Stawairski v. Summit Hill , 262 F. App'x 420 ( 2008 )

Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-30-2008
Stawairski v. Summit Hill
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-4832
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Recommended Citation
"Stawairski v. Summit Hill" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 1666.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/1666
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 06-4832
___________
STEPHEN STAWAIRSKI AND SUMMERLEE STAWAIRSKI,
Appellants
v.
BOROUGH OF SUMMIT HILL,
Appellee
________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
No: 06-cv-0668
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 3, 2008
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and DUBOIS,* District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: January 30, 2008)
*
Honorable Jan E. DuBois, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court of
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
1
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
The Stawairskis, appellants in this action, are owners of a parcel of land in Summit
Hill, Pennsylvania. In March 2001, they leased the land to a corporation, SBA Properties,
Inc. (“SBA”), permitting SBA to place a cell tower on the property. Thereafter, SBA
filed a zoning application in order to place the cell tower on the Stawairskis’ land. The
zoning application was denied on May 25, 2001 and the appeal was denied on August 1,
2001.1 On February 11, 2005, the Stawairskis filed a complaint, alleging that Summit
Hill violated their substantive due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
preventing them from using their property for the placement of a cell tower.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s well-
reasoned opinion. The District Court granted Summit Hill’s motion to dismiss the
Stawairskis’ substantive due process claim, finding the claim to be time barred.2 We
exercise plenary review over a district court's dismissal of claims pursuant to Rule
1
In addition, Summit Hill amended its zoning ordinance regulating cell towers on
December 10, 2001, to limit the placement of cell towers to government-owned land.
Summit Hill then rezoned a parcel of its own property for cell tower use and, on July 29
2002, leased that property to Atlas Tower Network, Inc. (“Atlas”) to install a cell tower
on the land. On May 12, 2003, a zoning permit was issued for the land leased by Atlas.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We
have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
12(b)(6). Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2007). In Pennsylvania, the
statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim alleging a violation of substantive due process is
two years. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599
(3d Cir. 1998). A cause of action accrues under § 1983 when the plaintiff “knew or
should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Id. The Stawairskis’
complaint was untimely because they were on notice of the fact that they could not put a
cell tower on their property, the injury they complain of, from the time SBA’s zoning
application was denied, on May 25, 2001, but did not file their complaint until February
11, 2005.3
3
The District Court correctly found that the plaintiffs’ appeal of the original zoning
decision tolled the statute of limitations until August 1, 2001. The tolling does not make
the plaintiffs’ action timely.
3