Johnson v. State of NJ , 134 F. App'x 507 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-19-2005
    Johnson v. State of NJ
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-1416
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005
    Recommended Citation
    "Johnson v. State of NJ" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1153.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1153
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    BPS-222                                                     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    NO. 05-1416
    ________________
    MARK E. JOHNSON,
    Appellant
    v.
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES; TOWNSHIP OF
    LONG HILL MUNICIPAL COURT; JUDGE JAMES D. BRIDE; BRIDGEWATER
    TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL COURT; JUDGE ROBERT J. FOLEY; OFFICER PETER
    OCHS; SUMMIT MUNICIPAL COURT; JUDGE DONALD P. BOGOSIAN; FAR
    HILLS BOROUGH MUNICIPAL COURT; JUDGE ROBERT K. HORNBY; OFFICER
    JOSEPH DILLION; MORRIS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; SUPERIOR
    COURT OF NEW JERSEY, LAW DIVISION SPECIAL CIVIL PART; JUDGE
    RONALD B. GRAVES; CARMEN J. LIUZZA, JR.; DEPARTMENT OF THE
    TREASURY, DIVISION OF TAXATION; BEDMINSTER POLICE DEPARTMENT;
    OFFICER TOM FINNERTY; MICHAEL DECAROLIS, OFFICER; FAR HILLS
    BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT; JAMES H. HUNDLEY; H & R BLOCK, INC.;
    BRIDGEWATER TOWNSHIP POLICE OFFICER PETER OCHS; HONORABLE
    ROBERT J. FOLEY, JUDGE OF BRIDGEWATER TOWNSHIP MUNICIPAL
    COURT; DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
    JAMES H. HUNDLEY
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-2320)
    District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    APRIL 21, 2005
    Before: RENDELL, FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: May 19, 2005)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Mark E. Johnson appeals from the dismissal of his complaint against a
    number of New Jersey state, municipal, and private actors. The appeal is frivolous, and
    we will dismiss pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i).
    On September 21, 2004, Johnson filed an amended complaint with the District
    Court. The complaint lists a number of defendants, the majority of whom are involved in
    separate unrelated incidents. On December 15, 2004, the District Court issued an order to
    show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction. Johnson failed to respond. By order entered January 24, 2005, the District
    Court dismissed the action.1 Johnson then brought this appeal.
    We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of the complaint. See Marran v.
    Marran, 
    376 F.3d 143
    , 149 (3d Cir. 2004); Kilkenny v. Guy C. Long, Inc., 
    288 F.3d 116
    ,
    119 (3d Cir. 2002). To the extent Johnson appeals from the dismissal of his claims
    relating to income tax, we do not agree that Flast v. Cohen, 
    392 U.S. 83
     (1968), is
    dispositive. Flast bars taxpayer standing where the plaintiff challenges a particular
    federal government spending program subject to extremely limited exceptions. 
    Id.
     at
    1
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    2
    101-03. Johnson, inversely, challenges the collection of income tax generally, by both the
    United States and New Jersey. Even so, the appeal is completely lacking in legal merit.
    The collection of income tax has long been deemed constitutional and arguments to the
    contrary will not succeed. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. amend XVI; see also
    Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n of Mississipi, 
    286 U.S. 276
    , 279-80 (1932) (discussing
    the basis for state income tax).
    To the extent Johnson seeks what amounts to an appeal from his motor vehicle
    fines and convictions, he is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobile
    Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. __, 
    2005 WL 711586
    , * 5-7 (Mar. 30, 2005).
    To the extent Johnson does not seek to appeal his convictions, but rather challenges a
    policy or procedure which is not an apparent appeal from the underlying judgment, he
    either fails to state a claim or is barred. Specifically, with respect to each judicial
    defendant, an appeal is frivolous because judges receive absolute judicial immunity for
    actions performed in or related to their judicial role. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania, 
    211 F.3d 760
    , 768-69 (3d Cir. 2000).
    Johnson’s Fourth Amendment claims against numerous police officers suffer from
    a similar defect. Police are afforded qualified immunity in the performance of their jobs.
    See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 818 (1982). Johnson fails to allege that any of
    the officers violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
    reasonable person would have known.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). His remaining claims are
    3
    unintelligible. Johnson did not attempt to clarify his pleadings in the District Court, nor
    does he present any arguments from which we can infer his intent on appeal.
    For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we will dismiss.
    4