Pace v. Vaughn , 71 F. App'x 127 ( 2003 )

Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
7-30-2003
Pace v. Vaughn
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 02-3049
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"Pace v. Vaughn" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 336.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-3049
___________
JOHN A. PACE
v.
DONALD VAUGHN; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellants
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-06568)
District Judge: The Honorable James T. Giles
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 7, 2003
BEFORE: NYGAARD, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 30, 2003)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
In this case, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argues that the District
Court erred by both statutorily and equitably tolling the statute of limitations for the
federal habeas corpus petition of appellee John Pace under the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), during the
period of time Pace was pursuing post conviction relief in state court under the
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546 (1998)
(PCRA). At issue is whether Pace’s application for state post-conviction relief was
“properly filed” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). We hold that our recent case, Merritt v.
Blaine, 326 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003), controls the analysis here, and because we find that
the application was not properly filed and that equitable tolling was not justified, we will
reverse the District Court.
I.
The one-year limitation of the AEDPA is statutorily tolled for the “time
during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2). Pace’s petition was statutorily tolled only if his petition for state post-
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conviction review was both pending and “properly filed.” Merritt, 326 F.3d at 162. In
Merritt, which was decided after Judge Giles issued his opinion, we analyzed our
decision in Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001):
We held in Fahy that an untimely PCRA petition does not toll
the statute of limitations for a federal habeas corpus petition. .
. . In Fahy, we noted that when applying AEDPA, ‘we must
look to state law governing when a petition for collateral
relief is properly filed’ and ‘defer to a state’s highest court
when it rules on an issue.’ Consequently, just as in Fahy, we
must defer to the state court’s holding that Merritt’s PCRA
petition was untimely and it follows that it was not ‘properly
filed’ under AEDPA.
Id. at 165-66 (citations omitted). Because the highest state court had held that Merritt’s
PCRA petition was untimely, it was not “properly filed” under AEDPA.
We do not see any material distinctions between our treatment of M erritt’s
pro se second PCRA petition and Pace’s. We are therefore bound by the state court’s
finding that Pace’s second PCRA petition was untimely, and we must reverse the District
Court’s order holding that Pace’s second PCRA petition was tolled by the statute.
II.
The general requirements for equitable tolling are that (1) the petitioner has
established that he has been prevented from asserting his rights “in some extraordinary
way,” and (2) the petitioner has demonstrated that he “exercised reasonable diligence in
investigating and bringing [the] claims.” Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
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The Commonwealth contends that, contrary to the determination of the
District Court, the lack of certainty as to how Pennsylvania courts would interpret the
PCRA is not an “extraordinary” circumstance. We agree. In Merritt, we explained:
We recognized that in 1997, when Fahy’s PCRA petition was
filed, the newly established PCRA time limit was ‘unclear’
and ‘inhibitively opaque.’ Indeed, we stated that based on
that uncertainty, Fahy ‘reasonably believed that the state
petition was properly filed.’ However . . . in Fahy we ‘did not
hold that this lack of clarity in Pennsylvania law constituted
extraordinary circumstances.’ In fact, we stated that ‘in non-
capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate
research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the
‘extraordinary’ circumstances required for equitable tolling.’
Instead of finding extraordinary circumstances, we based our
decision to apply equitable tolling in Fahy on the accepted
principle that ‘death is different.’ . . . This case is similar to
Fahy. . . . [I]t was not unreasonable (indeed it was
appropriate) for M erritt to have believed he was required to
exhaust his state remedies by filing a second PCRA petition
prior to filing a habeas petition in federal court. . . . Although
Merritt faces the grave penalty of mandatory life sentence
without the possibility of parole, we cannot apply the
rationale of Fahy to Merritt’s situation without violating our
tradition of avoiding intracircuit conflict of precedent.
Merritt, 326 F.3d at 169-70 (citations omitted). Merritt established that the uncertain
PCRA time limit is not an “extraordinary” circumstance in the case of mandatory life
sentence without the possibility of parole. In addition, the Merritt panel held that because
Merritt did not act promptly after the decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
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1997,1 at which point “Pennsylvania law as to the time bar of the PCRA became clear,”
there was no basis to find M erritt’s habeas petition timely under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. This case is on all fours with Merritt. We therefore conclude that there are no
extraordinary circumstances that would allow for equitable tolling.
III.
In conclusion, we hold that there is no basis to find Pace’s habeas petition
timely, either under the statute or under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Indeed, Pace
himself concedes that “Merritt is materially indistinguishable from Pace and, thus,
Merritt’s denial of both statutory and equitable tolling would apply here.” Appellee’s
Supp. Br. Re: Merritt, at 1. Based on the foregoing, we will reverse the District Court,
and dismiss Pace’s petition for habeas corpus as time-barred under the AEDPA.
1. See Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A. 2d 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997);
Commonwealth v. Conway, 706 A. 2d 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Richard L. Nygaard
Circuit Judge
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