United States v. Bullard , 38 F. App'x 753 ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2002 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    5-17-2002
    USA v. Bullard
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 01-1952
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Bullard" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 283.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/283
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 01-1952
    ___________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    vs.
    MICHAEL BULLARD
    Appellant.
    ___________
    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Criminal No. 00-cr-00085)
    District Judge: The Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr.
    ___________
    ARGUED
    May 6, 2002
    BEFORE: NYGAARD, ALITO, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
    Elizabeth T. Hey, Esq. (Argued)
    Defender Association of Philadelphia
    Federal Court Division
    Curtis Center
    Independence Square West
    Suite 540 West
    Philadelphia, PA 19105
    Counsel for Appellant
    Eric B. Henson, Esq. (Argued)
    Office of the United States Attorney
    Suite 1250
    615 Chestnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Counsel for Appellee
    (Filed: May 17, 2002)
    ___________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    ___________
    NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant, Michael Bullard, challenges the District Court’s refusal to issue
    his requested jury instruction during his criminal trial. We will affirm the District
    Court’s order because we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion.
    Bullard was indicted on a single count of possession of a firearm by a
    convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). A superseding indictment was
    obtained subsequently which added a Notice of Prior Convictions which exposed Bullard
    to the enhanced penalty provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e).
    The jury could not achieve unanimity in Bullard’s first trial, so the District Court
    declared a mistrial. During his second trial, the jury convicted Bullard of possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon, and, in a separate proceeding, also found that he had been
    convicted of the predicate offenses necessary for enhanced sentencing.
    During the trial, Bullard asserted the affirmative defense that he had a legal
    justification for being in possession of a firearm. While the Government bears the
    burden of proving the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the
    defendant bears the burden of proving the elements of his defense by a preponderance of
    the evidence. See United States v. Dodd, 
    225 F.3d 340
    , 342 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
    
    532 U.S. 959
     (2001). At the conclusion of the court’s jury instructions, Bullard
    requested a specific instruction comparing the weight of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
    standard to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The District Court refused to
    issue Bullard’s requested instruction, and Bullard assigns this as error on appeal.
    We review jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
    Zehrbach, 
    47 F.3d 1252
    , 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). We consider "whether, viewed
    in light of the evidence, the charge as a whole fairly and adequately submits the issues in
    the case to the jury." 
    Id.
     (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 
    823 F.2d 723
    , 727 (3d Cir. 1987)).
    We will reverse if "the instruction was capable of confusing and thereby misleading the
    jury." 
    Id.
     (quoting Bennis, 
    823 F.2d at 727
    ).
    We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
    issue Bullard’s requested comparative instruction. Taken as a whole, the jury
    instructions are not confusing or misleading. The Court properly instructed the jury of
    the Government’s burden. For example, it stated:
    Remember, as well, the law never imposes upon a defendant
    in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses
    or producing any evidence because the burden of proving
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is always assumed by the
    Government. (App. 448a).
    As I have mentioned to you, the Government’s burden of
    proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond a reason[able] doubt,
    with the exception of this justification defense which I will
    explain later. What this means is that unless the Government
    proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant has
    committed every essential element of an offense which he has
    been charged, you must find him not guilty as to that offense.
    (App. 458a-459a).
    It is not required that the Government prove guilt beyond all
    possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A
    reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common
    sense. The kind of doubt that would make a reasonable
    person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
    must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that
    a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it
    in the most important of his or her own affairs. Unless the
    Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    defendant has committed each and every element of the
    offense charged in the indictment, you must find the
    defendant not guilty of the offense. (App. 460a).
    The court also properly instructed the jury of Bullard’s burden in establishing the
    affirmative defense of legal justification. Among its instructions, it said:
    Now, there are two difference[s] with reference to this
    defense from the crime that is charged [ ] possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon. As to the defense of legal
    justification, the burden [of] proof is upon not the
    Government, but upon the defendant and it is the burden of
    the defendant to prove each of the elements of the defense by
    a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    Now, what is proof by a preponderance of the evidence? To
    establish by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove
    that something is more likely so than not so. In other words,
    [a] preponderance of the evidence in the case means such
    evidence as when considered and compared with that
    opposed to it, has more convincing force and produces in
    your minds the belief that what is sought to be true is more
    likely true than not true. (App. 468a).
    Taking the jury instructions as a whole, we find they are neither misleading nor
    confusing. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue Bullard’s
    requested comparative instruction.
    In sum, and for the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s
    judgment.
    _________________________
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing opinion.
    /s/ Richard L. Nygaard
    Circuit Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-1952

Citation Numbers: 38 F. App'x 753

Filed Date: 5/17/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023