Willie Gooding v. James Wynder , 459 F. App'x 83 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 10-1063
WILLIE GOODING,
Appellant
v.
JAMES WYNDER, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Dallas;
*SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
THOMAS CORBETT, Attorney General of Pennsylvania;
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR YORK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.)
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-07-cv-01243)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on October 27, 2011
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 25, 2012)
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Willie Gooding appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in relation to convictions for kidnapping and third degree murder. We
limit our review to the two issues on which the District Court granted certificates of
appealability, and for the reasons explained below, we will affirm the denial of
Gooding’s petition.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 7, 1996, Terrence Murphy, accompanied by two other men,
attempted to rob a house in York, Pennsylvania, where Gooding and others engaged in
illegal drug trafficking. While fleeing the scene, Murphy fired shots at Charles Malloy,
an associate of Gooding’s. Though uncertain of the shooter’s identity, Gooding, Malloy
and two other men - Antoine Brown and Corey Riera – speculated that Murphy and
Arthur Irick, both known for robbing drug dealers, might have been involved and set out
in search of them to retaliate. They soon found Irick, and, thinking that he could be of
use in locating Murphy, picked him up in one of their cars and continued their search.
Irick directed them to an apartment building where he thought Murphy could be found,
but he was not there. At that point, the men drove to an isolated lot and forced Irick out
of the car. Malloy then shot him four times, killing him.
Based upon evidence of the above presented at trial in Pennsylvania state court,
Gooding was convicted, as an accomplice, for the kidnapping and third degree murder of
Irick. He was sentenced to the maximum 20-40 years imprisonment for third degree
murder and the maximum 10-20 years imprisonment for kidnapping. He was
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unsuccessful in appealing his conviction in Pennsylvania state court and filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court. That court denied the petition but
granted certificates of appealability on two issues: (1) whether the prosecutor’s conduct
so infected the trial with unfairness as to deny Gooding due process and (2) whether
Gooding was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by his attorney’s failure
to request a jury instruction clarifying the limited purpose for which “other bad acts”
evidence was admitted. Gooding now raises these issues in his appeal to this Court.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction over Gooding’s petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 and our jurisdiction to hear his appeal is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253.
Our review is plenary, so we scrutinize the state court determinations under the same
standards as did the District Court. Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009).
Under those standards, a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by a federal court on a
claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the adjudication (1)
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A claim is
adjudicated “on the merits” when it is finally resolved based on its substance rather than
on a procedural or other ground. Thomas, 570 F.3d at 117. When a claim before a
federal habeas court has not been previously adjudicated “on the merits,” however, that
court conducts de novo review over pure questions of law and mixed questions of law
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and fact. Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009). Regardless of how a claim was
adjudicated in state court, that court’s relevant factual determinations are presumed
correct, rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process
Gooding first argues that his due process rights were violated by repeated
comments by the prosecutor that rendered his criminal trial fundamentally unfair. He
identifies 23 separate instances of such statements, made throughout the various stages of
the trial, which generally portray drug dealers in a negative light, emphasize the fact that
Gooding and his associates are drug dealers from New York City, and ascribe
responsibility for many of the problems facing York to the illegal activities of these
outsiders. Gooding argues that these statements deprived him of a fair trial because their
intent and effect were to cause the jury to conclude that he was a dangerous person and to
convict him in order to address the problems in York.
Gooding is correct that prosecutorial misconduct can “so infect[] [a] trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). This occurs, though, only if the misconduct
constitutes a “failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice.” Id. at 642. Under our interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, determining
whether this type of due process violation has occurred requires us to “examine the
prosecutor’s offensive actions in context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the
severity of the conduct, the effect of [any] curative instructions, and the quantum of
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evidence against the defendant.” Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001).
We agree with the District Court that the prosecutor’s statements connecting
Gooding to drug trafficking were not improper. Evidence that Gooding and his
associates were involved in such activity served to establish a connection between the
four of them and provided context and a motive for Irick’s kidnapping and murder. The
prosecutor’s references to Gooding’s drug dealing were therefore within bounds.
We also agree that the prosecutor’s statements about crime in York in general, its
association with outsiders from New York City, and the resulting implication that
Gooding and his associates were responsible not merely for Irick’s murder but also for
broader social problems in York were objectionable. However, in the context of the
entire trial, there were only a few isolated statements to this effect and they were made
only tangentially to proper statements explaining the connection between Irick’s murder
and drug trafficking. We also note that the trial judge instructed the jury that statements
of counsel were not evidence, thus minimizing any potential prejudice from these
statements. And perhaps most importantly, there was significant evidence of Gooding’s
guilt. Two of the other men involved in Irick’s murder, Brown and Riera, provided
detailed testimony about Gooding’s role, thereby implicating him as an accomplice. This
testimony was consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case and was corroborated
by the testimony of other witnesses, such as Terrence Murphy. The testimony was also
supported by physical evidence, including a murder weapon found with Riera’s
assistance that matched casings found at the crime scene. Finally, there was evidence of
a strong motive for the crimes. In light of all this evidence, the fact that any
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objectionable statements were not prominent in the context of the trial, and the general
jury instruction that such statements were not evidence, we find that the prosecutor’s
comments did not infect the trial with unfairness and thus did not render Gooding’s
conviction a violation of his due process rights.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As we have discussed, the prosecution’s evidence of Gooding’s engagement in
drug trafficking was relevant because it explained the relation between the four
assailants, their connection to Irick, and their motive for kidnapping and murdering him.
Gooding argues, however, that such evidence could have led the jury to make improper
inferences of his bad character and propensity to engage in crime, and that his attorney
should have requested that the court give an instruction to the jury to prevent it from
reaching these conclusions. He claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to do
so, thus depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, Gooding can make out a claim of
constitutionally ineffective counsel only if he can demonstrate “(1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient, that is, it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced [him].” Albrecht v. Horn, 485
F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-92
(1984)). To establish prejudice, Gooding must prove that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Even assuming that
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the failure to request a limiting instruction in relation to evidence of Gooding’s
engagement in drug trafficking was deficient performance by his attorney, we find that
Gooding cannot succeed on this claim because he cannot establish that he was prejudiced.
We reach this conclusion based on the strength of the evidence of Gooding’s guilt, which
we are required to consider. See Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 1999). As
we have described, such evidence was significant, including incriminating testimony
provided by two of his fellow assailants, corroborating testimony by other witnesses,
physical evidence, and strong evidence of motive. Accordingly, we are confident that the
outcome of Gooding’s trial would not have been different had his attorney requested a
limiting instruction related to evidence of his drug trafficking, and we reject his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying
Gooding’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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