In Re: Atl Fin Fed ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-25-2009
    In Re: Atl Fin Fed
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 09-1990
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    Recommended Citation
    "In Re: Atl Fin Fed " (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1125.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1125
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    AMENDED BLD-210                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 09-1990
    ___________
    In re: ATLANTIC FINANCIAL FEDERAL,
    Alleged Debtor
    MICHAEL R. SHEMONSKY,
    Appellant
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-00392)
    District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
    Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    June 11, 2009
    Before: MCKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: June 25, 2009)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Michael R. Shemonsky, representing himself as an “alter ego” of Atlantic
    Financial Federal (“AFF”), a failed savings and loan, initiated an involuntary bankruptcy
    filing for AFF. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the successor in
    interest to AFF’s receiver, filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy suit. After a hearing,
    the Bankruptcy Court granted the motion and dismissed the bankruptcy case. On
    December 19, 2008, Shemonsky filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal, which the
    Bankruptcy Court denied on January 21, 2009. Shemonsky filed a notice of appeal in
    which he designated the order of January 21, 2009.
    In the District Court, Shemonsky filed a brief. Although he briefly described a few
    of his motions in the Bankruptcy Court (including his efforts to get a loan for twenty-five
    billion dollars), he focused on one issue – whether the Bankruptcy Court should have
    construed his motion for reconsideration as a motion to reopen under Rule 60 of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Shemonsky claimed that the Bankruptcy Court’s order
    denying reconsideration was illegal because the Bankruptcy Court did not docket his
    motion until January 21, 2009. He argued that because of when his motion was docketed,
    it should have been docketed and construed as a motion to reopen.
    Noting Shemonsky’s extensive litigation history, the District Court considered
    only the issue raised in his brief. The District Court explained that Shemonsky
    misunderstood when his motion for reconsideration was docketed, noting that it was
    docketed as filed on December 19, 2008. After the motion was docketed, the Bankruptcy
    Court ruled on it on January 21, 2009. The District Court also reviewed the entire
    Bankruptcy Court docket and came to the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court properly
    considered the Shemonsky’s motion styled as a motion for reconsideration as a motion for
    2
    reconsideration. The District Court denied the appeal and affirmed the Bankruptcy
    Court’s ruling of January 21, 2009.
    Shemonsky appeals. He has filed a document in support of his appeal in which he
    notes merely that he previously sued the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. He also presents
    three motions – a motion to consolidate this case with another of his appeals, docketed at
    C.A. No. 09-1301, a motion for the “FDIC to Produce the 10K for Year Ended 9-30-89,”
    and a motion to “disbar and enjoin” counsel for the FDIC. The FDIC opposes the latter
    two motions. In presenting reasons why the FDIC should not be ordered to produce “the
    10K for Year Ended 9-30-1989,” the FDIC contends that the District Court properly
    affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The FDIC also argues, among other things, that
    Shemonsky has not been found to be AFF’s “alter ego,” that he has been enjoined from
    representing himself as an officer, director, employee, or agent of AFF, and also that the
    FDIC, as the successor in interest to AFF’s receiver, could not be ordered to create a 10-K
    report under the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
    see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j).
    The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s order
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s
    order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 1291. Our review of the District Court’s
    determination is plenary. See Kool, Mann, Coffee & Co. v. Coffey, 
    300 F.3d 340
    , 353
    (3d Cir. 2002). Upon review, and in complete agreement with the District Court’s
    3
    analysis, we conclude that Shemonsky’s appeal must be dismissed because it has no
    arguable basis in fact or law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989). In short, as the District Court concluded, the Bankruptcy Court
    properly treated Shemonsky’s motion as a motion for reconsideration. Shemonsky’s
    pending motions are denied.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-1990

Filed Date: 6/25/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021