Shapiro v. Prudential Ins Co , 78 F. App'x 818 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2003 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-28-2003
    Shapiro v. Prudential Ins Co
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 02-3805
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    Recommended Citation
    "Shapiro v. Prudential Ins Co" (2003). 2003 Decisions. Paper 184.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2003/184
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No.: 02-3805
    ____________
    STEPHEN SHAPIRO,
    Appellant
    v.
    PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 99-CV-04325)
    District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
    ______________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    on June 16, 2003
    Before: ALITO, ROTH, and HALL* , Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed October 28, 2003)
    ____________________
    *The Hon. Cynthia H. Hall, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    OPINION
    ROTH, Circuit Judge;
    Stephen Shapiro has appealed the judgment in favor of defendant Prudential
    Insurance Company of American entered by the United States District Court for the
    District of New Jersey.
    Shapiro, a former employee of Lanier Worldwide, was covered for long-term
    disability (LTD) benefits by Lanier’s Group Policy G-59115 (the plan), an employee
    benefits plan governed by ERISA. The plan provides LTD benefits for covered
    employees who meet all contractual requirements for such benefits, as follows:
    Total Disability exists when Prudential determines that all of these
    conditions are met:
    (1) Due to sickness or accidental injury, both of these are true:
    (a) You are not able to perform, for wage or profit, the material and
    substantial duties your occupation.
    (b) After the Initial Duration of a period of Total Disability, you are
    not able to perform for wage or profit the material and substantial
    duties of any job for which you are reasonably fitted by your
    education, training, or experience. The Initial Duration is shown in
    the Schedule of Benefits.
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    (2) You are not working at any job for wage or profit.
    (3) You are under the regular care of a Doctor.
    In February 1996, Shapiro left work as a major account representative for Lanier.
    He applied and received short term disability benefits. His doctors anticipated that he
    would be able to return to work in March. Shapiro did not return.
    In June 1996, Shapiro submitted a claim for LTD benefits under the plan.
    Shapiro’s claim was approved, effective May 24, 1996. According to his medical
    records, Shapiro was suffering from a degenerative disc disease and a cervical herniated
    disc, making it difficult for him to carry his fifty-pound sales bag and twenty-pound
    laptop computer on sales calls.
    On December 5, 1997, Prudential wrote Shapiro to notify him that part 1(b) of his
    plan’s total disability definition would become effective May 24, 1998, pursuant to the
    policy’s terms. To determine whether total disability continued as defined by part 1(b) of
    the plan, Prudential was going to conduct a thorough review of Shapiro’s claim to ensure
    that he was still eligible for LTD benefits.
    As a result of its review, two administrative appeals by Shapiro, a surveillance
    video, and a final administrative appeal, Prudential denied Shapiro’s claim on the basis
    that Shapiro was capable of performing sedentary work. Shapiro then brought suit in
    District Court.
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    Both Shapiro and Prudential filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
    District Court determined that Prudential’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious and
    granted summary judgment for Prudential. Shapiro appealed.
    We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise
    plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Pi Lambda Phi
    Fraternity v. University of Pittsburgh, 
    299 F.3d 435
    , 441 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, we apply
    the same standard of review to Prudential’s decision to deny benefits as the District Court
    should have applied. Smathers v. Multi-Tool/Multi-Plastics Employee Health and
    Welfare Plan, 
    298 F.3d 191
    , 194 (3d Cir. 2002); Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 
    206 F.3d 271
    , 278 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
    discloses no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as
    a matter of law. See F.C.R.P. 56(c); Cleotex v. Cartrell, 
    477 U.S. 317
     (1986).
    We find that Prudential’s initial termination of Shapiro’s LTD benefits, and its
    subsequent decisions to uphold this termination, were based on Prudential’s
    determination, supported by independent medical evaluations and objective observation,
    that Shapiro was able to perform sedentary work and was able to perform for wage or
    profit the material and substantial duties of any job for which he was reasonably fitted by
    his education, training, or experience. In view of the above, we cannot say that
    Prudential’s decision was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence, or
    erroneous as a matter of law. Thus, Prudential’s decision was neither arbitrary nor
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    capricious.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    TO THE CLERK:
    Please file the foregoing Opinion.
    By the Court,
    /s/ JANE R. ROTH
    Circuit Judge
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