Joseph Reisinger v. City of Wilkes-Barre , 520 F. App'x 77 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-1519
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JOSEPH R. REISINGER,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE; MAYOR THOMAS LEIGHTON, City of Wilkes-Barre;
FRANCIS KATZ, Plumbing Inspector, City of Wilkes-Barre, Code Enforcement Officer;
GREGORY BARROUK; MICHAEL KERMEC; THE CADLE COMPANY II, INC. *
*(Amended in accordance with Clerk’s Order dated March 28, 2011)
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 3:09-cv-00210)
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 10, 2012
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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., NYGAARD, VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 29, 2013)
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OPINION
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
In the course of pursuing his suit against Appellees, Appellant Joseph R. Reisinger
(“Appellant”) filed with the District Court (1) a motion for an extension of the discovery
period and (2) motions to compel production of documents by Appellees. The District
Court denied Appellant’s motions as well as a Motion to Reconsider. Appellant
appealed. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of
Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the facts
essential to our discussion. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Appellant filed suit against
Appellees in early February 2009, alleging, among other things, the violation of his First,
Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As part of its Case Management Order,
the District Court set the end of discovery for November 30, 2009. On October 30, 2009,
Appellant — at that time represented by counsel — filed his first motion to extend this
discovery deadline. (App. at 52-53 (requesting a 90-day extension “due to the number of
Defendants and the complexity of the case”).) The District Court granted this motion,
and extended the discovery deadline to January 31, 2010.
In early January 2010, Appellant once again requested an extension of the
discovery deadline — this time due in part to an “injury sustained by the Plaintiff on
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December 29, 2009.” (Id. at 61-62.) In granting this extension, the District Court
specifically limited the scope of discovery to the taking of certain already-noticed
depositions and “discovery related to information obtained during the depositions
specifically allowed by this Order.” (Id. at 63-64.)
In late March, Appellant — who is a tax attorney — discharged his counsel and
elected to proceed pro se. As a consequence, Appellant sought once again to extend the
discovery deadline — this time requesting an additional 120 days. Appellant averred that
his counsel never informed him of the various discovery deadlines and that, without the
requested extension of time, he would be unable to proceed with his suit. Appellant
therefore requested “(i) sixty (60) days to prepare and serve interrogatories and motions
for production of documents on each of the Defendants, . . . and to review the responses
thereto, and (ii) sixty (60) days to schedule and take depositions of the Defendants and
any other potential witnesses.” (Id. at 69-70.)
In its subsequent Order, the District Court again extended the discovery deadline,
this time mandating that “[a]ll discovery shall be completed on or before June 30, 2010.” 1
(Id. at 78-79 (extending the deadline, in part, because Appellant was “no longer
represented by counsel and [was] proceeding pro se”).)
The situation came to a head once the June 30, 2010 deadline passed. In early
August, Appellees requested an extension of the discovery deadline until September 30,
1
In a subsequent order, the District Court explained that this extension of time no longer
limited the nature of the discovery to which Appellant was entitled.
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2010 due to certain delays on Appellant’s part. Appellant responded with a cross-motion,
requesting an opportunity to file (a) motions to compel and (b) a response and proposed
amended case management plan. Appellant averred that he had not engaged in any
dilatory tactics but had instead been addressing a litany of health problems and the recent
death of his son (who had passed mere days before the June 30, 2010 deadline had run).
Before the District Court ruled on his cross-motion, however, Appellant filed a pair of
motions to compel on August 16, directing Appellees to produce certain documents and
answer certain interrogatories. The very next day, the District Court denied Appellant’s
motion for an extension of time 2 and, a day after that, denied Appellant’s motions to
compel as untimely.
Having thus been deprived of additional discovery, Appellant moved the District
Court to reconsider its rulings from August 17 and 18. After Appellees filed opposition
briefs in mid-September, Appellant requested a 10-day extension of time to file his reply
brief, successfully extending his filing deadline to October 14, 2010. But when the
fourteenth came, Appellant again requested an extension, this time seeking an additional
eleven days. And when those additional eleven days had gone by, Appellant once more
requested an extension, seeking an extra 24-hours, and another 48 hours after that. This,
it seems, was the straw that broke the camel’s back.
The District Court, citing its interest in “judicial economy and administrative
efficiency,” issued an order on October 28 that suspended all filing deadlines and
2
While the District Court’s order was dated August 16, it was not officially docketed
until August 17.
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prohibited any further filings without the District Court’s permission. Reisinger v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, No. 3:09-cv-00210 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2010). Consequently, it denied
Appellant’s motion for a 48-hour extension as moot. Id. Then, after a December 2010
conference, the District Court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration and referred
the case to a Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.
It was then that Appellant moved to voluntarily dismiss his case (with prejudice),
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so as to take an appeal
from the District Court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. On the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation, the District Court granted Appellant’s motion. Appellant’s
planned appeal is now before us.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331and 1343. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3
Ordinarily, “the denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1203 (3d Cir.
1995) (citing Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985)).
Thus, we look to see whether the decision was “‘arbitrary, fanciful or clearly
unreasonable.’” Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 201
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Ordinarily, a District Court’s discovery-related decisions are not final rulings under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Bacher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.3d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 2000). In the instant
case, however, Appellant chose to voluntarily terminate his suit — with prejudice — in
order to take immediate appeal from the District Court’s ruling regarding the motion to
reconsider. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
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(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 542 (3d
Cir. 2007)).
However, “[b]ecause an appeal from a denial of a Motion for Reconsideration
brings up the underlying judgment for review, the standard of review varies with the
nature of the underlying judgment.” McAlister v. Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348-49 (3d Cir.
1986)). Thus, where “the underlying judgment was based in part upon the interpretation
and application of a legal precept, our review is plenary.” United States v. Herrold, 962
F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Koshatka, 762 F.2d at 333). However, “to the
extent that the district court’s order was based on its factual conclusions, we review under
a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.” Id. (citing Ram Constr. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749
F.2d 1049, 1053 (3d Cir. 1984)). In reviewing a district court’s rulings regarding
discovery, we look for an abuse of discretion. See Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d
760, 778 (3d Cir. 2000).
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III. ANALYSIS 4
We have long held that “matters of docket control and conduct of discovery are
committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig.,
685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). Moreover, “[w]e will not interfere with a trial court’s
control of its docket ‘except upon the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted
in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.’” Id. (quoting Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1105 (5th Cir. 1972)). Thus, Appellant
would have to demonstrate that “the district court’s denial of discovery ‘made it
impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a showing is proof that more
diligent discovery was impossible.’” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar
Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Fine Paper, 685 F.2d at 818).
In the instant case, the District Court denied Appellant’s motion for an extension
of time because Appellant was “routinely dilatory in compliance with deadlines” and the
“scheduling difficulties which his problems create[d] for Defendants certainly [did] not
promote the efficient administration of justice.” (App. at 6.) Moreover, the District
Court rightly observed that, while the passing of Appellant’s son is a tragedy, Appellant
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The vast majority of Appellant’s arguments rely on an erroneous premise: that the
District Court’s decisions to deny his requests for additional discovery are tantamount to
imposing sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In line with
this argument, Appellant continuously asserts that the District Court, in denying him
additional discovery, effectively imposed the “Death Penalty” on his case. (See, e.g.,
Appellant’s Br. at 2.) As a preliminary point, we note that there is no basis in the record
for finding that these rulings were a form of sanctions. Thus, we decline to engage in the
sort of review that Appellant invites us to undertake.
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“present[ed] absolutely no evidence that he would have complied with the [existing]
deadline but for the tragic event.” (Id.) Most importantly, while Appellant did provide
plausible explanations for many of the delays, we find no abuse of discretion in the
District Court’s ruling given that he failed to demonstrate “that more diligent discovery
was impossible.” Mass. Sch. of Law., 107 F.3d at 1032 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We likewise see no error in the District Court’s denial of Appellant’s untimely
Motions to Compel. The District Court observed that “the Court has denied [Appellant’s]
motion for extension of time to file motions to compel” and “the Court’s subsequent
extension of the discovery deadline was not intended to provide an additional opportunity
to accomplish things that could have and should have been accomplished by the June 30,
2010, discovery deadline.” (App. at 145.) Because this motion could have rightly been
filed before the June 30 deadline — as the District Court noted, Appellant had conceded
his understanding of Appellees’ alleged stalling tactics — we see no abuse of discretion
in this ruling.
Having found no initial error that would have compelled the District Court to
reverse its decision on a motion to reconsider, we turn to the substance of Appellant’s
motion. Previously, we have held that motions to reconsider have a very limited scope:
they are not “to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case; rather, they may be used
only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”
Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011). Moreover, “new evidence” for
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purposes of this inquiry “does not refer to evidence that a party . . . submits to the court
after an adverse ruling. Rather, new evidence in this context means evidence that a party
could not earlier submit to the court because that evidence was not previously available.”
Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).
In the instant case, we do not see how any of the materials and arguments
submitted by Appellant in his Motion to Reconsider should have altered the District
Court’s analysis. The bulk of his submission consisted of claims and arguments (some
substantiated by appended documents) regarding the reasons behind his delays. Aside
from the fact that none of this material qualifies as “new evidence,” we also hold that
none of the arguments contained in Appellant’s submission should have compelled the
District Court to alter its decision with respect to the motion for an extension of time.
Likewise, we can discern no basis for finding an abuse of discretion on the District
Court’s part regarding the motion to compel — the District Court rightly held that the
motions were untimely, and Appellant provided no grounds (legal or factual) which
would mandate a contrary holding. 5
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of
Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider.
5
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting (and then declining to
reconsider its ruling on) Appellees’ motion for an extension of their discovery deadline.
Appellees demonstrated that they were unable to conduct sufficient discovery due to
Appellant’s delays — whatever the causes may have been — and the District Court did
not err in granting them additional time to complete discovery.
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