint, see Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192-93 (3d Cir.
2007), we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III.
Because the District Court dismissed Gage’s complaint as insufficiently
pled under Rule 8, our review is for abuse of discretion. See In re Westinghouse Sec.
Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 1996). That standard is highly deferential; an abuse of
discretion will be found when a District Court’s decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”
2
We denied Gage’s request for a temporary restraining order, as well as his
subsequent request for reconsideration.
2
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). We find no such
errors in this case.
“Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need present only a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” In re
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., --- F.3d ---, 2010 WL 3211147, at *6 (3d Cir. Aug. 16,
2010, Nos. 07-4046, 08-1455, 08-1777) (citations and quotations omitted). “That is to
say, there must be some showing sufficient to justify moving the case beyond the
pleadings to the next stage of litigation.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
234-35 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.
2010) (“For cases governed only by Rule 8, it is not necessary to stack up inferences side
by side and allow the case to go forward only if the plaintiff’s inferences seem more
compelling that the opposing inferences.”).
Gage’s claims are rooted in a real property dispute in Warren County, New
Jersey. (Pet. Br. at 15) (“The true matter of the fact [sic] is that for the last 12 years I
have been trying to resolve some issues about my property, Block 86.01, Lot 18.”). 3
While much of the complaint can be fairly characterized as a meandering diatribe, it does
3
In a prior suit, the District Court summarized Gage’s claims as follows: “Gage
alleges . . that he has been the ‘victim of property discrimination,’ arising from his ill-
fated attempts to subdivide his residential property in an effort to make the property more
marketable.” Gage v. Twp. of Warren, DC Civ. No. 09-519, p. 1 (D.N.J. June 10, 2009).
3
include an allegation by Gage that “[t]he Superior Court of Somerset court House in State
of New Jersey, have order the Sheriff of Somerset County to deprive us of our property,
by a pending sale without due process of law . . .” (errors and emphasis in original). And,
as noted above, Gage appended the sheriff’s sale notice to his complaint.
The critical inquiry on appeal is, then, whether Gage’s complaint should
have been deemed compliant with Rule 8(a)(2), to the extent it could be construed as
attempting to raise a procedural due process claim concerning the alleged deprivation of a
protected property interest. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir.
2008) (“To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a litigant must show (1) that the
state deprived him of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property and (2) that the
deprivation occurred without due process of law.”). We answer in the negative, and
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed
the complaint. Even construed liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam), there is too little factual matter in Gage’s complaint “to justify moving the
case beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35.
Moreover, the factual matter that is present “is so undeveloped that it does not provide
[the] defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Id. at 232.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. We do not
consider Gage’s motion for appointment of counsel, as he did not file a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis in connection with that motion and there is no statutory basis for
4
entertaining his motion other than 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Gage’s motion for
“emergency stay” is denied.
5