United States v. Abdul Muhammud , 701 F.3d 109 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 10-3138
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    ABDUL KARIEM MUHAMMUD, a/k/a Gerald Rogers
    Abdul Kariem Muhammud,
    Appellant
    ______________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Crim. No. 2-07-cr-00062)
    District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    September 13, 2012
    ____________
    Before: SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: September 28, 2012)
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    BARRY, Circuit Judge
    Abdul Kariem Muhammud pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement in
    which he waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack the judgment of conviction.
    Nevertheless, more than two years after he was sentenced, Muhammud filed a notice of
    appeal. The government, mistakenly believing that he was appealing the denial of his §
    2255 petition, moved to enforce the waiver but failed to assert the untimeliness of what
    was an appeal from the judgment of conviction. We are presented with the following
    questions: (1) whether the government can initially raise untimeliness in its merits brief to
    us, or must do so beforehand by motion; (2) whether a court can raise untimeliness sua
    sponte when the government has failed to do so; and (3) whether, if the appeal is not
    dismissed as untimely, Muhammud has waived his right to appeal. Because the
    government properly raised untimeliness in its merits brief, we will dismiss the appeal
    and do not reach the other questions presented.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    Muhammud was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to distribute
    controlled substances, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    ; possession of a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c); and possession
    of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). On June 12,
    2007, he pleaded guilty to all three counts pursuant to a written plea agreement that
    contained a waiver both of appeal and collateral attack of his conviction.1 At the plea
    hearing, he acknowledged the waiver, and responded to the District Court’s questions
    regarding the waiver. He was subsequently sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment,
    1
    The waiver contains limited exceptions not applicable here.
    2
    as stipulated in the plea agreement, and acknowledged at sentencing that his appellate
    rights were limited by the plea agreement. He did not file a notice of appeal within ten
    days of entry of the final judgment on June 27, 2008, as then required by Rule
    4(b)(1)(A)(i).
    Almost a year later, Muhammud filed a pro se motion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    ,
    asserting several bases of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his petition
    should be heard, despite the waiver, because his guilty plea had been coerced by his
    attorney and entered under duress. On August 19, 2009, the District Court granted the
    government’s motion to enforce the waiver and dismiss the petition after concluding that
    Muhammud had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his
    conviction and that upholding the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. On
    September 22, 2009, Muhammud filed, pro se, a notice of appeal with respect to the order
    dismissing the § 2255 petition. We remanded the matter to the District Court to
    determine whether a certificate of appealability (“COA”) should issue. The District Court
    denied a COA. We then denied Muhammud’s application to us for a COA, finding that
    jurists of reason would not debate the District Court’s conclusion that he knowingly and
    voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction.
    On June 11, 2010, Muhammud filed a notice of appeal from his judgment of
    conviction of two years earlier. The following month, the government moved to enforce
    3
    the appellate waiver and for summary affirmance,2 and the Clerk of the Court advised the
    parties of the timeliness issue. A motions panel referred the government’s motion to the
    merits panel and directed that the parties also brief whether we may raise sua sponte the
    timeliness requirement of Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), an issue left open in Gov’t of the Virgin
    Islands v. Martinez, 
    620 F.3d 321
    , 327 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010). The government now
    challenges this appeal as untimely and, failing that, as waived.
    II.     ANALYSIS
    The time limit for filing a criminal appeal set forth in Rule 4(b) is rigid but not
    jurisdictional, and may be waived if not invoked by the government. Martinez, 
    620 F.3d at 328-29
    ; see also Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 212 (2007). An untimely appeal
    must be dismissed, however, if the government objects. Martinez, 
    620 F.3d at 328-29
    .
    Although we have not directly considered the issue, other courts of appeals have
    allowed the government to object to timeliness at any point up to and including in its
    merits brief. (See Appellee’s Br. 26-27 (collecting cases)). We agree with that
    conclusion. Because the government invokes Rule 4(b) in its brief, we must—and will—
    dismiss this concededly untimely appeal.3
    2
    The government maintains that it did not move to dismiss the appeal as untimely
    because it mistakenly believed Muhammud was again attempting to appeal the order
    dismissing his § 2255 petition.
    3
    Although, given this conclusion, we need not reach the remaining questions, we
    note that, albeit in dicta, we have also agreed with other courts of appeals that a court may
    sua sponte raise untimeliness under Rule 4, see Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 
    670 F.3d 436
    , 445 n.18 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Gaytan-Garza, 
    652 F.3d 680
    , 681 (6th
    Cir. 2011) (dismissing four-year old appeal sua sponte); United States v. Mitchell, 518
    4
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We will dismiss the appeal as untimely.
    F.3d 740, 750-51 (10th Cir. 2008), and have already found, in the context of his collateral
    attack, that the waiver Muhammud acknowledged was knowing and voluntary. Enforcing
    that waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Goodson, 
    544 F.3d 529
    , 536 (3d Cir. 2008).
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-3138

Citation Numbers: 701 F.3d 109

Judges: Barry, Roth, Scirica

Filed Date: 9/28/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023