United States v. Jamael Stubbs , 578 F. App'x 114 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2638
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMAEL STUBBS,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 1-12-cr-00009-004
(Honorable Christopher C. Conner)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 10, 2014
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 28, 2014)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Jamael Stubbs was the getaway driver for an armed bank robbery. He
was indicted in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and, through vicarious liability, was
convicted of one count of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and
(d), and one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Stubbs appeals his § 924(c) conviction and sentence arguing
that (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of brandishing a firearm, and
(2) the imposition of a higher mandatory sentence for brandishing a firearm violates the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013),
because his indictment only charged him with using and carrying a firearm. Because
there was sufficient evidence to convict him of brandishing a firearm and the seven-year
sentence did not constitute reversible plain error, we will affirm.1
I.
On August 29, 2012, a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned
a twelve-count indictment charging Stubbs with two counts of armed bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and two counts of using and carrying a firearm
during the robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).2 He was charged along
with three co-defendants: Tristan Green, Nijul Alexander, and Jami Shabazz. Alexander
and Shabazz pled guilty and testified for the prosecution.
According to Alexander’s testimony, Stubbs was intimately involved in the
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
The charges related to two alleged bank robberies that took place in November and December
of 2007. The government withdrew the charges relating to the December robbery, and Stubbs
proceeded to trial only on the offenses arising out of the November robbery.
2
planning and execution of the November 2007 robbery. Stubbs, Green, and Alexander
planned the logistics in multiple discussions and rehearsed how the robbery would take
place. The defendants had planned that Stubbs would drive Green and Alexander to the
bank and, after the robbery, would drive Green and Alexander to another vehicle driven
by Shabazz, where the two gunmen would switch cars to avoid police detection.
As rehearsed and scheduled, Stubbs drove Green and Alexander to the bank on the
day of the robbery and remained in the vehicle while the two robbed the bank at
gunpoint. According to photographs taken from bank video, bank personnel testimony,
and co-conspirator admission, Green and Alexander pointed their guns at various bank
personnel during the robbery. After completing the robbery, Green, Alexander, and
Stubbs escaped in Stubbs’s car with backpacks filled with stolen money. As they fled,
dye packets contained among the stolen cash exploded. Green and Alexander threw the
backpacks containing the stained money and Alexander’s gun out of Stubbs’s car. Police
later identified those backpacks as ones purchased by Green and Stubbs a few days
before the robbery at a nearby Walmart. Stubbs dropped off Green and Alexander at
Shabazz’s car, and the four defendants reconvened at Stubbs’s house to clean the dye
from his car.
At the close of the government’s case, Stubbs moved for a judgment of acquittal
on the armed bank robbery and firearm counts. The District Court denied the motion,
concluding “there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could
reach a verdict of guilty.” App. 862. The jury found Stubbs guilty on both counts.
Although the indictment charged Stubbs with “carry[ing] and us[ing] a firearm during . . .
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a crime of violence . . . in violation of . . . Section 924(c)(1)(A),” App. 41, the jury found
that “Stubbs or a coconspirator did knowingly . . . brandish a firearm during . . . a crime
of violence,” App. 59 (emphasis added). Stubbs was sentenced to a prison term of 154
months—70 months for armed robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), plus 84
months (seven-year) statutory minimum for brandishing a firearm during a crime of
violence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).3 Stubbs filed a timely notice of appeal challenging his
conviction and sentence for the § 924(c) charge. Stubbs does not challenge his conviction
for armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d).
II.
Stubbs advances two arguments on appeal, both concerning his § 924(c)
conviction for brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence: (1) that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of brandishing a firearm under either a Pinkerton co-
conspirator theory or an aiding and abetting theory of liability, and (2) that the imposition
of a mandatory seven-year sentence for brandishing a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)
violates Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), because Stubbs’s indictment
only charged him with “carry[ing] and us[ing] a firearm,” but not with the separate
“brandishing” element.
A.
Stubbs first challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of
acquittal on the § 924(c) count. Stubbs argues the government did not produce sufficient
3
The crime charged in the indictment, using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence,
carries a five-year mandatory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
4
evidence to convict him under either theory of liability charged—Pinkerton co-
conspirator liability or aiding and abetting liability.
We exercise plenary review over the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
criminal conviction. United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 2012). “[T]he
critical inquiry . . . is whether . . . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez,
726 F.3d 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 318-19 (1979)). We accord deference to the jury’s verdict by viewing “the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government” and drawing “all reasonable inferences in
favor of the jury verdict.” Moyer, 674 F.3d at 206 (quoting United States v. Riley, 621
F.3d 312, 329 (3d Cir. 2010)).
The jury found Stubbs guilty of brandishing a firearm during commission of a
violent crime. Although Stubbs did not personally brandish a firearm during the bank
robbery, he can be vicariously liable for the offense under either a Pinkerton co-
conspirator theory or an aiding and abetting theory of liability. In Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), “the Supreme Court held that the criminal act of one
conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is attributable to the other[ ] [conspirators]
for the purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense.” United States v.
Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A defendant is liable for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators under a
Pinkerton theory if (1) the defendant is a party to a criminal conspiracy, (2) one or more
co-conspirators committed the substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, and
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(3) commission of the substantive offense was reasonably foreseeable. United States v.
Ramos, 147 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 1998).
Stubbs only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the first prong of
Pinkerton, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that he entered into a conspiracy
to commit an armed bank robbery.4 But Stubbs’s argument is unavailing. The first prong
of Pinkerton requires only that a defendant enter into an unlawful conspiracy. See, e.g.,
Ramos, 147 F.3d at 286; United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1997). All
that the first prong of Pinkerton requires for Stubbs’s § 924(c) brandishing count is that
the jury find the defendant joined a criminal conspiracy. Accordingly, the first prong of
Pinkerton liability is satisfied if Stubbs entered into an agreement to rob a bank.5
There was ample evidence in the record for a rational juror to find beyond a
4
Stubbs does not challenge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence that a co-conspirator
brandished a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy or that brandishing a firearm during the
robbery was reasonably foreseeable.
5
Stubbs points to one sentence of the district court’s jury instructions to argue that the
government had the higher burden of proving that he knowingly and voluntarily entered into a
conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery with full knowledge that guns would be used.
Appellant Br. 24. But reading the jury instructions as a whole, the district court adequately
instructed the jury on the first prong of Pinkerton liability. See App. 964 (“What the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that two or more persons in some way or manner
arrived at some type of an agreement, mutual understanding, or meeting of the minds to try to
accomplish a common and unlawful objective.” (emphasis added)); id. at 962-63 (“The
government does not have to prove that . . . Stubbs specifically agreed or knew that these
offenses would be committed. However, the government must prove that the offenses were
reasonably foreseeable to . . . Stubbs as a member of the conspiracy and within the scope of the
agreement . . . .”); id. at 963-64 (“The government does not have to prove . . . that all members of
the conspiracy . . . agreed to all the details or agreed to what the means were by which the
objectives would be accomplished.”); id. at 965 (“The government does not have [to] prove that
the alleged conspirators agreed to commit all of the crimes. The government, however, must
prove that they agreed to commit at least one of the object[ive] crimes . . . .”); id. at 931 (“You
are not to single out any one instruction alone as stating the law, but must consider the
instructions as a whole in reaching your decisions.”).
6
reasonable doubt that Stubbs joined a conspiracy to rob a bank with Green and
Alexander. According to Alexander’s testimony, Stubbs was intimately involved in the
planning and execution of the November robbery. Stubbs, Green, and Alexander planned
the logistics of the robbery in multiple discussions, and they rehearsed the robbery.
Furthermore, there was ample evidence that the robbery actually took place and that
Stubbs participated in the commission of the crime as rehearsed. In sum, there was
sufficient evidence that Stubbs entered into a criminal conspiracy with Green and
Alexander and the evidence of Stubbs’s role in the planning and execution of the robbery
was sufficient for a rational juror to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, Stubbs vicariously
liable for a violation of § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) under a Pinkerton co-conspirator theory.6
B.
Stubbs also argues the imposition of a mandatory seven-year sentence for
brandishing a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) violates Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 2151 (2013), because Stubbs’s indictment charged him with carrying and using a
firearm but not with the separate element of brandishing a firearm. Accordingly, we must
6
Stubbs also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction under an aiding and
abetting theory. In a case decided during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court
clarified the standard for showing that a defendant aided and abetted a § 924(c) offense. See
Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). The Court in Rosemond held that convicting
a defendant for a § 924(c) offense under an aiding and abetting theory requires the government to
prove that “the defendant actively participated in the underlying . . . violent crime with advance
knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Id. at
1243 (emphasis added). The defendant must have advance knowledge of the use of a firearm so
that he or she has the opportunity “to make the relevant legal (and indeed moral) choice” to join
the criminal venture or “to quit the crime.” Id. at 1249. Since we find the evidence sufficient to
convict Stubbs under a Pinkerton theory of vicarious liability, we need not decide whether there
was sufficient evidence of Stubbs’s advance knowledge under Rosemond.
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address (1) whether the “brandishing” element of § 924(c) must be charged in an
indictment, and, if so, (2) whether its omission constitutes reversible plain error.
1.
A person who uses or carries a firearm during a crime of violence faces a
consecutive sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A
person who brandishes a firearm during a crime of violence faces a consecutive sentence
of at least seven years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Stubbs’s indictment
charged him with “carry[ing] and us[ing] a firearm during . . . a crime of violence . . . in
violation of . . . Section 924(c)(1)(A).” App. 41. But the jury convicted Stubbs of
“brandishing” a firearm during the armed robbery, which carries a higher mandatory
sentence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). App. 59. The additional “brandishing” element
increased his mandatory minimum sentence from five years to seven years.
Less than a month after Stubbs was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Alleyne
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). In an extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), which held that—under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution—any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond a statutory
maximum constitutes an element of a crime that must be charged in the indictment and
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, Alleyne held that any fact which increases
a mandatory minimum sentence also constitutes an element of a crime. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct.
at 2155. The Court in Alleyne determined that the “brandishing” provision of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii)—the same element at issue here—constitutes an element of a separate,
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aggravated § 924(c) offense that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.7 Id.
at 2163.
The government contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, unlike in
Apprendi, did not explicitly say that the element must also be charged in the indictment
and only requires that brandishing be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The
government therefore argues that Stubbs’s sentence does not run afoul of Alleyne because
the jury in Stubbs’s case found brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
To adequately address the government’s argument, we briefly recite the
jurisprudence’s evolution. In Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that “under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees
of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6 (1999). One year later, the
Court confirmed this constitutional view expressed in Jones, holding that the Constitution
imposes those requirements in a case involving a state statute. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
476; see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (“In [Apprendi], we held
that . . . any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In federal
prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)). The Apprendi Court reasoned that “[i]f a defendant faces
7
In so doing, Alleyne overruled United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), which held that
“brandishing” under § 924(c) was a sentencing factor that did not need to be alleged in the
indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
9
punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain
circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma
attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should
not—at the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances—be deprived of
protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
484.
In Alleyne, the Court applied the constitutional requirements announced in
Apprendi to facts that increase a statutory minimum sentence. The Alleyne Court held that
“the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the
mandatory minimum.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160; see also id. at 2163 (“[T]here is no
basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that
increase the minimum.”). Thus, the constitutional requirements that apply to facts that
increase a statutory maximum apply to facts that increase a statutory minimum. The
Alleyne Court concluded
The District Court imposed the 7-year mandatory minimum sentence based
on its finding by a preponderance of evidence that the firearm was
“brandished.” Because the finding of brandishing increased the penalty to
which the defendant was subjected, it was an element, which had to be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge, rather than the
jury, found brandishing, thus violating petitioner’s Sixth Amendment
rights.
Id. at 2163-64. The Court expressly relied on the fact that the brandishing element was
not submitted to the jury in overturning Alleyne’s sentence. That the Court did not hold
in the alternative that the brandishing element was also improperly omitted from the
indictment does not mean—as the government argues here—that only some of the
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constitutional requirements of Apprendi apply to facts that increase a mandatory
minimum. Rather, because “the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to
facts increasing the mandatory minimum,” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160, the fact of
brandishing is an element of the crime that “must be charged in an indictment,” Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 476. In other words, if the failure of a federal indictment to charge an element
that increased a statutory maximum constitutes an Apprendi error, see Cotton, 535 U.S. at
627, then the failure of a federal indictment to charge an element that increased the
statutory minimum constitutes an Alleyne error. Here, the omission of “brandishing”—an
element of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) that increases the statutory minimum—from
Stubbs’s indictment is an error in light of Alleyne.
2.
Because the omission of the brandishing element from the indictment was not
challenged before the district court, we review Stubbs’s sentence for “plain error” under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. A reversible
plain error requires: (1) “an error” (2) “that is plain,” (3) “that affect[s] substantial
rights,” and (4) that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Alleyne was decided after Stubbs was
sentenced, we consider whether an error was plain at the time of appellate review. See
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1127 (2013).
In United States v. Cotton, the Supreme Court faced a question similar to the one
we face here. 535 U.S. at 625. A federal indictment charged Cotton with conspiracy to
11
distribute a “detectable amount” of cocaine, but Cotton was convicted of and sentenced
for conspiracy to distribute “at least 50 grams of cocaine base.” Id. at 628. The quantity
element raised the statutory maximum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Because
Apprendi was decided after Cotton was sentenced but during his direct appeal, the Court
in Cotton had to decide whether an indictment’s omission of an element that increased a
statutory maximum sentence constituted reversible plain error. Id. at 627. The Court held
that although the omission of the element from the indictment was an error, it “did not
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”
because of the “overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence” that Cotton’s crime
involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base. Id. at 632-34 (“The evidence that the
conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base was overwhelming and essentially
uncontroverted. . . . Surely the grand jury, having found that the conspiracy existed,
would have also found that the conspiracy involved at least 50 grams of cocaine base.”).
Likewise, the omission of “brandishing” from Stubbs’s indictment was an error,
but not one that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings” because the evidence that at least one of Stubbs’s co-conspirators
brandished a firearm during the bank robbery was “overwhelming and uncontroverted.”
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633-34. Photographs taken during the robbery from the bank’s
surveillance video show Stubbs’s co-conspirators pointing guns at bank employees. One
of Stubbs’s co-conspirators testified that he brandished a gun during the bank robbery.
And several bank personnel testified at trial that firearms were pointed at them during the
robbery. Moreover, there was no evidence challenging or undermining the fact that
12
firearms were brandished during the bank robbery. Based on this evidence, the grand
jury, having found that the conspiracy existed, would have also found that the crime
involved brandishing firearms. Because of the “overwhelming and uncontroverted”
evidence of brandishing a firearm, the Alleyne error here “did not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 632-33.
Accordingly, Stubbs’s sentence for brandishing a firearm under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) does
not constitute reversible plain error.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Stubbs’s conviction and sentence.
13