United States v. Wallace , 213 F. App'x 98 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-11-2007
    USA v. Wallace
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1323
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Wallace" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1775.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/1775
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    CLD-68
    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-1323
    ________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    CLARENCE WALLACE,
    Appellant
    _______________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Criminal No. 02-cr-00197)
    District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
    ___________________________
    Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    November 30, 2006
    Before: RENDELL, SMITH and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: January 11, 2007)
    ______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _____________
    PER CURIAM
    Clarence Wallace appeals from the District Court’s order disposing of his post-trial
    motion for return of property. Because we determine that the appeal is lacking in
    arguable legal merit, we will dismiss it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
    Wallace was arrested by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation on March
    6, 2002. During the arrest, the agents seized Wallace’s Bulova watch and $2,153 in cash.
    Wallace was eventually convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery,
    two counts of armed bank robbery, two counts of brandishing a firearm, and being a felon
    in possession of a firearm. In addition to a 960-month prison sentence, Wallace was
    ordered to pay $25,968 in restitution to the two victim banks. United States v. Wallace,
    135 Fed. Appx. 527, 527 (3d Cir. 2005).
    After he was convicted, Wallace filed a motion, under FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g)
    (formerly Rule 41(e)), to return the property that had been seized during his arrest.
    Approximately two years later, the government responded to the motion. The District
    Court ordered the government to return the Bulova watch, but allowed it to retain the cash
    that it had seized. Wallace appealed.
    We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A motion for the
    return of property under FED. R. CRIM P. 41(g) may be made after the termination of
    criminal proceedings, and is treated as a civil proceeding for equitable relief. United
    States v. Chambers, 
    192 F.3d 374
    , 376 (3d Cir. 1999). We review the District Court’s
    decision for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. Having granted
    Wallace leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, we must
    now determine whether his appeal should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B). An appeal may be dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it has no arguable
    basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989).
    2
    Although property seized by the government as part of a criminal investigation
    generally must be returned once criminal proceedings have concluded, a defendant has no
    right to the return of his property if the government has a continuing interest in the
    property, such as in a forfeiture action or an outstanding lien. United States v. Premises
    Known as 608 Taylor Ave., Apartment 302, 
    584 F.2d 1297
    , 1302 (3d Cir. 1978); see also
    United States v. Albinson, 
    356 F.3d 278
    , 280 (3d Cir. 2004); 
    Chambers, 192 F.3d at 376
    .
    The order of restitution in Wallace’s case constitutes a lien in favor of the United States
    on all of his property. See 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c);1 Lavin v. United States, 
    299 F.3d 123
    ,
    127 (2d Cir. 2002). Because the money that Wallace wants returned is subject to a lien
    under a valid order of restitution, he is not entitled to its return. See United States v.
    Mills, 
    991 F.2d 609
    , 612 (9th Cir. 1993)(“[A] valid restitution order under the VWPA
    gives the government a sufficient cognizable claim to defeat a defendant’s Rule 41(e)
    motion for return of property, if that property is needed to satisfy the terms of the
    restitution order.”) Rather, the government may use the cash seized from Wallace to
    1
    18 U.S.C. § 3613(c) provides in relevant part:
    [A]n order of restitution made pursuant to section[ ] . . . 3663 . . . is a lien in favor
    of the United States on all property and rights to property of the person fined as if
    the liability of the person fined were a liability for a tax assessed under the Internal
    Revenue Code of 1986. The lien arises on the entry of judgment and continues for
    20 years or until the liability is satisfied, remitted, set aside, or is terminated under
    subsection (b).
    (citation omitted).
    3
    satisfy the restitution order.
    In sum, we readily conclude that the District Court correctly denied Wallace’s
    motion for return of the $2,153 that was seized when he was arrested. Because his appeal
    lacks merit, we will dismiss it under § 1915(e)(2)(B).
    4