Muhammad v. Davis , 461 F. App'x 91 ( 2012 )

ALD-123 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-4632
___________
MARC ANTWAIN X. RIVERS MUHAMMAD, SR.,
Appellant
v.
YVETTE DAVIS; THE LUZERNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WELFARE; THE LUZERNE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON
PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION; DONALD T. ROGERS, Esquire;
MRS. PAULA DEJOSEPH, Esquire, Hearing Officer;
JOHN LEIGHTON, Conference Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-01292)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 1, 2012
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 12, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
1
Marc Antwain X. Rivers Muhammad, Sr., appeals, pro se, the District Court’s
order dismissing his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because we
conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. See
3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
Plaintiff Marc Antwain X. Rivers Muhammad, Sr., had a son with defendant
Yvette Davis in February 2009. In June 2009, the Luzerne Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Section ordered Muhammad to make monthly child support
payments. Muhammad challenged the order on constitutional grounds and was given a
new trial. The hearing officer adjusted his payments, but determined that his
constitutional claims were beyond her jurisdiction. The Superior Court denied his second
appeal. In July 2011, Muhammad filed a pro se complaint against Davis and the
remaining defendants. He claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and (3) and § 1983, that the
order that he pay child support to Davis violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to
privacy. He also asserts that the defendants used the administrative and judicial process
in furtherance of their conspiracy to deprive him of his rights.
The Magistrate Judge reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), and recommended that it be dismissed. After considering Muhammad’s
objections, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, including its
recommendation that leave to amend be denied for futility, and dismissed the case.
Muhammad filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary action is warranted if an appeal presents no
substantial question. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
As the District Court noted, to state a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(2) or (3), Muhammad must allege that the conspirators intended to deny him equal
protection of the laws. See § 1985; see also Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.
1997). Muhammad alleged in his complaint that the defendants conspired to deprive him
of equal protection of the laws by forcing him to pay child support in violation of his
right to privacy.
The District Court correctly found there is no legal basis to extend the definition of
privacy in the way Muhammad seeks. Rather, the state’s interest in child welfare is
sufficiently compelling to overcome a claim challenging a support order on privacy
grounds. See N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the child
support order is not unconstitutional, and Muhammad’s complaint does not allege a
deprivation of equal protection of the laws.
Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that it would be futile to allow Muhammad to file an amended complaint.
See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
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IV.
Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
4