Joseph Greenawalt v. Clarion Cty , 459 F. App'x 165 ( 2012 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 11-2422
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JOSEPH GREENAWALT,
Appellant
v.
CLARION COUNTY
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-01489)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 23, 2012
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Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2012)
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OPINION
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Joseph Greenawalt appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to his
former employer, Clarion County, in his suit alleging unlawful employment
discrimination on the basis of age and gender. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to
our decision. Greenawalt worked as a corrections officer at the Clarion County Jail from
November 2001, when he was hired at age 51, until August 2008, when he was
terminated at age 58. An investigation by the Deputy Warden in 2008 revealed that
Greenawalt, using an alias to conceal his identity, had been covertly mailing ―gifts‖ of
about $20 per week ($600 to $700 total) to a female inmate and depositing that money in
her account at the Jail. Clarion County Jail Administrative Policy A-106, which was in
place at the time of Greenawalt’s employment, restricted the permissible nature of
relationships between corrections officers and current and former inmates. It specifically
prohibited monetary gifts. When confronted, Greenawalt admitted that he sent the money
to the inmate under a false name and that his actions violated Policy A-106. After an
administrative hearing on the matter, Greenawalt was discharged.
Greenawalt then sued Clarion County, claiming that he was discharged on the
basis of his age and gender in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. Although Greenawalt admitted he knowingly violated
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Policy A-106, he claimed that he was treated less favorably than younger, mostly female,
corrections officers who violated that same policy.
Greenawalt pointed to four comparators. Corrections Officer Bobbie Mangiantini
married a former inmate. She was also, according to some of her evaluations, too
―inmate-friendly.‖ Among other things, she reportedly had a snowball fight and played a
―foot game‖ with current inmates. The County did not discharge Mangiantini nor did it
ask her to resign. Corrections Officer Holly Parrish was permitted to resign, and did so,
after the County discovered that she had written a letter to a former inmate. Corrections
Officer April Johnston was given a oral warning for her involvement with a former
inmate on Facebook. Corrections Officer Brad Smith, according to Greenawalt, was also
involved with a former inmate and not disciplined.
The District Court granted Clarion County’s motion for summary judgment. The
Court determined that Greenawalt failed to establish a prima facie case of age or gender
discrimination. Specifically, he did not produce evidence that would give rise to an
inference of discrimination because he did not show that he was treated differently than
similarly situated individuals who were not members of his protected class. Greenawalt’s
suggested comparators, according to the Court, were not similarly situated to him. It
found that the circumstances surrounding their violations of Policy A-106 (relationships
with former inmates) and the circumstances of his violation (covertly ―gifting‖ money to
a current inmate) were sufficiently distinguishable such that it was reasonable for the
County to treat their offenses differently. In addition, the Court assumed that even if
Greenawalt could establish a prima facie case, he offered insufficient evidence to suggest
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that Clarion County’s non-discriminatory reason for his termination (his violation of
Policy A-106) was merely pretext for unlawful discrimination. The Court also rejected
his mixed-motive and subordinate-bias theories. Greenawalt appeals.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Regents of Mercerberg Coll. v.
Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is
proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).
III.
Greenawalt offers three theories of discrimination — a pretext theory, a mixed-
motive theory, and a subordinate-bias (or ―cat’s paw‖) theory. All three theories fail.
We analyze Greenawalt’s pretext theory under the familiar McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting analysis.1 See Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d
1061, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the
initial burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff does so,
the burden shifts to the defendant to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
1
The same analysis applies to Greenawalt’s Title VII, ADEA, and PHRA claims. See
Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94
F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).
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employment action. Once the defendant does so, the presumption of discriminatory
action is rebutted and the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s stated reasons are a
pretext for unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973).
To make out a prima facie case, Greenawalt must show, among other things, that
he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403,
410-11 (3d Cir. 1999). Those circumstances may include the more favorable treatment of
similarly situated individuals outside of the plaintiff’s protected class. Id.
We agree with the District Court that Greenawalt did not meet his burden of
making out a prima facie case of discrimination. His proffered comparators are not
similarly situated to him. Although each of the corrections officers violated the same
policy (Policy A-106) as he did, none of them covertly deposited money in a current
inmate’s account at the jail. The County was well within its discretion in treating
Greenawalt’s case differently than those of his comparators. If a current inmate can
convince a corrections officer to send the inmate hundreds of dollars, the officer may be
subject to the inmate’s direction in other ways. In fact, according to Greenawalt, the
female inmate told other inmates that she ―owned‖ him. That is a security risk. It was
permissible for the County to believe that relationships with former inmates, though they
violate the policy, are not nearly as egregious as Greenawalt’s behavior.
We also agree with the District Court that, assuming Greenawalt had established a
prima facie case of age or gender discrimination, the County has given a legitimate, non-
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discriminatory reason for Greenawalt’s termination, and Greenawalt has failed to present
evidence of pretext. ―In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1)
casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder
could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-
finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative
cause of the employee’s termination.‖ Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d
358, 370 (3d Cir. 2008). As proof of pretext, Greenawalt again points to the more
favorable treatment his comparators received. But, as we noted, his comparators did not
engage in similar conduct. We agree with the District Court that the County’s
―determination that Greenawalt committed a sufficiently egregious offense worthy of
termination was such that a fact-finder could not reasonably infer that Greenawalt’s
termination was a post hoc fabrication, or that Greenawalt’s age or gender motivated
[the] decision.‖
Greenawalt’s mixed-motive theory also fails. To begin, a violation of the ADEA
cannot be shown using a mixed-motive theory. Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684,
690-91 (3d Cir. 2009). Under Title VII, a mixed-motive plaintiff may establish an
unlawful employment practice by demonstrating ―that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The plaintiff is not
required to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to proceed on a mixed-
motive theory under Title VII. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).
Circumstantial evidence of discrimination is sufficient. Id. at 99-100. As our discussion
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above makes clear, Greenawalt presents no direct or circumstantial evidence that his
gender was a motivating factor in his termination.
Finally, Greenawalt cannot proceed on a subordinate-bias, or ―cat’s paw,‖ theory
of discrimination. A plaintiff may proceed on this theory if he offers evidence that ―those
exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate‖
him. Abramson v. William Patterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001).
Greenawalt claims that the County relied on the Jail’s Warden to provide them with the
facts on which they based their termination decision. However, he has failed to point to
any evidence that the Warden had discriminatory, bad intent toward him.
* * * * *
For these reasons, we affirm the order of the District Court granting Clarion
County summary judgment.
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