Barbara Abbott v. Loan City Inc , 395 F. App'x 805 ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 08-2153
BARBARA L. ABBOTT,
Appellant
v.
LOAN CITY, INC.,
MORTGAGES ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.;
*FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Receiver for
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK;
THE PRIORITY MORTGAGE GROUP, INC.
* (Amended per Clerk’s Order dated 12/2/08)
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. No. 2-05-cv-04497)
District Judge: Hon. Juan R. Sánchez
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Monday, September 20, 2010
Before: McKEE, Chief Circuit Judge, AMBRO
and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 30, 2010)
OPINION
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Barbara L. Abbott appeals the District Court’s judgement in favor of the defendant
in her suit under the Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C § 1601 et seq. For the
1
reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
The district court has set forth the factual and procedural history of this case, and
we need not repeat them. See Abbott v. Washington Mutual Finance, Inc., 2008 WL
756069 (E.D.Pa. March 20, 2008). On appeal, Abbott argues that the district court erred
in finding that the broker’s compensation charge was not covered under the TILA and
that the defendant was not liable for damages. She also argues that the court abused its
discretion 1 by refusing to allow her to amend her complaint.2
In his Memorandum and Opinion, Judge Sánchez carefully and clearly explained
his reasons for finding that the fees paid to the broker are not covered by the TILA. The
district judge’s analysis is thorough and well-reasoned, and we can add little to his
thoughtful analysis since his Memorandum and Opinion explain the court’s conclusions.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order substantially for the reasons set
forth in the district court’s Memorandum and Opinion without further elaboration.
1
W e need not discuss Abbott’s contentions that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint,
because, for the reasons the district court has explained, that court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing the
complaint to be amended. See Abbott, 2008 W L 756069, *3-4.
2
W e will not address arguments that Abbott is attempting to raise now that were only contained in the
amended complaint since that complaint is not before us. See United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir.
1995) (refusing to address an issue raised for the first time on appeal).
2