Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc. v. Wen Wu , 383 F. App'x 228 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 09-1239 and 09-1321
MON CHERI BRIDALS, INC.
v.
WEN WU, individually; WEN WU d/b/a JACQUELIN BRIDALS;
WEN WU, d/b/a PRIVATE COLLECTION; WEN WU, d/b/a CHRISTINA WU;
WEN WU, d/b/a LABELLE FASHIONS; WEN WU d/b/a TIFFANY COLLECTION;
ABC COMPANIES 1-10, fictitious designations;
FORMOSA SUNRISE CORPORATION;
MDTW, INC.; UNITED WU ENTERPRISES, INC.;
BERNIE KAITZ; MIRAGE COLLECTION, INC.
Wen Wu, individually, and Formosa Sunrise Corporation,
and MDTW and United Wu Enterprises, Inc.,
Appellants in No. 09-1239
Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc.,
Appellant in No. 09-1321
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 3-04-cv-01739 and
D.C. Civil No. 3-05-cv-05934)
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson
Argued April 14, 2010
BEFORE: FISHER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges,
and DITTER*, District Judge
(Filed: June 4, 2010)
Craig S. Hilliard, Esq. (Argued)
Stark & Stark
P.O. Box 5315
Princeton, NJ 08543
Counsel for Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc.
Joseph F. Posillico, Esq. (Argued)
Fox Rothschild
10-75
2000 Market Street, 20 th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Wen Wu, individually,
and Formosa Sunrise Corporation,
and MDTW and United Wu Enterprises, Inc.
OPINION
COWEN, Circuit Judge
Mon Cheri Bridals, Inc. (“Mon Cheri”) designs and sells wedding and special
occasion dresses, for which it has obtained various copyrights and trademarks. Mon
* Honorable J. William Ditter, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2
Cheri had reason to believe that Wen Wu, through various entities that he controlled
(collectively, the “Wu defendants”), had copied certain dresses and sold them as Mon
Cheri dresses. Mon Cheri filed an action against the Wu defendants seeking damages and
injunctive relief for copyright and trade dress infringement, unfair competition, and
breach of contract. (Civil Action No. 04-1739 (AET)). Subsequently, Mon Cheri
discovered facts that led it to believe that Wu and another retailer, Bernie Kaitz, had
conspired to copy an entire line of Mon Cheri dresses, Mon Cheri’s Montage line. Mon
Cheri filed a second action against Kaitz and the company that Kaitz controlled, Mirage
Collection, Inc. (collectively, the “Mirage defendants”), and the Wu defendants seeking
damages and injunctive relief for unlawful passing off of its Montage dress line. (Civil
Action No. 05-5934 (AET)). The District Court consolidated the two actions.
Ultimately, Mon Cheri settled with the Mirage defendants (the “Agreement”) and
electronically filed a stipulation of dismissal. Mon Cheri then proceeded in a jury trial
against the Wu defendants on its breach of contract, copyright infringement, and passing
off claims. The jury returned a verdict in Mon Cheri’s favor on each claim, awarding
Mon Cheri $324,000 in compensatory damages and $375,000 in punitive damages. At
the conclusion of the trial, the District Court vacated the award for punitive damages,
denied Mon Cheri’s request for treble damages under the Lanham Act and New Jersey
law, and denied Mon Cheri’s request for attorneys’ fees.
3
On appeal, the Wu defendants assert that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to
establish the validity of the copyrights at issue, (2) there is insufficient evidence of
copyright infringement, (3) the District Court erred in denying their request to stay the
trial until Mon Cheri produced documents from its dress designer, (4) the District Court
erred in permitting Mon Cheri to conceal the terms of the Agreement from the jury, yet
permitting Mon Cheri to link the Wu defendants to the Mirage defendants, (5) there is
insufficient evidence to support the passing off claim against the Wu defendants when
improperly admitted hearsay evidence is struck from the record, and (6) there is
insufficient evidence to establish the damages awarded. Mon Cheri asserts that the
District Court erred in: (1) vacating the award of punitive damages, (2) denying
attorneys’ fees, and (3) denying treble damages on the passing off claim. For the reasons
set forth below, we will affirm the District Court in all respects.
DISCUSSION
A. Copyright Infringement
“To establish a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of original elements of
the plaintiff’s work.” Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir.
2005) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307
F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002)). The Wu defendants contend that Mon Cheri did not
establish either prong of their copyright infringement claims.
4
1. Copyright Validity
The introduction of a certificate of registration from the Copyright Office is prima
facie evidence of validity. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (“In any judicial proceedings the
certificate of a registration . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright . . . .”); accord Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873 (3d
Cir. 1982). Moreover, “[p]ossession of a registration certificate creates a rebuttable
presumption that the work in question is copyrightable.” Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s
Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989). The parties do not dispute that Mon
Cheri introduced twenty-nine certificates of registration into evidence, thereby
establishing prima facie validity with respect to those copyrights. The burden shifted to
the Wu defendants to show why the copyright claims were invalid. The Wu defendants
contend that the copyrights are invalid because Mon Cheri committed fraud on the
Copyright Office and because the copyrighted material lacks originality.
a. Fraud on the Copyright Office
Fraud on the Copyright Office is an affirmative defense to claims of copyright
infringement. To establish this defense, a defendant must show that in applying for the
copyright at issue the applicant knowingly or intentionally failed to disclose a material
fact. See Fonar Corp. v. Domenick, 105 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that with
respect to the affirmative defense of fraud upon the Copyright Office, “the presumption
[of validity] may be overcome only by ‘proof of deliberate misrepresentation’”) (quoting
5
Whimsicality, Inc., 891 F.2d at 455); accord Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 125, 142-43 (D.N.J. 1982). The omission must be intentional. See
Whimsicality, 891 F.2d at 456 (“It is the law of this Circuit that the knowing failure to
advise the Copyright Office of facts which might have occasioned a rejection of the
application constitutes reason for holding the registration invalid . . . .”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). An applicant’s “mere inadvertence” is insufficient to establish
this defense. Id. at 455 (explaining that the presumption of validity “generally is not
overcome by an ‘innocent misstatement’”); accord Raquel v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 196
F.3d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A]n inadvertent and immaterial misstatement will not
invalidate a copyright registration, a proposition on which there is broad consensus in the
federal courts.” (citations omitted)); Imperial Laces Inc. v. Westchester Lace Inc., 95-
CV-5353 (BSJ), 1998 WL 830630, *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (rejecting fraud on
the Copyright Office because the omission “appears to have been the result of mere
inadvertence rather than fraud”).
At trial, the Wu defendants asserted this defense, contending that Mon Cheri failed
to disclose that its works were derivative rather than original, as required in the
application, and that this omission constituted fraud on the Copyright Office. In
particular, they pointed to testimony from Mon Cheri’s designer, Ivonne Dome, that one
of the flower and vine motifs incorporated into the embroidery and bead work for dress
6
number 21917 was not her original work.1 The Wu defendants contend that Mon Cheri’s
failure to disclose this information constituted fraud.
There is no evidence that Mon Cheri knowingly or intentionally omitted this
information. Yolanda Carita, Mon Cheri’s Director of International Sales, assisted Mon
Cheri’s attorneys with preparation of copyright applications and signed those applications
as Mon Cheri’s agent. Carita testified about the standard processes in place for the
creation of new Mon Cheri dress designs. Dome created embroidery or bead patterns and
dress styles and then presented them to Carita, Mon Cheri’s owner Steven Lang, and
others, who then together collaborated on the final design. Dome created numerous
original designs and worked on her initial designs independently, sometimes sketching
until three or four in the morning. No one directly supervised Dome when she sketched.
Thus, no one observed Dome incorporating public elements into her designs and Dome
never indicated that she had. Dome’s final work product (the embroidery or bead patterns
plus style of dress) always had a distinct look such that it could be distinguished from
dresses from other designers. Carita relied on this process for her basis for attesting to the
originality of Dome’s work. (Mar. 25, 2008 Tr. at 112, 122-23, 126.)
Lang, the founder and owner of Mon Cheri, also signed the copyright applications.
He testified that the Montage dress line, designed exclusively by Dome, had a very
1
The Wu defendants assail several of Mon Cheri’s copyrights; however, they focus
their attention on the copyright for the embroidery pattern on dress number 21917.
7
specific and identifiable look. (Mar. 26, 2008 Tr. at 13.) Lang’s testimony regarding the
design process confirmed Carita’s testimony and he specifically testified about the design
of dress number 21917. (Id. at 30-36.) Dome modified the embroidery and bead
patterns several times before the design team accepted the final product. She changed the
thread color and type several times as well. (Id. at 32; Apr. 1, 2008 Tr. at 35.) Lang
observed her create the basic sketch for the embroidery and bead patterns and the
modifications were based on this first sketch.2 (Mar. 26, 2008 Tr. at 32-35.) None of
the design team had seen an embroidery and bead pattern of that nature prior to Dome’s
2
On appeal, the Wu defendants seek a new trial on the ground that the District
Court’s denial of their discovery motion regarding Dome’s sketches resulted in an unfair
trial. This challenge lacks merit.
It appears that neither of the parties engaged in much discovery until
approximately two months before trial. Both parties then filed discovery-related motions,
including the motion now at issue on appeal. The parties stipulated to a discovery
schedule (including depositions of key witnesses, such as Wu, Lang, and Dome) and to
the voluntary withdrawal of their motions. (A-I at 916-19.) The Wu defendants
discovered that Dome created sketches during their deposition of her, which occurred just
two weeks before trial. Dome stated that no one from Mon Cheri had asked her to
produce the sketches but that Mon Cheri would have duplicates of anything in her
possession. Dome indicated that most of her records were kept in her basement and were
destroyed by flooding. Under these circumstances, we will not fault the District Court for
determining that no discovery violation occurred. Moreover, the Wu defendants did not
raise this discovery issue with the District Court until their post-trial motion for a new
trial.
The Wu defendants argue that Mon Cheri ignored a document request served on
June 3, 2006. It is unclear whether this request was actually served on that date. The
document is dated May 3, 2006, and was not filed with the District Court until March 23,
2008.
8
creation. (Apr. 1, 2008 Tr. at 38.) Mon Cheri received industry awards for dress number
21917.
Dome testified that her embroidery and bead patterns are inspired by observing her
surroundings, including natural objects such as the sediment patterns on a rock. (Mar. 27,
2008 Tr. at 194.)3 Additionally, she sometimes found inspiration from public use
elements. (Id. at 212.) She then used those elements and others to create the patterns on
her dresses, which could involve rearranging elements, changing their size, style, and
quantity, adding elements, and other design techniques. (Id. at 211-13.) She was not
involved with the copyright application process, though she knew that Mon Cheri
protected her work.
Against this evidence, the Wu defendants failed to present any evidence of Carita’s
or Lang’s intent to commit fraud on the Copyright Office. Nor was there any evidence of
concealment generally. Further, the omission likely was not material, as the Copyright
Office grants copyrights for derivative work. See Imperial Laces, 1998 WL 830630, at
*2 n.4 (“Although required to do so, Imperial failed to identify lace design No. 8191 as a
derivative work on its copyright application. As this appears to have been the result of
mere inadvertence rather than fraud, however, this omission in no way invalidates
Imperial’s copyright registration.”).
3
Dome was in China working for Mon Cheri on a new dress line during the trial.
The parties presented her deposition testimony to the jury. The citations above refer to
that testimony as presented during trial.
9
b. Sufficient Originality
“The sine qua non of copyright is originality.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). “Original, as the term is used in copyright,
means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied
from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id.
(citing 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)). The “requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.; see also Folio
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that
“only an ‘unmistakable dash of originality need be demonstrated, high standards of
uniqueness in creativity are dispensed with’”) (quoting Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d
1313, 1321 (2d Cir. 1989)). Further, “the mere borrowing of elements from previous
works will not defeat copyrightability as long as the author has devised a new version of
the work or has otherwise rearranged or transformed it so as to have made an original
contribution.” CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1518
(1st Cir. 1996).
The jury properly concluded that the works for which Mon Cheri sought
copyrights were sufficiently original. According to Dome, she found inspiration from
many sources and in the case of dress number 21917, she was inspired by a particular
flower and vine drawing. She used these two common elements, but rearranged them,
changed their size, color, and frequency, and created an embroidery and bead pattern that
10
she considered to be her original work. This work is sufficiently original under copyright
law. See Folio, 937 F.2d at 764-65 (holding that a fabric design that consisted of roses
that were available in the public domain, but were rearranged for the particular fabric
design at issue “required little creative input” but still was “original work and, as such,
copyrightable”); Imperial Laces, 1998 WL 830630, at *2 (holding that a lace design that
incorporated a prior lace design within it, but that included a heavy liner, thereby giving
the overall pattern a “reticulated or squiggly appearance” was sufficiently original). The
testimony from Carita and Lang confirmed Dome’s description of her design process.
Moreover, the Wu defendants’ own expert witnesses, two dress designers, stated that they
designed their dresses in the same manner and considered them to be original. (Mar. 27,
2008 Tr. at 173-75; Mar. 31, 2008 Tr. at 166-68.)
The cases that the Wu defendants rely upon are distinguishable. The copyright
applicant in Garner v. Sawgrass Mills Ltd. Partnership, Civ. No. 3-94-307, 1994 WL
829978, *8-9 (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 1994), had first-hand knowledge of the prior work and
failed to disclose it. Id. (invalidating for lack of originality as the applicant, who had a
copy of the incorporated prior work in his possession, failed to disclose the incorporation
of that prior work). Neither Carita nor Lang had any knowledge of the common elements
that Dome incorporated. Further, in Towle Manufacturing Co. v. Godinger Silver Art
Co., 612 F. Supp. 986, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the court invalidated a copyright for a baby
bottle that consisted of five glass etchings, all of which were prior work widely available
11
on the market, to which the applicant made no modifications. Dome testified that the
patterns that she created, which incorporated public use elements, were entirely original,
as were her bead and thread color choices. These modifications are sufficient to support a
finding of originality. See Folio, 937 F.2d at 764-65.
2. Unauthorized Copying
A plaintiff establishes unauthorized copying by showing that the defendant “had
access to a copyrighted work” and “that there are substantial similarities between the two
works.” Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir.
2002). There is ample evidence to establish both access to the copyrighted work and
substantial similarity between Mon Cheri’s copyrighted work and the embroidery patterns
and dress styles of the Mirage dresses. The Wu defendants had access to the copyrighted
material—the embroidery patterns applied to various Montage dresses—through many
public sources, such as Mon Cheri’s website, Mon Cheri’s catalogues, wedding
magazines, national advertisements, trade shows, and dresses on display at national award
ceremonies. (See Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex. O at 35-36; Ex. R at 18; Ex. S at 181-82.) In fact,
Wu admitted that if he wanted to copy the dresses of other manufacturers he could,
although he disclaimed doing so. (See Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex. P at 43-44.) Moreover, there
is evidence that Wu obtained Montage catalogues and used them for this particular
purpose. (See Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex. Q at 43-44.) With respect to similarities between the
dresses and the applied embroidery patterns, several witnesses testified that the Montage
12
and Mirage dresses were “exactly” alike or the same (see Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex. A; Ex. D
at 44-45) and witnesses for the Wu defendants, including Wu himself, testified that they
were “a lot alike” or substantially similar (see Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex. C; Ex. F).
B. Agreement
The Agreement includes a release stating that:
Lang and Mon Cheri . . . release and forever discharge Kaitz
and Mirage and any of their heirs, subsidiaries and affiliated
companies, successors, assigns, predecessors, parents,
divisions, members, shareholders, officers, directors,
employees, insurers, attorneys, agents and representatives
from any and all claims, actions . . . arising out of . . . the
[consolidated actions] . . . .
(A-II 277-78.) Additionally, the parties attached an affidavit from Kaitz to the
Agreement (“Kaitz Affidavit”), in which Kaitz stated that he was the “sole owner of
Mirage” and that “[n]either Wen Wu nor any entities Mr. Wu owns or controls has any
ownership interest in Mirage.” (A-II at 284-85.)
The Wu defendants contend that Mon Cheri’s strategy with respect to the passing
off claim—linking the Wu defendants to Mirage—is incompatible with the general
release contained in the Agreement and statements in the Kaitz Affidavit. They argue that
the District Court erred in not ordering Mon Cheri to produce the document to them pre-
trial. Additionally, they argue that the District Court erred in denying their motion for a
new trial after Mon Cheri linked them to Mirage, but concealed the general disclosure and
the Kaitz Affidavit from the jury.
13
Despite their contentions, the existence of the Agreement was not hidden from the
Wu defendants. Mon Cheri and Mirage reached a settlement in principal at a settlement
conference with the court in November 2006, which the Wu defendants attended. The
Wu defendants did not pursue any discovery related to the terms of the finalized
agreement.4 On July 3, 2007, nine months before the parties tried this case, Mon Cheri
filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, indicating that it had settled with the Mirage defendants.
(A-I at 807.) Again, the Wu defendants did not pursue the finalized agreement through
discovery requests. The parties filed a Joint Pretrial Order on January 15, 2008, in which
Mon Cheri disclosed that it intended to establish that the Wu defendants created the
Mirage dress line. (A-I at 877-911.) The Wu defendants did not seek a copy of the
Agreement at the final pre-trial conference, despite Mon Cheri’s disclosure.
The first documented request from the Wu defendants for the Agreement was an
email to Mon Cheri’s counsel on the eve of trial. (A-III at 688-89.) Mon Cheri did not
object, but informed the Wu defendants’ counsel that the Agreement contained a
confidentiality clause and that the Wu defendants would need to obtain consent from
Kaitz or a court order directing Mon Cheri to produce it. Kaitz refused to consent.
4
The Wu defendants contend that they requested the Agreement in their document
request served on May 3, 2006. This document request predates the settlement by nearly
six months. The Wu defendants contend that they made several requests in 2007, both in
writing and orally, but they did not support this assertion with any documentation. The
first documented request for the Agreement is in the form of an email sent from counsel
for the Wu defendants to Mon Cheri’s counsel on the eve of trial. (A-III at 688-89.)
14
The parties disagree over what transpired next. Mon Cheri contends that the Wu
defendants did not pursue the issue any further until its motion for a new trial after Mon
Cheri’s closing argument. The Wu defendants assert that they raised this issue with the
court in a pre-trial teleconference held on March 20, 2008. (A-II at 338-39.) There is no
transcript from this conference. The Wu defendants assert that the District Court denied
their request on the ground that liability could be apportioned through a reduction in
damages. The Wu defendants assert that they registered an ongoing objection to this
ruling because they felt that the Agreement could affect Mon Cheri’s substantive case, not
just damages. In the opinion denying the Wu defendants’ motion for a new trial, the
District Court referred to the March 20, 2008 conference, but did not mention or explain
its pre-trial denial of their request. (A-I at 17-18.)
The Wu defendants did not pursue this issue again until the charging conference
held on April 1, 2008. (Apr. 1, 2008 Tr. at 85-86.) At that time, the District Court
ordered Mon Cheri to produce the Agreement the following day. On April 2, 2008, the
District Court continued the charging conference; however, Mon Cheri did not produce
the Agreement and the Wu defendants did not raise the issue. The District Court charged
the jury on April 3, 2008, and the parties gave their closing arguments. Mon Cheri finally
produced the Agreement on April 4, 2008, for in camera review. The District Court
indicated that the Agreement and, in particular, the Kaitz Affidavit presented “a real
problem.” (Apr. 4, 2008 Tr. at 2-3.) The District Court ordered the parties to make
15
supplemental closing arguments to the jury to clarify which dresses were at issue for each
claim. (Id. at 8.) Additionally, the District Court ordered Mon Cheri to produce the
Agreement to the Wu defendants.
Upon reviewing the agreement, the Wu defendants argued that the general release
applied to them thereby barring Mon Cheri’s claims against them because testimony Mon
Cheri solicited indicated that the Wu defendants were either an affiliate or an agent of
Mirage, both of which were released under the Agreement. Secondly, the Wu defendants
argued that the Kaitz Affidavit was contrary to the facts that Mon Cheri established at
trial with respect to the relationship between Mirage and the Wu defendants. The Wu
defendants requested a new trial in the event that the jury returned a verdict in Mon
Cheri’s favor. The District Court reserved judgment on that issue and permitted the
parties to make their supplemental closing statements. (Id. at 16.)
The Wu defendants were not diligent in pursuing the Agreement and the evidence
does not suggest that Mon Cheri intended to conceal it from the Wu defendants.
Therefore, the case relied upon by the Wu defendants is distinguishable. In Vernon
Duane Daniel v. Penrod Drilling Co., 393 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. La. 1975), the court
granted a motion for a new trial because the plaintiff made a secret agreement with one of
the defendants to drop its case against that defendant at the conclusion of the trial if that
defendant refrained from attacking the plaintiff’s case during trial and from informing the
other defendants of the agreement. Id. at 1059-61. In this case, all parties were aware of
16
the Agreement and the Wu defendants had ample opportunity to obtain a copy of it in
advance of trial. The District Court denied the Wu defendants’ request to compel made
during a teleconference held on March 20, 2008, noting that counsel delayed pursuit of
this document until four days before trial. This ruling was reasonable in light of the
parties’ delay in pursuing discovery.
Second, it was clear from the Joint Pretrial Order that Mon Cheri intended to link
the Mirage dress line to the Wu defendants; yet the Wu defendants did not object to those
assertions in preparing the Order, and did not object at the final pretrial conference.
Excerpts from the Order indicate that Mon Cheri intended to establish that:
Defendants’ breaches and infringements included the
formation of a separate company, Mirage Collection, Inc.,
which was formed for the purpose of selling a line of dresses
intentionally copied from Mon Cheri’s flagship dress line,
Montage.
***
Defendant selected the name “Mirage” because the name
sounded very much like “Montage,” and they intended to and
did in fact confuse the consuming public into thinking that the
Mirage dresses were in fact Mon Cheri dresses.
(A-I at 880.)
Finally, the terms of the Agreement do not prohibit litigation of Mon Cheri’s
claims against the Wu defendants. “The general rule is that a release of one tortfeasor
will not release others who may also be liable to plaintiff for his harm unless the release is
so intended or the plaintiff receives as a result thereof either full satisfaction or
17
satisfaction intended as such.” Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Leontarakis, 387 N.J. Super.
583, 594 (App. Div. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence that
Mon Cheri or Kaitz intended to release the Wu defendants. To the contrary, the Kaitz
Affidavit makes it clear that the Wu defendants did not own or control Mirage or receive
any profits or income from Mirage. Mon Cheri and Kaitz likely included these statements
to counter any defense of release by the Wu defendants. Further, Wu testified that he had
no involvement with Mirage.
Mon Cheri pleaded theories of direct, contributory, and vicarious liability against
the Wu defendants. The District Court charged the jury on these different theories of
liability without objection from the Wu defendants. Finally, there is no support for any
argument that the Agreement intended to cover Mon Cheri’s breach claim against the Wu
defendants, which arose out of an earlier contract exclusively between Mon Cheri and the
Wu defendants.
C. Jury Instructions
The Wu defendants contend that the jury instructions on the breach of contract,
copyright infringement, and passing off claims unfairly tainted the deliberation process on
the grounds that the instructions (1) failed to specify which claims pertained to which
dresses, (2) permitted consideration of LaBelle and Mirage dresses, interchangeably, and
(3) permitted consideration of the Mirage dresses, even though Wu was released by the
Agreement. They contend that these erroneous instructions merit a new trial.
18
The Wu defendants failed to preserve this issue for appeal. They did not raise this
issue at the charging conference and did not object during the jury charge. They first
raised this issue in their post-trial motion. Under Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party must object or submit competing jury instructions to preserve that issue
for appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1) (“A party may assign as error: (A) an error in an
instruction actually given, if that party properly objected; or (B) a failure to give an
instruction, if that party properly requested it and—unless the court rejected the request in
a definitive ruling on the record—also properly objected.”). Otherwise, that party is not
entitled to a new trial unless the instruction given was in plain error. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
51(d)(2) (“A court may consider a plain error in the instructions that has not been
preserved as required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error affects substantial rights.”). We see no
such error here.
Moreover, the jury instructions do not suffer from the alleged infirmities. The jury
instructions informed the jurors that Mon Cheri settled with Mirage. (Apr. 3, 2008 Tr. at
38.) Notably, the jury instruction on the passing off claim states: “Plaintiff’s claims in
connection with ‘Passing Off’ are limited to the Mirage dresses and do not include the
sale of dresses under the Labelle Fashion label.” (A-I at 863.) Further, the District Court
directed the parties to make supplemental closing arguments on this precise issue to
provide additional clarity for the jury.
19
D. Challenge to Admission of Hearsay Evidence
At trial, Beverly Martin, a wedding dress retailer, testified about an incident in
which an individual named “Dominic” entered her store and encouraged her to pass off
Mirage dresses as Montage dresses. Mon Cheri sought to introduce her testimony on
Dominic’s out of court statements as the admissions of a party opponent under Rule
801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, contending that Dominic was the Wu
defendants’ agent. The District Court permitted Martin to testify and informed the jury
that they should only consider her testimony if they first determined that Dominic was an
agent. The Wu defendants assert that the District Court erred in sending the agency
finding to the jury, that there was insufficient evidence to establish agency, and that the
jury’s consideration of the hearsay statements was highly prejudicial.
It is unnecessary to determine whether it was improper to send the agency issue to
the jury as the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Dominic was an agent
for the Wu defendants. Martin testified that Dominic identified himself as a sales
representative of various dress lines sold by the Wu defendants. (Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex. V
at 48.) Martin purchased approximately twenty dresses from Dominic. Dominic filled
out the purchase order, which was a form for dresses to be ordered from “Jacqueline
Bridals, Mirage, Tiffany, The Private Collection, Christina Wu and La Belle.” (Id. at 56-
57.) There is no dispute that the non-Mirage brands mentioned are brands created by and
sold exclusively by the Wu defendants. All of the dresses ordered (including the Mirage
20
dresses), were shipped from the Wu defendants’ warehouse in Fort Myers, Florida. (Id. at
60.) Other sales representatives identified Dominic as a sales agent for Wu. (Pl. Supp.
App’x. Ex. X at 27-28.) Indeed, several of the Wu defendants’ witnesses, including Wu
himself, admitted that Dominic worked as a sales representative for the Wu defendants
for several years and that his sales territory covered Martin’s store. (Pl. Supp. App’x. Ex.
W at 22-24; Ex. Y at 135.) Sending this evidentiary issue to the jury was a harmless error
at most as Martin’s testimony regarding her conversation with Dominic was admissible as
a party-admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
E. Damages
The Wu defendants contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
award of compensatory damages. Mon Cheri cross-appeals the District Court’s grant of
the Wu defendants’ motion to vacate the jury’s award of punitive damages, as well as the
denial of Mon Cheri’s motion for augmented damages under the Lanham Act.
1. Damages for Breach of Contract
The jury awarded Mon Cheri $107,000 for its breach of contract claim. The Wu
defendants contend that Mon Cheri failed to establish actual damages and therefore, is
only entitled to an award of nominal damages. We disagree. Generally, “a breach of
contract without pecuniary harm entitles the non-breaching party to no more than nominal
damages.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 386, 409 (3d Cir. 1993).
However, when the defendant’s profits better define the harm suffered, it is appropriate to
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use a defendant’s profits as the measure of damages. See U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter
Comms., Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a defendant’s profits will
support a damages award “when those profits tend to define the plaintiff’s loss”). Wu
testified as to the dresses that he sold and the profits that he accumulated, which
supported the jury’s award under this alternative theory of damages.
2. Damages for Copyright Infringement
An infringer of a copyright is liable either for the copyright holder’s actual
damages or for statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). Mon Cheri elected the
former. “In establishing the infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present
proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or
her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). “Any doubt as to the computation of costs or
profits is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 514 (9th Cir. 1985). Further, “[i]f the infringing defendant
does not meet its burden of proving costs, the gross figure stands as the defendant’s
profits. ” Id.
In the instant action, the jury awarded Mon Cheri $107,000 on Mon Cheri’s
copyright infringement claim. Mon Cheri established the number of dresses sold and the
price, thereby meeting its prima facie burden. Wu testified regarding the net profits and
costs associated with these sales. The Wu defendants did not present any additional
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evidence on costs, such as purchase orders or bills. The jury instructions properly
informed the jurors of the burdens of proof for both sides. (A-I at 862-63.) The jury
considered the evidence presented and likely discredited Wu’s testimony on costs in
reaching its award, which is permitted under the Copyright Act.
3. Damages for Passing Off
The jury awarded Mon Cheri $110,000 in damages on its passing off claim. The
Wu defendants attack this award on the grounds that (1) the jury improperly based its
award on the Mirage dresses, and all liability stemming from those dresses was released
in the Agreement, and (2) Mon Cheri cannot base its award for both its copyright
infringement and passing off claims on the same profits. Both contentions lack merit. 5
First, as discussed above, the Agreement does not release the Wu defendants. Second,
Mon Cheri did not receive a double recovery. The jury awarded $107,000 on the
copyright infringement claim for infringement related to the LaBelle dresses. The jury
awarded $110,000 on the passing off claim related to the Mirage dresses. These awards
reflect harm suffered under separate statutory schemes for separate facts and the jury
instructions specified which dresses applied to which claims.
Mon Cheri cross-appealed the District Court’s denial of its request for treble
5
Judge Ditter while agreeing with the rest of the opinion believes that the passing off
claim did not have sufficient evidence to prove the claim which justified sending the issue
to the jury. Because he believes the issue should never have been presented to the jury,
he would limit the plaintiff’s recovery to the balance of the damages.
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damages on this claim under the Lanham Act and New Jersey law on unfair competition.
The Wu defendants failed to respond to this issue in their reply brief. As an appellate
court, we review a district court’s decision with respect to treble damages for abuse of
discretion. See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 782-83 (11th Cir. 1979).
Both the Lanham Act and New Jersey unfair competition law give courts the power to
treble damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:4-2. However, if the court
finds an intentional or willful violation of the Lanham Act, “the court shall, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judgment for three times such profits or
damages . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). As one circuit has explained:
The interplay of these provisions demonstrates that a showing
of intent or bad faith is unnecessary to establish a violation of
[the Lanham Act], or to seek remedies pursuant to § 1117(a).
But where, as here, a registrant seeks the mandatory treble
damages and attorneys’ fees provided for in § 1117(b), the
plaintiff must prove the defendants’ intent to infringe.
Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fl., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir. 1991).
In the instant action, it is unclear whether Mon Cheri sought trebling under
discretionary § 1117(a) or mandatory § 1117(b). The District Court denied Mon Cheri’s
request for trebled damages explaining that “[t]he circumstances of this case, the claims
involved, and the verdict returned by the jury awarding damages, do not warrant
augmented damages.” (A 13.) Mon Cheri has not persuaded us to disturb this ruling
whether it was made under either provision.
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4. Punitive Damages
The jury awarded Mon Cheri $375,000 in punitive damages, in addition to a total
award of $324,000 in compensatory damages. The District Court vacated the jury’s
award of punitive damages, which Mon Cheri now appeals. This circuit reviews de novo
the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages; however, the court must accept
findings of fact by the district court, unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 n.14 (2001).
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition
of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). To determine whether an award of punitive
damages comports with due process, courts must “consider three guideposts: (1) the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and
(3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id. (citing BMW of N. Am. Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). “The Supreme Court has recognized that the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct is ‘the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award.’” CGB Occ. Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health
Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419). To
evaluate the degree of reprehensibility, courts consider whether: “(1) the harm caused
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was physical as opposed to economic, (2) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to
or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others, (3) the target of the conduct had
financial vulnerability, (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident, and (5) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere
accident.” Id. (citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419).
Mon Cheri challenges the District Court’s finding with respect to the fourth and
fifth reprehensibility factors.6 The District Court found the fourth factor in the Wu
defendants’ favor explaining that in this circuit, “the ‘repeated conduct’ factor will
necessarily have ‘less force’ where the defendant’s misconduct did not extend beyond his
dealings with the plaintiff.” (A-I at 9 (quoting CGB Occ., 499 F.3d at 191).) The District
Court recognized that there were numerous dresses involved and repetitive conduct, but
gave this factor less weight because the Wu defendants’ reprehensible conduct was
limited to their dealings with Mon Cheri. (A-I at 10.) The District Court’s adherence to
this Court’s precedent was not improper.
With respect to the fifth factor—intent—the District Court concluded that “based
on the nature of [Mon Cheri’s] passing off claims . . . [whether] . . . the harm was the
result of intentional malice, [or] trickery, is unclear and uncertain.” (A-I at 10.) The
District Court indicated that the only claim for which punitive damages was available was
6
The District Court found the first three factors in favor of the Wu defendants,
which is supported by the record and not challenged on appeal. Accordingly, we will not
address the District Court’s analysis with respect to these factors.
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the passing off claim. The District Court noted that the evidence of the Wu defendants’
involvement consisted of their agent Dominic’s attempt to pass off Mirage dresses, which
was too attenuated to support punitive damages. Mon Cheri has not persuaded us to
disturb this finding, which is dispositive on the issue of punitive damages.
F. Attorneys’ Fees
The District Court denied Mon Cheri’s motion for attorneys’ fees, which Mon
Cheri appeals, contending that it is entitled to fees under both the Lanham and Copyright
Acts. Courts have the power to award attorneys’ fees under both the Lanham and
Copyright Acts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 505 (“In any civil
action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs . . .
[and] . . . the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as
part of the costs.”). This circuit reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion. See
Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009); see
also Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacomm Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2000).
In the instant action, the District Court denied Mon Cheri’s request for attorneys’
fees under the Lanham Act. Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, we do
not find the District Court’s denial an abuse of discretion. Moreover, because the
standards for awarding fees under both acts are substantially similar, we decline to
remand the issue of whether to award fees under the Copyright Act as a denial under this
27
Act would be appropriate as well.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court
in all respects.
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