State v. Williams , 2012 UT App 128 ( 2012 )


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  •                             IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    ‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐
    State of Utah,                                )         MEMORANDUM DECISION
    )
    Plaintiff and Appellee,                )           Case No. 20100732‐CA
    )
    v.                                            )                  FILED
    )               (April 26, 2012)
    Joshua Williams,                              )
    )              
    2012 UT App 128
    Defendant and Appellant.               )
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Fourth District, Provo Department, 091403373
    The Honorable Samuel D. McVey
    Attorneys:       Anthony V. Rippa, Murray; and Brook J. Sessions, South Jordan, for
    Appellant
    Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    Before Judges Voros, Roth, and Christiansen.
    CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
    ¶1      Defendant Joshua Williams appeals his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, a
    first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76‐5‐302 (2008). Williams argues that the trial
    court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm.
    ¶2    Pursuant to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Williams moved for
    a new trial on the theory that he was prejudiced by being jointly tried with a
    codefendant. In particular, Williams contends that the codefendant’s counsel’s closing
    argument unfairly placed blame on Williams, making him appear more culpable than if
    he had been tried separately. Williams asserts that because he agreed with the
    codefendant that neither defendant would testify at trial, Williams did not expect the
    codefendant’s counsel to cast blame on Williams. Williams also seems to contend that,
    despite being charged with the same offenses for the same alleged actions, the
    codefendant’s conviction of only the lesser‐included offense of unlawful detention is
    proof that Williams was prejudiced by the joint trial.
    ¶3      In ruling on Williams’s motion for a new trial, the trial court determined that the
    jury found the victim’s testimony credible and that the victim’s testimony implicated
    Williams more strongly than the codefendant. Further, the trial court determined that
    Williams had been given an adequate opportunity to cross‐examine all of the witnesses
    at trial. The trial court also noted that Williams elected not to testify after he had been
    advised of his right to do so.
    ¶4      Williams did not timely move the trial court to sever his trial from the
    codefendant’s and he therefore waived his right to do so. See Utah Code Ann. § 77‐8a‐
    1(4)(b) (2008) (“A defendant’s right to severance of . . . defendants is waived if the
    motion is not made at least five days before trial.”). In any event, we determine that the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because the
    joinder of the defendants’ trial did not prejudice Williams. See generally Utah R. Crim.
    P. 24(a) (“The court may . . . grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any
    error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.”);
    State v. Menzies, 
    845 P.2d 220
    , 224 (Utah 1992) (“The decision to grant a new trial
    pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 is a matter within the discretion of the
    trial court [, and] we will not reverse a ruling denying a new trial absent a clear abuse
    of that discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    ¶5     Although the codefendant’s counsel’s encouragement to the jury to find that
    Williams was more culpable than his client may have impacted the jury, Williams has
    not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial
    because he has not demonstrated that the joint jury trial prejudiced him. Specifically,
    evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the victim owed Williams money, that
    Williams owned and drove the car used in the kidnapping, and that Williams and the
    codefendant took the victim to Williams’s home. Williams has identified no evidence
    that would have been excluded had the defendants been tried separately, nor has he
    identified any argument made by the codefendant’s counsel that could not have been
    made by the State had the defendants been tried separately. Also, the codefendant’s
    20100732‐CA                                  2
    conviction of a lesser offense does not demonstrate that a jury would have found
    Williams any less culpable had he been tried separately.
    ¶6       Moreover, Williams has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying his motion for a new trial because, even under Utah Code section 77‐8a‐1 and
    the case law interpreting that statute, Williams has not demonstrated that he would
    have received a better outcome if he had been tried separately. See Utah Code Ann.
    § 77‐8a‐1(4)(a) (“If the court finds [that] a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder of . . .
    defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court
    shall . . . grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.”);
    State v. O’Brien, 
    721 P.2d 896
    , 898 (Utah 1986) (instructing a trial court to “grant
    severance when there is any doubt as to prejudice”); State v. Telford, 
    940 P.2d 522
    , 525‐26
    (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same). Prejudice occurs where “joint defendants have defenses
    that [are] inconsistent with or . . . obstruct or impede each other.” O’Brien, 721 P.2d at
    898; accord Telford, 
    940 P.2d at 525
    ‐26. “Antagonistic defenses alone are not sufficient to
    require a separate trial. Rather, severance is required only if the defenses conflict to the
    point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.” Telford, 
    940 P.2d at 526
     (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “hostility between co‐defendants or the
    fact that one defendant attempts to cast blame on his co‐defendant is not alone sufficient
    reason to require severance of the co‐defendants’ trials.” OʹBrien, 721 P.2d at 899.
    ¶7      Even though the codefendant’s counsel cast blame on Williams for the
    aggravated kidnapping, Williams’s and the codefendant’s defenses were not
    antagonistic to “the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.” See Telford,
    
    940 P.2d at 526
     (internal quotation marks omitted). Williams’s counsel and the
    codefendent’s counsel used the same strategic approach and cooperated with each other
    to the point of even agreeing to not have either defendant testify against the other. Both
    defenses, including the codefendant’s counsel’s closing argument, focused on proving
    that the victim’s testimony was not believable and that the victim’s actions were
    voluntary. The jury did not have to reject Williams’s defense to believe the
    codefendant’s defense, and vice versa. See 
    id.
     (concluding that the trial court erred by
    failing to sever the trial for defendants because “the defenses were mutually exclusive,”
    that is, “the jury had to reject one defense to believe the other”). We thus conclude that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a new trial.
    20100732‐CA                                    3
    ¶8      Because we determine that Williams was not prejudiced by the joint trial, we
    need not reach Williams’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for his counsel’s failure
    to move the court for a severance of trial. See Archuleta v. Galetka, 
    2011 UT 73
    , ¶ 38, 
    267 P.3d 232
     (“To prevail [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], a defendant must
    show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
    manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
    judgment and, second, that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defendant.” (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Even if Williams’s trial counsel was ineffective in not
    seeking to sever the trial of Williams and the codefendant, Williams has not shown that
    the joint jury trial prejudiced him.
    ¶9     Accordingly, we affirm.
    ____________________________________
    Michele M. Christiansen, Judge
    ‐‐‐‐‐
    ¶10    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    J. Frederic Voros Jr.,
    Associate Presiding Judge
    ____________________________________
    Stephen L. Roth, Judge
    20100732‐CA                                  4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20100732-CA

Citation Numbers: 2012 UT App 128

Filed Date: 4/26/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2021