Ben Roten v. Lawrence McDonald , 394 F. App'x 836 ( 2010 )


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  • ALD-286                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-4651
    ___________
    BEN ROTEN,
    Appellant
    v.
    DR. LAWRENCE MCDONALD
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D.C. Civil No. 08-00081)
    District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    September 10, 2010
    Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: September 21, 2010)
    _________
    OPINION
    ________
    PER CURIAM
    In this civil rights action commenced under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , Ben Roten, a Delaware
    state inmate formerly confined at the Sussex Correctional Institution (SCI),
    1
    claimed that he was sexually abused by an SCI medical professional - Dr. Lawrence
    McDonald - during a required physical examination. The District Court granted McDonald’s
    motion for summary judgment. Roten filed this appeal. Because the material facts in this
    case are not in dispute, and because a reasonable jury could not find Roten’s complaint to
    have stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim against McDonald, we find no error in the
    District Court’s decision. Furthermore, because this appeal presents no substantial question,
    we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    I.
    In his original complaint1 , Roten alleged that SCI directed him to undergo a complete
    physical examination on October 25, 2006. The physical examination was conducted solely
    by McDonald. Believing that he was “sexually molested” during the examination (Dist. Ct.
    dkt #2, at 5), Roten sought relief through the inmate grievance process. He was ultimately
    unsuccessful. On November 10, 2006, McDonald met with Roten to, in Roten’s words, “try
    to explain why he touched me the way he did.” 
    Id.
     Roten later wrote: “I told him that I was
    uncomfortable talking to him and I left.” (Dist. Ct. dkt #32, at 8.)
    On February 1, 2008, Roten filed this civil rights complaint, naming as defendants
    McDonald, Department of Corrections Commissioner Carl Danberg (Commissioner
    1
    Roten was granted leave to file an amended complaint in order to change the
    complaint’s caption and to add a monetary value to his punitive damages request. Roten
    did not, however, alter or expound upon the factual allegations in the original complaint.
    2
    Danberg), and additional SCI employees and contractors. The District Court granted Roten
    leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, after screening his complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
    (e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1), it dismissed from the case all named defendants save
    McDonald. Discovery ensued.
    In an excerpt from Roten’s journal, produced in response to McDonald’s request for
    documents, Roten wrote that McDonald did not wear gloves during the October 25, 2006
    exam, and further described their interaction as follows:
    Dr. McDonald then proceeded with the examination by having me remove my
    jumpsuit down to the [waist] and to remove my tee-shirt. He listened to me
    breathe, then he ask[ed] me to remove my jumpsuit and boxers and to lay
    back[.] He the[n] examined my pubic area and ask[ed] me if I had a hernia
    surgery, and I told him [‘]yeah, I had surgery[,’] that I thought he knew that.
    He acted like he didn’t know about it. He then ask[ed] me to lift my left leg
    up and to hold them apart[.] He then took my penis in one hand and pulled it
    to the right, while he cuffed my testicles in his other hand and rolled them
    around in a massaging motion.
    (Dist. Ct. dkt #32, at 6.)
    McDonald repeated that series of manipulations with Roten’s right leg raised, after
    which McDonald told Roten to get dressed.2 The examination appeared to be finished until
    Roten told McDonald that he was suffering from frequent urination. According to Roten,
    McDonald told him to remove his clothes again, then:
    he rolled over in his chair and took my penis in his first two fingers and
    thumbs of each hand then he squeezed down my penis in a milking motion
    2
    At his deposition, Roten testified that each series of manipulations lasted between
    fifteen and twenty seconds.
    3
    until he got to the tip [and] then he pulled the tip open with his thumbs and
    look[ed] in the pee hole[.] Then he told me everything was [okay and] to get
    dressed.
    
    Id. at 7
    .
    In a document responsive to Roten’s interrogatories, McDonald explained the medical
    justification for his conduct during Roten’s physical exam:
    Holding each leg up and then pushing down on each leg is used to evaluate
    strength of legs and back. The genital exam includes palpating the testicles
    looking for masses, tenderness and presence and size of both testicles. The
    penis is positioned out of the way for the testicular exam. These are all
    common elements of a complete physical exam.
    ***
    The palpation of the shaft of the penis is to look for points of pain or masses
    and to express any discharge. This is not part of a routine genital exam but
    was performed after [Roten] had completed his exam and had redressed. He
    then informed [me] of his frequent urination problems and so [I] asked him to
    lower his pants and boxers to permit the above exam. [My] concern was for the
    presence of a venereal disease or infection and whether [Roten] needed a
    urethral probe. [I] did not feel this was needed. [I] did order a urine culture.
    (Dist. Ct. dkt #47, at 7-8.)
    To get a second opinion, Roten sent out letters to different medical professionals
    asking what steps they would take in diagnosing and treating a patient complaining of
    frequent urination. Roten’s letters did not describe the examination performed by McDonald.
    Roten received a response from Dr. Mark T. Edney, who wrote that “[u]rinary frequency has
    many potential causes,” (Dist. Ct. dkt #57, at 7), including fluid intake or an enlarged
    prostate. If the latter, Dr. Edney wrote, “[s]ometimes we will start a medicine like Flomax
    4
    to try to reduce frequency by unblocking the prostate,” 
    id.,
     but beyond that it would depend
    on the patient’s individual situation. In a separate letter, Dr. Robert L. Klaus wrote that
    Roten’s questions “could only be answered by an office visit where we could have you void
    in a special machine to determine how your flow is and also measure you for residual urine
    with ultrasound.” 
    Id. at 9
    . In addition to those letters, Dr. James E. Moulsdale, a board-
    certified urologist, reviewed Roten’s complaint and the evidence presented in his case by
    both parties. Accepting as true Roten’s description of the October 25, 2006 physical exam,
    Dr. Moulsdale opined that there was nothing improper about McDonald’s conduct.
    During his deposition, Roten testified that he was molested as a child, and that the
    examination by McDonald caused bad memories to resurface. Roten eventually came under
    the care of Elena Padrell, a part-time psychiatrist at SCI who was directly employed by
    Correctional Medical Service (CMS). Roten attended therapy sessions with Padrell almost
    every week.     Padrell eventually resigned her position at SCI, stating in a letter to
    Commissioner Danberg that she “had to resign or risk compromising my professional ethics.”
    (Dist. Ct. dkt #61, at 2.) In that letter, Padrell outlined six reasons that supported her
    decision, the sixth reading as follows:
    Finally, during my treatment sessions with patients I was told by several of
    them about a very serious matter concerning the possible sexual abuse of
    inmates by a medical colleague. When I brought this to the attention of CMS
    officials I was told . . . that I should be a ‘team player’ and let those allegations
    pass. Doing so would be a serious violation of my professional ethics,
    however. Thus, when I realized that nothing was going to be done to even
    look into those allegations, I felt I had to resign and seek the opportunity to
    discuss these issues with you.
    5
    
    Id. at 3
    .
    Padrell’s letter did not mention by name Roten or McDonald. Commissioner Danberg
    responded to Padrell’s letter in kind, stating that the allegation “of staff sexual misconduct
    reported to you by inmates . . . has been investigated by Internal Affairs and reviewed by the
    Medical Society of Delaware and determined to be unfounded.” 
    Id. at 4
    . By contrast, Roten
    received a letter from the Delaware Board of Medical Practice advising Roten that his claim
    of sexual misconduct was “criminal in nature and therefore outside the jurisdiction of this
    agency to investigate.” (DC dkt #57, at 11.)
    In one of Roten’s journal entries, he wrote that he underwent a subsequent physical
    examination on April 20, 2007. This exam was administered by “a new [d]octor, . . . and at
    no time did he ever ask me to get undressed past my [waist], [and] at no time did he ever feel
    my penis or [testicles], the way Dr. McDonald did.” (Dist. Ct. dkt #32, at 13.)
    On June 22, 2009, McDonald moved for summary judgment. Roten filed a response
    to the motion, and McDonald filed a reply. On November 30, 2009, the District Court
    granted McDonald’s motion and entered judgment in his favor the following day. Roten
    timely appealed.
    II.
    The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    .       We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and our review is plenary. See Howley v. Mellon
    Financial Corp., --- F.3d ---, 
    2010 WL 3397456
    , at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2010, No. 08-1748).
    6
    “Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
    non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). We may affirm the District Court’s
    grant of summary judgment on any grounds that find support in the record. Azur v. Chase
    Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 
    601 F.3d 212
    , 216 (3d Cir. 2010). Furthermore, if Roten’s appeal
    fails to present a substantial question, we may summarily affirm the judgment below. See
    LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
    III.
    “Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights established in the
    Constitution or federal laws.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 
    455 F.3d 418
    , 423 (3d Cir.
    2006). The District Court reasonably construed Roten’s claim of sexual abuse as one arising
    under the Eighth Amendment, which proscribes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
    pain.”    Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    , 104 (1976) (citation omitted).         The Eighth
    Amendment also secures an inmate’s “right not to be sexually abused by a state employee
    while in confinement.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 
    256 F.3d 120
    , 142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001).
    A touchstone of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in this context is that its violation will not
    be found unless a prison official acts with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v.
    Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 834 (1994).
    It is worth reinforcing that “[o]ur role in reviewing a grant of summary judgment is
    not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine
    7
    whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
    nonmoving party.” Reedy v. Evanson, --- F.3d ---, 
    2010 WL 2991378
    , at *8 (3d Cir. Aug.
    2, 2010, No. 09-2210) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Importantly, the material
    facts of this case are not in dispute; the only divergence lies between the parties’ perceptions
    concerning the legality of McDonald’s conduct. Having reviewed the entire record in this
    case, we conclude that, even viewing that record in the light most favorable to Roten, a
    reasonable jury could not return a verdict in his favor on his Eighth Amendment claim
    against McDonald.
    We arrive at this conclusion despite drawing the inference that McDonald was the
    “medical colleague” referenced in Padrell’s letter to Commissioner Danberg. That inference
    is not enough for Roten’s suit to survive summary judgment. Roten failed to present
    evidence even suggesting that McDonald’s conduct during the October 25, 2006 physical
    exam deviated in any way from standard procedure.3 Neither Dr. Edney nor Dr. Klaus was
    asked to comment on the appropriateness of McDonald’s conduct, and both indicated that
    they would need to examine Roten in person to address his specific medical concerns. Dr.
    Moulsdale did, however, review the specific evidence presented in this case, and he believed
    there to be no impropriety during Roten’s physical exam. Moreover, having inferred that
    3
    That is the case regardless of Roten’s indication that a subsequent physical
    examination at SCI was conducted differently and, inferring favorably for Roten, less
    intrusively. Notably, it does not appear as though Roten complained of the same
    symptoms during that examination.
    8
    Padrell’s letter to Commissioner Danberg included a veiled reference to McDonald, we note
    that the SCI inmates’ allegations of sexual misconduct were investigated by DOC Internal
    Affairs, reviewed by the Medical Society of Delaware, and determined to be “unfounded.”
    Roten offered no evidence to undermine the integrity of those investigations.
    To support an Eighth Amendment claim, it is not enough for an inmate to object to
    the manner in which a medical professional administers treatment or conducts an
    examination. See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 
    834 F.2d 326
    , 346 (3d
    Cir. 1987). Judges are not “versed in the nuances of the practices and techniques of the
    medical profession and thus are ill-equipped to substitute their views regarding what is
    medically adequate, proper, or antiseptic.” Ragsdale v. Turnock, 
    841 F.2d 1358
    , 1389 (7th
    Cir. 1988) (Coffey, J., dissenting). Therefore, for the reasons given in this opinion, we are
    confident that no reasonable jury could deem the allegations in Roten’s complaint sufficient
    to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation.4
    Accordingly, because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily
    affirm the District Court’s judgment. Roten’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
    4
    After determining that summary judgment was appropriate as to Roten’s federal
    claim, the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the extent
    Roten raised a state law claim for assault and/or battery. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (c). This
    was not an abuse of discretion. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
    129 S. Ct. 1862
    , 1867 (2009) (noting standard of review).
    9