Guifarro v. United States , 172 F. App'x 429 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-27-2006
    Guifarro v. USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 04-4694
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    Recommended Citation
    "Guifarro v. USA" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1385.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1385
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No: 04-4694
    MARCO A. GUIFARRO,
    Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
    PATRICK O. PRICE; DEPARTMENT
    OF THE ARMY; JOHN DOES 1-5
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (Civ. No. 03-cv-01741)
    Trial Judge: Ronald J. Hedges, Magistrate Judge *
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 3, 2006
    Before: McKEE, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN,
    Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: March 27, 2006)
    OPINION
    McKEE, Circuit Judge.
    Marco A. Guifarro appeals from the Magistrate Judge’s finding in favor of the
    *
    The parties consented to the Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 636(c).
    1
    United States in his action under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1 and from the Magistrate
    Judge’s denial of his motion for a new trial. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
    Since we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite as much of the facts
    and procedural history as are helpful to our brief discussion of this appeal. The trial court
    specifically found that “[a]t no time relevant to the accident did plaintiff have a green
    signal or it[s] equivalent.” App. 2. It further found that Guifarro attempted to cross the
    intersection against a signal in disregard of oncoming traffic, and that he failed to observe
    the government automobile. Thus, the trial court concluded that Guifarro was negligent.2
    On appeal, Guifarro does not argue that the trial court’s findings were clearly
    erroneous. Instead, he argues that the trial court failed to address certain issues relative to
    the negligence of the government driver, viz., that he was late for an appointment; that he
    was driving in excess of the speed limit; that he was talking to a passenger in the
    automobile; and that he was not alert while driving. However, the trial court did consider
    1
    “Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 to provide a means by
    which the federal government could, like other employers, be held liable for the torts of
    its employees committed within the scope of employment.” Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr.,
    The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time for
    Reconsideration, 
    42 Okla. L
    . Rev. 459 (1989). Under the Act, the state law which would
    determine the liability of “a private individual under like circumstances” applies to the
    liability of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Because the accident occurred in New
    Jersey, New Jersey law applies. Rodriquez v. United States, 
    823 F.2d 735
    , 739 (3d Cir.
    1987).
    2
    We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
    Our review of the trial court’s conclusions of law is plenary. North Penn Gas Co. v.
    Corning Natural Gas Corp., 
    897 F.2d 687
    , 688 (3d Cir. 1990).
    2
    those issues and expressly found that any negligence on the part of the driver did not
    equal or exceed Guifarro’s own negligence. App. 2-3. Those findings are fully
    supported by the record. Accordingly, that finding was not clearly erroneous, and the
    court did not err in concluding that Guifarro’s own negligence defeated this claim.
    Moreover, because we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the
    evidence and a miscarriage of justice does not result from it, the district court did not
    abuse its discretion in denying Guifarro’s motion for a new trial.3
    For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the trial court.
    3
    A new trial should be granted only when the verdict is contrary to the weight of
    the evidence or when a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand.
    Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 
    926 F.2d 1344
    , 1352 (3d Cir. 1991). A trial
    court's decision on a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    Roebuck v. Drexel University, 
    852 F.2d 715
    , 735 (3d Cir. 1988).
    3