Helena Chem Corp v. Nelson , 28 F. App'x 120 ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2002 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-24-2002
    Helena Chem Corp v. Nelson
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 0-3700
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002
    Recommended Citation
    "Helena Chem Corp v. Nelson" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 31.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/31
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    NOT-PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    __________
    NOS.    00-3700 AND 01-1252
    __________
    HELENA CHEMICAL CO., A DELAWARE CORPORATION
    v.
    JESSE NELSON, SR., d/b/a NELSON FARMS
    Appellant in 00-3700
    Helena Chemical Company,
    Appellant in 01-1252
    _________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-05662)
    District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
    __________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 8, 2002
    Before: MANSMANN, RENDELL and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: January 23, 2002)
    __________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    __________
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
    Helena Chemical Co. ("Helena") sued Nelson Farms seeking payment for
    chemicals and spraying services, and Nelson Farms counterclaimed,
    asserting that
    Helena's improper application of herbicides had damaged its fields. The
    District Court
    entered summary judgment in favor of Nelson Farms for negligence, and
    against Nelson
    Farms on its claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (the "Consumer
    Fraud
    Act"), N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. The jury determined damages, and Nelson Farms was
    awarded
    $310,826 for the negligence claim.
    Nonetheless, Nelson Farms appealed, contending that the judge should
    have found
    that Helena's actions violated the Consumer Fraud Act because Helena
    "knowingly
    ignored label directions and applied the pesticide [improperly]," because
    the
    misrepresentation by Helena was of a type contemplated by the Consumer
    Fraud Act such
    that the issue should have been submitted to the jury, and because the
    court erred in
    failing to find that the violations of federal and state law were
    "aggravating
    circumstances" within the meaning of Cox v. Sears Roebuck, 
    647 A.2d 454
    (N.J. 1994),
    sufficient to give rise to a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. We have
    jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C.    1291, and our review of a summary judgment decision is
    de novo.
    The District Court first considered whether a statement by Helena
    that it would
    match a competitor in quality and price amounted to fraudulent inducement
    to contract.
    It found that, at most, Helena may have breached an oral guarantee of
    quality, which does
    not violate the Consumer Fraud Act by itself, but must be accompanied by
    aggravating
    circumstances. See D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 
    501 A.2d 990
    ,
    997-98, 1001
    (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). The District Court found that Nelson
    Farms had put
    forth no evidence of aggravating circumstances and, in particular, that
    there was no
    evidence of "concealment of an intent to provide inferior service from the
    outset." On
    appeal, Nelson Farms urges us to hold that the repeated application of the
    herbicide after
    Helena's employees realized it was not mixing well amounted to aggravating
    circumstances. But we agree with the District Court that this does not
    rise to the level
    contemplated by the statute. Finally, the District Court reasoned that
    Helena's statement
    was "puffing" rather than fraud under the Consumer Fraud Act. See Gennari
    v. Weichert
    Co. Realtors, 
    672 A.2d 1190
     (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), aff'd as
    modified, 
    691 A.2d 350
     (N.J. 1997) (requiring that the misrepresentation must be
    material to the
    transaction, must be false, and must induce the buyer to make the
    purchase).
    The District Court next rejected Nelson Farms' argument that Helena's
    failure to
    follow the instructions on the label amounted to an unconscionable
    business practice
    because it violated statutes that regulate the use of herbicides. The
    District Court found
    no basis in law for this argument and reasoned that misuse of herbicides
    can be remedied
    without reliance on the Consumer Fraud Act through the herbicide statutes'
    own
    enforcement provisions.
    We agree that summary judgment against Nelson Farms on its Consumer
    Fraud
    Act claim was appropriate, essentially for the reasons in the District
    Court's opinion. We
    agree that there was no evidence that either Helena's statement or its use
    of herbicides
    violated the Consumer Fraud Act. The improper herbicide application did
    not constitute
    an "unconscionable commercial practice," in part because it did not
    reflect the lack of
    "good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing" that Cox
    requires. 
    Id.
    Moreover, Helena's statement that it would meet the quality and cost of
    its competitor did
    not constitute a misrepresentation. Instead, it was an assurance given,
    but Helena then
    failed to perform in accordance with the assurance. No one alleges that
    the company
    lacked the qualifications and was not competent; rather, it just did not
    follow the label.
    Also before us is Helena's cross-appeal from the District Court's
    denial of its
    motion for a new trial or remittitur on the ground that the jury awarded
    excessive
    damages. In its opinion, the District Court examined in detail the
    presentations made by
    competing experts, the calculations of the quantity of each crop that was
    lost or damaged,
    and the evidence as to the value of these crops. We conclude that the
    District Court did
    not abuse its discretion in denying this motion and that the jury's damage
    verdict was not
    "so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial conscience." Murray v.
    Fairbanks Morse,
    
    610 F.2d 149
    , 153 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted).
    Finally, Helena cross-appealed from the order granting Nelson Farms'
    motion to
    add prejudgment interest to the final judgment. We agree with the
    District Court that this
    was an appropriate addition, as the New Jersey Court Rules expressly
    provide for interest
    without requiring that it be requested in the complaint or in pretrial
    submissions.
    In sum, for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its
    opinion, we will
    AFFIRM.
    ____________________________
    TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
    Please file the foregoing memorandum opinion.
    /s/ Marjorie O. Rendell
    Circuit Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0-3700

Citation Numbers: 28 F. App'x 120

Filed Date: 1/24/2002

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023