Steven Addlespurger v. Tom Corbett , 461 F. App'x 82 ( 2012 )


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  • GLD-093                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 11-3915
    ____________
    STEVEN ADDLESPURGER,
    Appellant
    v.
    TOM CORBETT, Pennsylvania State Attorney General
    in his official and individual capacities; STEPHEN
    ZAPPALLA, Allegheny County District Attorney
    in his official and individual capacities; DONNA JO
    MCDANIELS, President Judge Allegheny County Fifth
    Judicial District in her professional and individual
    capacities; RAYMOND BILLOTTE, Administration
    of Pennsylvania Courts Fifth Judicial District in his
    official and individual capacities; KIM BERKELEY
    CLARK, Administrative Judge in her professional and
    individual capacities; PATRICK QUINN, Domestic
    Relations Services in his official and individual
    capacities; DAVID WECHT, Judge in his official and
    individual capacities; WILLIAM MULLEN, Sheriff in
    his official and individual capacities; DAN ONORATO,
    Chief Executive of Allegheny County and in his official
    and individual capacities; RAMON RUSTIN, Jail
    Warden in his official and individual capacities;
    DANIEL RICHARDS, Department of Public Welfare
    in his official and individual capacities; MICHAEL H.
    WOJCIK, County solicitors in his official and individual
    capacities; KATE BARKMAN, Department of Court
    records in her professional and individual capacities
    __________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 2-09-cv-01064)
    District Judge: David Stewart Cercone
    __________________________________
    Submitted on Motions for Summary Affirmance
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    January 20, 2012
    Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: February 9, 2012)
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Steven Addlespurger filed a pro se complaint in the United States
    District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking injunctive relief against
    the Family Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. Addlespurger,
    who was a defendant in a support action filed by his wife, Julie Addlespurger, sought to
    enjoin an upcoming contempt proceeding, and complained that he had been subjected to
    numerous contempt orders, and had been incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail. He
    contended that the prior contempt orders were entered in violation of his due process
    rights, and he sought an order enjoining the Family Division from holding the upcoming
    contempt proceeding, and an order staying further proceedings in the Family Division.
    Addlespurger consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c)(1), who viewed the complaint as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    , and transferred it here for consideration of whether to grant leave to file a
    successive petition. (Addlespurger had filed a prior habeas corpus petition, challenging
    the Family Division’s contempt orders for non-payment of child support.) Upon its
    2
    transfer here, we concluded that Addlespurger’s pro se complaint should have been
    viewed as a civil rights action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     for injunctive relief based on
    alleged due process violations in the Family Division proceedings. Accordingly, we
    transferred the matter back to the district court for further proceedings.
    On remand, the case was reassigned to a district judge, and Addlespurger then
    filed an amended complaint, alleging, in a rambling, unclear, and disorganized fashion,
    that 13 defendants violated his constitutional rights, essentially by prosecuting and
    imprisoning him pursuant to child support and contempt orders. The complaint contained
    allegations of fraud, forgery, harassment, and conspiracy. Addlespurger sought money
    damages, and named as defendants former Attorney General Tom Corbett and Daniel
    Richards of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare’s Bureau of Child Support
    Enforcement (the “State defendants”); several Family Division judges and administrators,
    including President Judge Donna Jo McDaniels, Administrative Judge Kim Berkeley
    Clark, Judge David Wecht, Court Administrator Raymond Billotte, and Family Division
    Administrator Patrick Quinn (the “judicial defendants”); Allegheny County Executive
    Dan Onorato, District Attorney Steven Zappala, Court Records Director Kate Barkman,
    Warden Ramon Rustin, and Solicitor Michael Wojcik (the “County defendants”); and
    Sheriff William Mullen.
    The defendants moved in their respective groups to dismiss the amended
    complaint, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6); each group and Sheriff Mullen raised numerous
    bases for dismissing the amended complaint. In an order entered on August 1, 2011, the
    District Court granted the motions and dismissed the amended complaint. The court
    3
    painstakingly worked through the counts in the complaint, and determined that there was
    no basis for the action to proceed. In an order entered on September 20, 2011, the
    District Court denied a timely filed motion for reconsideration. Addlespurger appeals.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . The majority of the appellees have moved
    in their respective groups for summary affirmance of the District Court’s orders
    dismissing the amended complaint and motion for reconsideration. Addlespurger has
    submitted a response in opposition to summary action, which we have considered.
    We will summarily affirm. Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we
    may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no substantial question
    is presented by the appeal. We exercise plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal,
    see Weston v. Pennsylvania, 
    251 F.3d 420
    , 425 (3d Cir. 2001), and we “are free” to
    affirm the judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record,” see Bernitsky v.
    United States, 
    620 F.2d 948
    , 950 (3d Cir. 1980). A motion to dismiss should be granted
    if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
    on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). The plausibility
    standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009).
    As explained by the District Court, Addlespurger’s claims in the main flow from
    defendant Judge David Wecht’s having issued orders with the intent of carrying out
    Pennsylvania’s child support laws. Judges are absolutely immunized from a civil rights
    suit for money damages arising from their judicial acts. Mireles v. Waco, 
    502 U.S. 9
    , 9
    (1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 
    435 U.S. 349
    , 355-56 (1978). The order of a
    4
    judge entered against Addlespurger in the Family Division proceedings may not serve as
    a basis for a civil action for damages. See 
    id.
     In addition, the defendant court
    administrators are similarly absolutely immunized from a suit for damages under the
    doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, because their activities were an integral part of the
    judicial process. A court administrator or deputy administrator, who is charged with the
    duty of carrying out facially valid court orders, enjoys quasi-judicial immunity from
    liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order. See Gallas v.
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 
    211 F.3d 760
    , 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Kincaid
    v. Vail, 
    969 F.2d 594
    , 601 (7th Cir. 1992); Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 
    878 F.2d 1285
    , 1288-90 (10th Cir. 1989). Sheriff Mullin’s involvement in the alleged civil
    rights violations was based on the actions of his deputies, who jailed Addlespurger
    pursuant to Judge Wecht’s orders. He too is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity under
    these circumstances. Accordingly, dismissal of the amended complaint against Judges
    Wecht and Clark, Deputy Administrator Quinn, and Sheriff Mullins was proper.1
    The action against President Judge McDaniels and Court Administrator Billotte
    was properly dismissed because a civil rights claim cannot proceed exclusively on a
    theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 
    845 F.2d 1195
    , 1207 (3d Cir.
    1
    There appears to be a claim of “extortion” against defendant Quinn with respect
    to the precise calculation of the monthly child support payments under Pennsylvania Rule
    of Civil Procedure 1910.16-1, see Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 10-12, 20-21, but, to state a
    claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the
    Constitution or laws of the United States, West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988). An
    allegation of a violation of the state child support rules will not suffice and thus this claim
    properly was dismissed. The claim against State defendant Daniel Richards in his
    individual capacity (he was alleged to have collaborated with defendant Quinn) fails for
    the same reason.
    5
    1988). Liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed absent personal involvement in
    the alleged actions, see Rizzo v. Goode, 
    423 U.S. 362
    , 375-77 (1976); Chincello v.
    Fenton, 
    805 F.2d 126
    , 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986). As to the County defendants,
    Addlespurger’s claims are especially unclear, but, again, there do not appear to be any
    allegations of personal involvement in the purported violation of his rights, and liability
    cannot proceed on a theory of respondeat superior, see 
    id.
     Accordingly, the amended
    complaint was properly dismissed as to the County defendants as well. Addlespurger’s
    motion for reconsideration did not cure these deficiencies.
    As to the State defendants, to the extent they were sued in their official capacity,
    the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Any official capacity claim fails
    because the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and Pennsylvania Department
    of Public Welfare share in the immunity conferred to the States by the Eleventh
    Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 
    502 U.S. 21
    , 25-27 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
    Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 71 (1989). The claims against former Attorney General Corbett in
    his individual capacity fail because Addlespurger failed to allege any personal
    involvement in the purported violation of his rights, Rizzo, 
    423 U.S. at 375-77
    ;
    Chincello, 
    805 F.2d at 133-34
    .
    Last, Addlespurger alleged that he was routinely subjected to strip searches, upon
    being jailed for contempt, pursuant to a policy established by County defendant Warden
    Rustin. See Amended Complaint, at ¶ 65. These searches, he alleged, violate the Fourth
    Amendment. The District Court properly held that this claim was foreclosed by our
    decision in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
    621 F.3d 296
    , 311 (3d Cir. 2010),
    6
    petition for cert. granted, 
    131 S. Ct. 1816
     (2011), in view of the fact that Addlespurger
    does not allege that any of the searches were conducted in an unreasonable manner. In
    addition, the allegations of a conspiracy among the defendants to violate Addlespurger’s
    civil rights does not survive Rule 12(b)(6). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
    right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 555
    . Furthermore,
    there is no private cause of action for a violation of the federal mail and wire fraud
    statutes, and we agree with the District Court’s disposition of Addlespurger’s excessive
    force and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the appellees’ motions, and summarily
    affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint and denying the
    motion for reconsideration.2
    2
    We do so without regard to whether the appellees specifically moved for summary
    affirmance.
    7