United States v. Harvey ( 1998 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    LEON DURWOOD HARVEY,
    Claimant-Appellant.
    and
    PREMISES KNOWN AS 3301 BURGUNDY
    ROAD, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA, a
    No. 98-1116
    parcel of real property and all
    appurtenances thereto, lying in
    Fairfax County, Virginia, and
    containing 10.671 acres; said
    property being titled in the name of
    Realcon Investments, Inc., and any
    and all proceeds from sale of said
    property,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
    Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge.
    (CA-81-1057-A)
    Submitted: October 30, 1998
    Decided: December 4, 1998
    Before MURNAGHAN and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Leon Durwood Harvey, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Gordon
    Dean Kromberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Leon Durwood Harvey appeals the district court's order denying
    his motion for return of funds and payment of interest. Because Har-
    vey filed his motion in 1997, more than ten years after the criminal
    forfeiture of all Harvey's property, we affirm the district court's order
    denying the motion as untimely.
    The United States contended that Harvey and others planned drug
    smuggling at a property in Alexandria, Virginia, known as 3301 Bur-
    gundy Road, which was owned by Realcon, a Liechtenstein corpora-
    tion. The United States has always contended, and Harvey admits,
    that Realcon was his alter ego. When Realcon attempted to sell the
    property, the United States filed a warrant of arrest against, and
    attached, the property. The district court stayed the civil proceedings
    pending further developments in criminal actions against Harvey and
    his confederates, who had been indicted. See United States v. 3301
    Burgundy Rd., 
    728 F.2d 655
    , 656 (4th Cir. 1984).
    The district court denied Realcon's motion to lift the stay, and
    Realcon appealed. Barry Toombs, one of Harvey's cohorts, subse-
    quently pleaded guilty to RICO violations. As part of his plea agree-
    2
    ment, Toombs agreed to forfeit the Burgundy Road property. The
    district court entered a consent judgment requiring that $200,000 in
    proceeds from the sale of the property be transferred to the United
    States. See 
    id. at 657
    .
    In 3301 Burgundy Rd., we vacated the consent judgment because
    Toombs had no forfeitable interest in the property. We remanded to
    the district court for a determination of the property's rightful owner.
    See 
    id.
     Following remand, the district court on April 30, 1984, dis-
    missed the case for want of jurisdiction because the proceeds of the
    sale had been transferred outside the Eastern District of Virginia, to
    the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. Neither Realcon nor
    Harvey appealed the dismissal.
    A superseding indictment was returned against Harvey in 1985.
    The United States also sought forfeiture of all of Harvey's property.
    Harvey was convicted in 1986 on numerous counts, including RICO
    violations, operating a continuing criminal enterprise, tax evasion,
    and conspiracy. On February 18, 1986, the district court entered an
    order forfeiting all of Harvey's assets, including his corporate, busi-
    ness, and personal interests. Harvey was sentenced to forty years in
    prison; his term later was reduced to thirty years.
    On August 27, 1997, Harvey filed the subject motion for return of
    seized property, claiming that the forfeiture litigation in this case was
    still pending, presumably because we vacated the forfeiture order in
    3301 Burgundy Rd. He claimed that he was entitled to the return of
    the property (or its proceeds) and to interest from the date of the
    improper seizure.
    Harvey ignores the fact that he forfeited all his assets in the crimi-
    nal proceeding. He admits that he and Realcon were the same entity.
    Therefore, the valid criminal forfeiture of all his assets included the
    forfeiture of the Burgundy Road property, which had been held in the
    name of Realcon.
    Harvey waited more than ten years after the criminal forfeiture to
    institute this action. The most generous limitations period that might
    apply to this motion for return of seized property is six years. See 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2401
     (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); Boero v. DEA, 
    111 F.3d
        3
    301, 305 n.5 (2d Cir. 1997). His motion was untimely, as the district
    court correctly found.
    Harvey is not, as he contends, entitled to application of the rule
    announced in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 
    510 U.S. 43
     (1993). In Good, the Supreme Court declared that the seizure
    of real property without a pre-seizure hearing violated the owner's
    due process rights. See 
    id. at 46
    . The remedy for a Good violation is
    to release to the owner of the property the profits or rent which the
    owner lost during the period of the illegal seizure. See United States
    v. Marsh, 
    105 F.3d 927
    , 931 (4th Cir. 1997).
    To the extent that Good applies to criminal forfeitures, it applies
    only to cases that were pending at the time Good was announced. See
    
    id.,
     105 F.3d at 931. As the forfeiture in this case was accomplished
    long before the Good decision, Harvey may not benefit from the
    Good rule.
    We therefore affirm the decision of the district court. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
    quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-1116

Filed Date: 12/4/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014