Lawson v. Local 124 , 50 F. App'x 73 ( 2002 )

Opinions of the United
2002 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-17-2002
Lawson v. Local 124
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 01-2559
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"Lawson v. Local 124" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 658.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 01-2559
___________
ISIAH LAWSON;
MITCHELL TAYLOR; ANTONIO MONRESA,
Appellants
v.
PASSAIC COUNTY AND VICINITY CARPENTERS
AND MILLWRIGHTS LOCAL 124;
JOHN RADDIS; JACK TOBIN; ANTHONY BARISO;
ANSELMI AND DeCICCO, INC., a corporation;
JOHN DOE 1-50
_______________________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-05207
(Honorable William H. Walls)
___________________
Argued June 4, 2002
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 17, 2002)
ALAN KRUMHOLZ, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
574 Summit Avenue
Jersey City, New Jersey 07306
Attorney for Appellants
ROBERT A. FAGELLA, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)
Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum & Friedman
One Riverfront Plaza
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorney for Appellees,
Passaic County and Vicinity Carpenters
and Millwrights, Local 124, John Raddis,
Jack Tobin, and Anthony Bariso
__________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that summary judgment should not have been
entered in favor of defendants on their employment discrimination claims brought under
29 U.S.C. § 185, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1.1 Plaintiffs Isiah Lawson and Mitchell Taylor (two African-
1
Counts 1, 2, and 3 of plaintiffs' complaint allege that employees of Passaic County
and Vicinity Carpenters and Millwrights Local 124 ("Local 124"; "the Union")
–defendants Raddis, Tobin, and Bariso–violated the NJLAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1, and caused
plaintiffs to suffer loss of income and emotional distress. Counts 4, 5, and 6 allege that
defendant labor union and its agents violated the contractual right of plaintiffs to fair
representation in violation of the Bill of Rights under 29 U.S.C. § 411 and 29 U.S.C.
(continued...)
2
Americans) and Antonio Manresa (a Cuban-American) contend they were denied
opportunities to work as carpenters in the construction industry on the basis of their race
or ethnicity. The District Court granted summary judgment to defendants because
plaintiffs' claims were time-barred or they failed to rebut the defendants' proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons.
Because we agree that plaintiffs failed to rebut defendants' proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions, we will affirm.2
I.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We exercise de novo review over a grant of summary judgment. Goosby v.
Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000).
1
(...continued)
§ 185. Counts 7, 8, and 9 allege that the individual Caucasian defendants discriminated
against plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Counts 10, 11, and 12 repeat the
foregoing allegations and direct them at defendant corporations ("John Does 1-50") who
employed Local 124 employees. Counts 13, 14, and 15 request punitive damages for
"willful wanton and gross misconduct." Plaintiffs no longer pursue their 29 U.S.C. § 411
claim on appeal.
2
For the first time on appeal, plaintiffs raise the argument that the six-month limitation
period enunciated in DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), does
not apply to their fair representation claims. We decline to reach this issue.
3
III.
Plaintiffs are union carpenters who allege they were the victims of racial and
ethnic discrimination because defendants deprived them of job opportunities by failing
and/or refusing to refer them for construction jobs. Defendants are the carpenter's union
itself, individual defendants employed by Local 124, and some John Doe corporations
who have signed with Local 124.
On November 1, 1996, plaintiffs filed suit alleging they were victims of
employment discrimination. In January 1997, Defendants Anselmi and DeCicco filed a
cross-claim and motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.3 On March 10, 1998, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed for failure to
comply with discovery orders.
In May 1998, the District Court declined to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on these
grounds, ordered that discovery be closed, and ordered defendants to file motions for
summary judgment. The District Court subsequently entered summary judgment for
defendants on all claims. The District Court held that plaintiffs' claims of employment
discrimination were either time barred under a two-year statute of limitations or rebutted
by the Union defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.
Underlying this dispute is the operation of an "out of work" list maintained in a
Union hiring hall as a means of making job referrals to contractors who have entered into
3
The parties have stipulated that all cross-claims have been dismissed.
4
collective bargaining agreements with Local 124. Plaintiffs allege the procedures
followed by the Union and the contractors using this list provided inadequate
accountability with regard to the assignment of work because union members could also
be referred by telephone, thereby circumventing the "sign-in list" at the hall. Plaintiffs
also contend the Union kept records of referrals on scraps of paper "which are disposed
of and cannot be checked for more than one day at a time by union members." Plaintiffs
contend that as a result of such practices, they were denied job referral opportunities and
given fewer work hours than other union members.
Defendants dispute plaintiffs' claims and contend job referrals are made from the
disputed list in chronological order, subject to certain exceptions that shop stewards,
foremen, or minority members may be assigned in a different way. Defendants also
contend that many different factors influence the hours of work assigned, including
contractors' preferences for certain workers and the varying lengths of available
construction jobs. Defendants' expert witness Dr. Adrienne Eaton, an Associate
Professor at Rutgers University, performed a statistical analysis of the differences in
hours worked between the minority and non-minority members of Local 124. She
concluded that there was no statistically significant evidence of race or ethnicity-based
differences in the hours worked by Local 124 members. Plaintiffs presented no expert
evidence contradicting Dr. Eaton's report.
This timely appeal followed.
5
IV.
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination does not contain a specific statute of
limitations. Ali v. Rutgers, 166 N.J. 280, 285 (2000). For a time, there was a split of
authority on whether NJLAD claims were subject to a six-year or two-year statue of
limitations. Id. In Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282 (1993), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that NJLAD claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Id. at
298 (specifying that this time limitation would only apply prospectively). After further
confusion about the prospective application of the two-year statute of limitations,
Montells was re-visited in Ali. 166 N.J. at 282 (holding "that in cases in which the
operative facts4 arise both before and after the date of Montells, plaintiffs must file their
actions prior to the expiration of the six-year limitations period or within two years from
the date of this opinion, whichever is earlier"). Conscious of the need to timely
adjudicate discrimination claims, the New Jersey Supreme Court added that for NJLAD
actions accruing5 after July 27, 1993 (the date Montells was decided), but before
November 30, 2000 (the date Ali was decided), "in which plaintiffs allege operative facts
arising prior to July 27, 1993, the limitations period is the earlier of six years from the
date of accrual or two years from the date of this opinion." Id. at 287.
4
"Operative facts" were defined as "events or facts relevant to a cause of action." Id. at
286.
5
"Accrual" was defined as the "technical term found in statutes of limitations to denote
the date on which the statutory clock begins to run." Id.
6
In this case, the District Court did not have the benefit of Ali and stated that "any
NJLAD claim, even one based on events that occurred before the Montells decision,
would have a two-year statute of limitations." Accordingly, the District Court through no
fault of its own erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims as time barred under a two-year
statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed for reasons we discuss.
V.
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination prohibits employers from engaging
in discrimination. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 81-84 (1978).
Analysis of NJLAD claims closely tracks the analytical framework applied to federal
employment discrimination claims. Id. Once a prima facie case of discrimination has
been established, the employer "must come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment decision." Goosby, 228 F.3d at 319.6 If the employer
can proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.;
Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095-96 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995) ("At all
times the burden of proof or risk of non-persuasion, including the burden of proving 'but
for' causation or causation in fact, remains on the employee."). Pretext is shown when a
factfinder could reasonably either "(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate
6
For purposes of this appeal, we will assume arguendo that plaintiffs made a prima
facie case of discrimination.
7
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200
F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000).
1.
Plaintiff Lawson, an African-American, contends he was discriminated against
under the NJLAD because Local 124 did not enforce minority set-asides and because he
was "skipped over" on the hiring list when a white worker was sent to jobs instead of
him. As noted, the District Court entered summary judgment for defendants on Lawson's
claims because "[t]he union defendants have produced evidence that [the white worker
sent out before him] was sent to that job as a foreman, at the contractor's request, and that
Lawson was not sent because he then was not qualified to be a foreman." We see no
error on the grant of summary judgment.
2.
Plaintiff Taylor, an African-American, contends he was discriminated against
because Local 124 gave him fewer than average work hours. Defendants did not dispute
that Taylor had fewer than average work hours, but explained that fewer hours were
assigned as a result of legitimate factors, such as a member's sign up date, availability,
and qualifications. Specifically, defendants presented evidence that Taylor's
qualifications were insufficient because he could not "read or perform the elementary
mathematical calculations necessary to be an effective carpenter." The District Court
8
found that Taylor was unable to rebut these nondiscriminatory reasons for his lower than
average work hours. (Plaintiffs "appear to argue that the mere existence of a disparity is
sufficient to both prove a prima facie case of NJLAD discrimination and to show that the
defendants' proffered reasons are pretexts for discrimination.") We see no error.
Taylor himself admitted that his qualifications were deficient. In addition, Taylor
acknowledged that he never looked at the out-of-work list to verify his belief that he was
improperly "passed over." In these circumstances, summary judgment was properly
entered for defendants on Taylor's claim of discrimination.
3.
Plaintiff Manresa, a Cuban-American, brought discrimination claims based on his
receipt of fewer than average work hours and because of Local 124's alleged failure to
file a grievance on his behalf when he was laid off by a union contractor and replaced by
a white worker. The District Court entered summary judgment for defendants because
Manresa "failed to rebut the legitimate explanations offered by defendants, and thus to
evidence violation of either state or federal law." Again, we see no error.
Concerning the work hours claim, we agree with the District Court that Manresa
failed to counter defendants' contention that any deficiencies in hours received were due
to nondiscriminatory factors. These factors include members' availability, the need to
provide shop stewards and foremen, and contractors' preferences and demand for
workers.
9
Regarding the grievance claim, the defendants presented evidence that Manresa
was laid off because he was hired as a temporary replacement for another worker who
returned from vacation as expected and that Manresa–the last worker hired–was laid off
under the Union's "last-in first-out method." Manresa acknowledged that after the
disputed layoff, the Union referred him to other jobs with the same wages and benefits.
Furthermore, the District Court found that the statistic offered by Manresa to show
pretext was inaccurate. Manresa stated that two-thirds of the workers laid off at the same
time as he from the Anselmi and DeCicco job were racial or ethnic minorities. But, "only
three workers were laid off on that date–and over a 2 ½-year period, 24 of 31 workers laid
off were non-minority."
VI.
For these reasons, we also hold that plaintiffs' section 1981 claims were properly
dismissed for failure to show pretext. See Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir.
1997) (McDonnell Douglas analytical framework also applies to § 1981 claims).
10
VII.
We will affirm the District Court's entry of summary judgment for defendants.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Anthony J. Scirica
Circuit Judge
DATED: October 17, 2002