Matter of Vandenburg v. Vandenburg , 28 N.Y.S.3d 736 ( 2016 )


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  •                           State of New York
    Supreme Court, Appellate Division
    Third Judicial Department
    Decided and Entered: March 31, 2016                    519686
    ________________________________
    In the Matter of DEBBIE
    VANDENBURG,
    Appellant,
    v                                     MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JESSICA VANDENBURG,
    Respondent,
    et al.,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________
    Calendar Date:   February 19, 2016
    Before:   Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ.
    __________
    Tammy J. Arquette, Clifton Park, for appellant.
    Renee L. Litz-Taylor, Schenectady, for respondent.
    Lawrence Dahlke, Schenectady, attorney for the child.
    __________
    Clark, J.
    Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Schenectady
    County (Burke, J.), entered July 21, 2014, which dismissed
    petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct
    Act article 6, for an order of visitation with respondents'
    child.
    Petitioner is the maternal grandmother of a child born to
    respondents in 2011. In 2013, as a result of her "strained"
    relationship with respondent Jessica Vandenburg (hereinafter the
    mother), petitioner commenced this Family Ct Act article 6
    proceeding seeking visitation with the child. Following a trial,
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    Family Court concluded that petitioner had established standing
    to seek visitation, but that visitation was not in the child's
    best interests and it therefore dismissed her application.
    Petitioner appeals.
    In seeking visitation with his or her grandchild, a
    petitioning grandparent must first establish that he or she has
    standing pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72 (1) and, second,
    that visitation is in the best interests of the child (see Matter
    of E.S. v P.D., 8 NY3d 150, 157 [2007]; Matter of Wilson v
    McGlinchey, 2 NY3d 375, 380 [2004]). Where the child's parents
    are living, the grandparent may establish standing by
    demonstrating that "conditions exist which equity would see fit
    to intervene" (Domestic Relations Law § 72 [1]; see Matter of
    Wilson v McGlinchey, 2 NY3d at 380; Matter of Rubel v Wilson, 111
    AD3d 1065, 1067 [2013]). The grandparent "must establish a
    sufficient existing relationship with [his or her] grandchild, or
    in cases where that has been frustrated by the parents, a
    sufficient effort to establish one, so that the court perceives
    it as one deserving the court's intervention" (Matter of Emanuel
    S. v Joseph E., 78 NY2d 178, 182 [1991]; accord Matter of Roberts
    v Roberts, 81 AD3d 1117, 1118 [2011]). If the parents have
    impaired the grandparent's ability to foster a relationship with
    the child, "the grandparent[] must demonstrate that [he or she]
    did everything possible under the circumstances to establish a
    relationship with the[] grandchild[]" (Matter of Couse v Couse,
    72 AD3d 1231, 1232 [2010]; see Matter of Rubel v Wilson, 111 AD3d
    at 1067).
    Here, although they disagreed as to the number of visits
    and the length of time over which the visits occurred, both
    petitioner and the mother testified that petitioner cared for the
    child during the early months of her life. Petitioner stated
    that, when her visits with the child ceased in early 2012, she
    regularly called and sent text messages to the mother asking to
    see the child, but that the mother rarely responded. Petitioner
    also asserted that she attempted to send cards to the child and
    that, on one occasion, she placed a card and a balloon for the
    child on the mother's car. Moreover, the record revealed that
    petitioner has repeatedly and consistently sought visitation with
    the child, having filed three prior petitions seeking such
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    relief. Petitioner withdrew each of those prior petitions after
    the mother agreed to afford her visitation and, while these
    periods of visitation were short lived, the mother testified that
    she has permitted petitioner to visit with the child at least a
    handful of times since January 2012. As this evidence
    demonstrated that petitioner developed a relationship with the
    child early on in her life and thereafter made repeated efforts
    to continue that relationship, Family Court properly determined
    that petitioner established her standing to seek visitation with
    the child (see Matter of Laudadio v Laudadio, 104 AD3d 1091,
    1092-1093 [2013]; see generally Matter of Waverly v Gibson, 79
    AD3d 897, 899 [2010]).
    The determination of whether visitation with a grandparent
    is in the child's best interests requires evaluation of "a
    variety of factors, including 'the nature and extent of the
    existing relationship between the grandparent and child, . . .
    the basis and reasonableness of the parent's objections, the
    grandparent's nurturing skills and attitude toward the parent[s],
    the attorney for the child's assessment and the child's wishes'"
    (Matter of Articolo v Grasso, 132 AD3d 1193, 1194 [2015], quoting
    Matter of Stellone v Kelly, 45 AD3d 1202, 1204-1205 [2007]).
    "[C]ourts should not lightly intrude on the family relationship
    against a fit parent's wishes[, as t]he presumption that a fit
    parent's decisions are in the child's best interests is a strong
    one" (Matter of E.S. v P.D., 8 NY3d at 157; see Matter of Hill v
    Juhase, 105 AD3d 1278, 1280 [2013]).
    The record clearly established a breakdown of the
    relationship between petitioner and the mother and that efforts
    to repair their relationship had been unsuccessful. In fact, one
    attempt to resolve their differences nearly led to a physical
    altercation. While the existence of animosity between petitioner
    and the mother is not, in isolation, sufficient to support
    denying petitioner visitation with the child (see Matter of E.S.
    v P.D., 8 NY3d at 157; Matter of Stellone v Kelly, 45 AD3d at
    1204), several witnesses also consistently testified that
    petitioner had a quick temper, used foul language in the presence
    of her grandchildren and often directed disparaging or demeaning
    comments at various members of her family, including children.
    Considering the foregoing testimony, which was credited by Family
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    Court, and the attorney for the child's support for the denial of
    visitation to petitioner, we conclude that there is a sound and
    substantial basis in the record for Family Court's determination
    that an order of grandparent visitation, in the face of
    respondents' objections, was not in the child's best interests
    (see Matter of Articolo v Grasso, 132 AD3d at 1194-1195; Matter
    of Couse v Couse, 72 AD3d at 1233). Contrary to petitioner's
    contention, the court was not required to direct visitation
    simply because the mother expressed that she was not opposed to
    allowing petitioner limited and supervised visitation with the
    child on a discretionary basis (see generally Matter of Couse v
    Couse, 72 AD3d at 1233).
    Peters, P.J., Garry, Rose and Lynch, JJ., concur.
    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
    ENTER:
    Robert D. Mayberger
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 519686

Citation Numbers: 137 A.D.3d 1498, 28 N.Y.S.3d 736

Filed Date: 3/31/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023