Malak v. Atty Gen USA , 110 F. App'x 217 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2004 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    9-24-2004
    Malak v. Atty Gen USA
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 03-1056
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    "Malak v. Atty Gen USA" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 333.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/333
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    Nos. 03-1056 & 03-4206
    SAMY MANSOUR MALAK,
    Petitioner
    v.
    JOHN ASHCROFT,
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA No. A77-714-548)
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    September 13, 2004
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ALITO and AM BRO, Circuit Judges
    (Filed        September 24, 2004                   )
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
    In this immigration case, petitioner Samy Malak appeals the orders of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals denying his petitions for asylum and withholding of removal. We
    will affirm.
    I.
    Samy Malak is a 34-year old citizen of Egypt and a Coptic Christian. His asylum
    claims center around alleged mistreatment by his neighbor Ahmed Abu Shanab, a
    member of the Muslim Brotherhood,1 as well as an alleged lack of response by the local
    police.
    In 1994, Malak and Shanab lived in adjacent apartments in a building owned by
    Malak’s father. Malak cites to several confrontational incidents between his family and
    Shanab’s family in support of his asylum application. Shanab allegedly told Malak’s
    wife, Teriza, to not wear a cross on her necklace and to cover her head when entering or
    leaving the apartment building. Teriza was allegedly frightened by this encounter and
    refused to enter or leave the building unless accompanied by her husband. Malak also
    claims Shanab and his wife have attacked and beaten Teriza. In another incident, Malak
    alleges his company truck was vandalized by “a group of Shanab’s men,” members of the
    Muslim Brotherhood. At one point, Malak reported the presence of wanted criminals at
    Shanab’s apartment, leading to the arrest of one of them and Shanab. Upon his release,
    Shanab allegedly attacked Malak with a sword, blaming him for the arrest and saying
    Malak “must pay for it.” In April 1998, M alak relocated his family to a suburb of Cairo.
    But he claims two female followers of Shanab determined the family’s whereabouts and
    attempted to kidnap Malak’s son while he was attending school. Malak claims all of
    1
    The IJ took judicial notice that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization.
    2
    these incidents are at least partially motivated by Shanab’s disdain for his religious
    affiliation.
    In addition to alleged persecution from Shanab, Malak maintains the local police
    refused to help him, as they were either intimidated by Shanab, or they supported Shanab
    because of his affiliation with the M uslim Brotherhood. When M alak filed a report with
    the police concerning the attacks on Teriza, the police allegedly refused to take action
    against Shanab. Instead, the police officers allegedly told them to try to reconcile with
    Shanab and to forgive him. In another instance, Malak’s family filed two complaints with
    the police to remove Shanab from his apartment because of his refusal to pay two years
    rent, but the police took no action. Malak claims this police inaction demonstrated their
    fear of and support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and their refusal to assist Coptic
    Christians.
    Leaving his wife and son in Egypt, Malak arrived in the United States in March
    1999 as a nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to remain in the country for sixth
    months. He filed for asylum in December 1999, and the INS placed him in removal
    proceedings in June 2000.
    The immigration judge rejected Malak’s asylum, withholding, and torture claims,
    finding his testimony and affidavit not credible. The IJ noted Malak testified to several
    crucial events during the proceedings but failed to list them in his asylum application and
    affidavit. These omitted events included the alleged attempted kidnapping of his son; the
    3
    allegation of police refusal to transmit reports relating to Shanab’s attack on Malak’s wife
    and son to their commanding officer who was Christian; and Shanab’s alleged attack after
    Malak reported to the police that Shanab had criminals living with him. The IJ also found
    some discrepancies between Malak’s testimony and his affidavit, with respect to who saw
    the men who vandalized the company car; who informed Malak about the fight between
    his wife and Shanab’s family; and where Shanab threatened Malak after he filed charges
    against Shanab. Even assuming Malak’s story was credible, the IJ ruled in the alternative
    that Malak did not demonstrate he was persecuted on statutorily protected grounds under
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A).
    Malak appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s ruling without opinion. After
    his motion to reconsider was denied by the BIA, he appealed.
    II.
    When the BIA defers to the decision of an IJ, we review the IJ’s decision as the
    final agency decision. Xie v. Ashcroft, 
    359 F.3d 239
    , 242 (3d Cir. 2004). We review both
    the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and the denial of asylum eligibility under the
    substantial evidence standard. 
    Id.
     Under this standard, the IJ’s ruling must be upheld
    unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 
    Id. at 243
     (quoting Gao v. Ashcroft, 
    299 F.3d 266
    , 272 (3d Cir. 2002)). We have jurisdiction
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    .
    4
    III.
    An adverse credibility determination must be based on evidence in the record,
    rather than on speculation. Gao, 
    299 F.3d at 272
    . Minor inconsistencies unrelated to the
    asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are not a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility
    finding. 
    Id.
     Instead, “[t]he discrepancies must involve the ‘heart of the asylum claim.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Ceballos-Castillo v. INS, 
    904 F.2d 519
    , 520 (9th Cir. 1990)). After
    considering several omissions and discrepancies between M alak’s testimony and his
    previously submitted affidavit, the IJ determined that M alak’s story was not credible.
    Malak claims on appeal he inadvertently omitted several events because he thought
    the initial affidavit need only provide a “summary” of his claims. In addition, he argues
    the inconsistencies are minor and are unrelated to the “heart of the asylum claim.”
    Notwithstanding his assertion, the events to which M alak testified are integral to his
    claims of persecution. The IJ could reasonably have expected Malak to have listed all of
    the incidents of alleged police misconduct, as well as the fight between himself and
    Shanab and the attempted kidnapping of his son. The IJ’s credibility findings are
    supported by substantial evidence from the record. We see no error.
    To establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution, Malak must show:
    “(1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is ‘on account
    of’ one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is committed by the government or
    forces the government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.” Gao, 
    299 F.3d at
    272
    5
    (quoting Navas v. INS, 
    217 F.3d 646
    , 655 (9th Cir. 2000)). 2 Furthermore, the alien must
    establish that the primary motivating factor behind the persecution is a statutorily-
    protected ground. Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 
    328 F.3d 179
     (3d Cir. 2003). Because of our
    deferential standard of review of the IJ’s findings of facts, we must affirm the denial of
    asylum unless the protected ground was the primary motivating factor of the persecution.
    
    Id.
    Malak claims Shanab persecuted him on account of his Christian faith and that the
    local police were “unable or unwilling” to protect him because of his faith. Based on the
    evidence he has presented, however, it is not at all clear that the alleged conduct of
    Shanab and his “followers” was motivated by religious bias or personal and financial
    conflicts.
    Assuming the police did not follow up on Malak’s reports, there is little indication
    that religious bias motivated the inaction. Malak surmises that officers failed to pass
    along his report to the commanding officer because the officer was also a Coptic
    Christian, but this is speculation.
    Although Malak belongs to a religious minority, there is scant evidence of
    widespread religious persecution toward Coptic Christians in Egypt. Malak has presented
    reports of sporadic incidents of violence by radical Islamic groups and local police
    2
    The five statutorily-protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A).
    6
    towards Christians. But the Egyptian government has stated that the Muslim
    Brotherhood’s existence violates Egyptian law, and many members of the group have
    been arrested and detained by the government. The finding that there is no current
    credible evidence that Malak could reasonably fear persecution on account of his
    Christian faith if he returns to Egypt is well supported in the record.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Malak’s petitions for review and affirm
    the orders of the BIA.
    7