Reynolds v. Department of Homeland Security Citizenship & Immigration Services , 523 F. App'x 178 ( 2013 )

BLD-292 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1795
___________
CRAYTON EVERTON REYNOLDS,
Appellant
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:13-cv-00036)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 20, 2013
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 3, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Crayton Everton Reynolds, a citizen of Jamaica, is a federal prisoner at the
Moshannon Valley Correctional Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania.1 In 2013,
Reynolds filed a “Petition for U.S. Citizenship” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), claiming
that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had failed to act on
his naturalization application (which was allegedly filed in 2006). He requested that the
District Court grant him United States citizenship, or, in the alternative, order USCIS to
process his application and/or grant him citizenship. The District Court denied his
requests and dismissed the petition.
Reynolds appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conduct
plenary review of decisions based on subject-matter jurisdiction and other questions of
law. See Nuveen Mun. Trust v. Withumsmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir.
2012) (citation omitted); see also Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (“We may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.”).
We agree with the District Court that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1447(b). By its plain language, the statute provides jurisdiction for the District
Court to consider citizenship matters “[i]f there is a failure to make a determination under
section 1446 of this title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which the
examination is conducted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). In other words, § 1447(b) contains no
1
Reynolds pleaded guilty to drug-related crimes and received a five-year sentence. See
United States v. Reynolds, E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 2:09-cr-00823.
2
basis for action if the applicant has not yet been “examined” in connection with his
citizenship application. And the statute’s language “suggests that the examination is a
distinct, single event[:] the date on which the interview occurs.” Walji v. Gonzales, 500
F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Duran-Pichardo v. Att’y Gen., 695 F.3d 282, 286
(3d Cir. 2012); Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 386 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The 120-day
period under § 1447(b) does not even begin to run until after the initial naturalization
examination . . . .”); United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). Without the presence of an eligibility examination, the District Court lacks
jurisdiction under the statute. See Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2008),
distinguished on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678
F.3d 254, 259 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012).
While Reynolds’s petition is somewhat vague, he strongly implied that he never
received an interview. See, e.g., Pet. 3–4 (explaining that his interview was cancelled in
2007 and that attempts to reschedule were for naught). Reynolds provided no contrary
information about an interview below. Nor has he done so on appeal, despite being
afforded time to do so (and despite being informed of this defect in his petition by the
District Court). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed the
application under § 1447(b) for lack of jurisdiction.
Alternatively, Reynolds’s petition can be read to invoke the District Court’s
mandamus authority (under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1361) or the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). See, e.g., Ali v. Frazier, 575 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090
3
(D. Minn. 2008). The District Court appears to have held that Reynolds’s status as a
prisoner defeated any nondiscretionary duty that might have been owed to him by the
USCIS. We need not reach that question, however, because Reynolds is currently in
removal proceedings, and “a district court cannot order the Attorney General to naturalize
an alien who is subject to pendent removal proceedings.” Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 259; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1429. The District Court could not order or hasten, whether via the
Administrative Procedure Act or mandamus, relief that the USCIS is statutorily barred
from granting.2
As this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
judgment of the District Court.3 See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
2
Removal proceedings may have formally commenced after the Magistrate Judge issued
his Report and Recommendation, but before the District Court adopted it. Thus, by the
time it issued its order, the District Court could not have granted relief.
3
Our decision is without prejudice to Reynolds’s ability to pursue a defensive claim of
citizenship in his removal proceedings or an affirmative application subject to the
statutory requirements and limitations. See Rios-Valenzuela v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
506 F.3d 393, 396–97 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing the different ways a person can
assert a claim of citizenship).
4