Frompovicz v. Schuylkill , 130 F. App'x 580 ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
5-11-2005
Frompovicz v. Schuylkill
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-1934
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"Frompovicz v. Schuylkill" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 1211.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 04-1934
___________
STANLEY F. FROMPROVICZ, JR., t/a;
Far Away Springs; CAROL FROMPOVICZ, t/a Far Away
Springs; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Trustee for the
Estate of Steven Girard,
Appellants
v.
COUNTY OF SCHUYLKILL; SCHUYLKILL COUNTY ZONING HEARING
BOARD; SCHUYLKILL COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION; JOHN SMYTHE;
MICHAEL CHICKERSKY; DANIEL DAUB; JOHN HUDAK, Zoning Officer,
Schuylkill County; CHARLES ROSS, Director, Schuylkill County
Planning Commission; FORREST SHADLE, Schuylkill County
Commissioner; EDWARD D. BARKET, Schuylkill County
Commissioner; FRANK STAUDENMEIR, Schuylkill County
Commissioner; JERRY KNOWLES, Schuylkill County Commissioner;
PAUL DATTE, Assistant Solicitor, County of Schuylkill; JAMES
L. LEWIS, Former Solicitor, Schuylkill County Zoning
Hearing Board; CHRISTOPHER HOBBS, Solicitor, Schuylkill
County Zoning Hearing Board; MARY KAY BERNOSKY, Solicitor,
Schuylkill County Planning and Zoning Department; JOSEPH
JONES, Solicitor, County of Schuylkill
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-01039)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on January 13, 2005
Before: ROTH, CHERTOFF,* Circuit Judges, IRENAS,** District Judge.
(Filed: May 11, 2005 )
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge
In 2001, Stanley and Carol Frompovicz bought a property known as the
Brandonville Industrial Park, which has been zoned CR (conservation residential) and R3
(high density residential) since 1996. Trading as Far Away Springs, the Frompoviczes
lease 800 acres of water removal rights from an adjacent property owned by the Girard
Estate. On their property, they seek to start and run a spring water extraction and bottling
business.
In pursuit of their goal, the Frompoviczes filed various applications for land use
and zoning approval. As set forth in more detail in the District Court’s opinion, they
sought permission to encapsulate springs, install piping, collect, remove, and deliver
water, and load trucks. Additionally, they proposed a residential subdivision plan. All of
their applications were denied, and any decision appealed to the County Zoning Hearing
*
Judge Chertoff resigned after this case was submitted to the panel but before this
opinion was filed. The opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d)
(2005).
**
Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, United States District Judge for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation.
2
Board was affirmed. Further appeals of the zoning decisions remain pending before the
Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas (“Court of Common Pleas”).
Additionally, in January 2002, also in the Court of Common Pleas, the
Frompoviczes sought a declaration that an earlier industrial zoning classification of their
property still applied. However, the Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment
in favor of Schuylkill County, ruling that the Frompoviczes took title of Brandonville
Industrial Park subject to the CR and R3 zoning classifications in place since 1996. The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Court of Common Pleas’ decision in
June 2004.
The Frompoviczes and the City of Philadelphia, as Trustee for the Girard Estate,
brought six claims in the suit before the District Court. Specifically, they claimed
violations of their substantive and procedural due process rights, a conspiracy to deny due
process rights, municipal liability for civil rights violations, taking without just
compensation, and third party interference with business relationship.
The District Court relied on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (derived from Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)) to dismiss the substantive due process claim for lack of
jurisdiction. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(1). The District Court dismissed the rest of the
federal claims for failure to state a claim, and then chose not to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6); 28 U.S.C. §
3
1367(c) (2005). The Frompoviczes and the City of Philadelphia appeal from the District
Court’s order.1
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The standard of review of
the dismissals pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is plenary. See Gould Electronics,
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d
217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). The dismissal of the state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cf. DeAscencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342
F.3d 301, 311 (3d Cir. 2003).
Appellants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar consideration of
their substantive due process claim. The Supreme Court recently clarified the contours of
Rooker-Feldman, explaining that the doctrine deprives the lower federal courts of
jurisdiction only in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., No. 03-1696, 2005 WL 711586, at *4, 2005 U.S. LEXIS
2929, at *10 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2005). Rooker-Feldman does not prevent a district court
from hearing a suit in which a party is attempting to litigate in federal court claims
previously brought in state court. See id. at 2005 WL 711586 at *8, 2005 U.S. LEXIS at
1
Appellants do not appeal the dismissal of their procedural due process or takings
claims; therefore, these claims are waived. See Warren G. ex rel. Tom G. v. Cumberland
County Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999).
4
*27-8. “If a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a
legal conclusion that a state court reached in a case to which he was a party ..., then there
is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of
preclusion.’” See id. (citations omitted). In the District Court, at least some aspects of
Appellants’ substantive due process claim overlaps with claims filed on behalf of Far
Away Springs in Pennsylvania state court. The overlap, and Pennsylvania state court
rulings on the zoning and land use issues, may preclude Appellants’ success on the merits
in District Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2005); however, they do not prevent the District
Court from considering Appellants’ claim. Therefore, the District Court’s order will be
vacated to the extent that it dismissed the substantive due process claim. On remand, the
District Court is free to consider whether it should apply preclusion doctrine or stay or
dismiss the claim in deference to Appellants’ state-court actions. See Exxon Mobil Corp.,
2005 WL 711586 at *4, 2005 U.S. LEXIS at *10.
Because the substantive due process claim will be reinstated, the two remaining
federal claims that rely in part on the existence of a substantive due process violation
must also be reinstated. Although the District Court correctly concluded that Appellants
cannot state a claim for conspiracy to violate due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
they state a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the substantive due process
claim is considered. Similarly, because Appellants properly alleged a substantive due
process claim, they also state a claim for municipal liability for the deprivation of their
5
due process rights. Appellants’ state law claim of third party interference with business
relationship must be also reinstated because the federal claims described herein should
not have been dismissed. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 308 (3d Cir. 2000).
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order will be vacated to the extent
that it dismissed the substantive due process claim for lack of jurisdiction, the claims
asserting conspiracy to deny due process rights and municipal liability for civil rights
violations for failure to state a claim, and the state law claim of third party interference
with business relationship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). This matter will be remanded
to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.