Salamone v. Mullin ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-20-2005
    Salamone v. Mullin
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 04-1678
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    Recommended Citation
    "Salamone v. Mullin" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 992.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/992
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 04-1678
    SALVATORE SALAMONE,
    Appellant
    v.
    PATRICIA MULLIN, Assoc. Special Agent in Charge of the
    Philadelphia Office of United States Immigration and Customs
    and Enforcement (USICE) of the Department of Homeland
    Security; THEODORE NORDMARK, Assistant District Director for
    Deportation and Detention of USICE in Philadelphia;
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-05622)
    District Judge: Honorable Herbert J. Hutton
    Argued December 7, 2004
    Before: AMBRO, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
    SHADUR*, District Judge
    (Opinion filed June 20, 2005)
    *Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Judge for the Northern District
    of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    Steven A. Morley, Esquire (Argued)
    Morley, Surin & Griffin
    325 Chestnut Street
    Suite 1305-P
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorney for Appellant
    Patrick L. Meehan
    United States Attorney
    Virginia A. Gibson
    Assistant United States Attorney
    Chief, Civil Division
    Richard M. Bernstein (Argued)
    Assistant United States Attorney
    615 Chestnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19106
    Attorneys for Appellees
    OPINION
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge
    Salvatore Salamone appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
    in his immigration case. His legal efforts to remain in the United States have taken a
    long, winding path toward resolution. Partly because of legal developments during the
    case’s progression and at least partly because of the parties’ oversight in certain instances
    (for example, they failed to address governing statutory provisions until this Court
    directed them to do so), even the issues presented have been moving targets. Legal
    theories have shifted, some were abandoned and still others sprung to life too late.
    2
    In the end, we consider Salamone’s contention that he has been denied a
    meaningful review—indeed, even an adjudication in the first instance—of his application
    for discretionary relief under former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed), in violation of his right to due process of law.
    We agree, and for the reasons described below conclude that Salamone is entitled to an
    administrative adjudication of his application for discretionary relief before an
    immigration judge (“IJ”).
    I.
    Salamone was lawfully admitted to the United States as a legal permanent resident
    on November 22, 1963. On April 15, 1985, he was convicted in the United States District
    Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for possession of an unregistered firearm
    and falsification of firearms transaction records. He was also convicted on June 24, 1987,
    in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for the offenses
    of false statements and conspiracy to violate currency laws. He served approximately
    nine years in prison for these convictions.
    What is now the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 1 began deportation
    proceedings on August 8, 1994, charging Salamone with deportability based on his prior
    1
    As a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002), what
    was formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service has ceased to exist as an agency
    within the Department of Justice, and its enforcement functions have been transferred to
    DHS.
    3
    criminal convictions. Specifically, he was charged (1) under INA § 241(a)(2)(c), 8
    U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(c), for his 1985 firearms convictions and (2) of having committed at
    least two crimes of moral turpitude under INA § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), § 1231(a)(2)(A)(ii), for
    his 1987 convictions for false statements and violation of currency laws. On August 10,
    1994, an IJ ruled that Salamone was deportable under § 241(a)(2)(C) for having been
    convicted of a firearms offense. The IJ dismissed the charge under § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii),
    determining that Salamone had been convicted of only one crime involving moral
    turpitude rather than the two or more such convictions required under § 241(a)(2)(A)(ii).
    Salamone subsequently sought relief under former INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C.
    § 1182(h), which then provided for “hardship waivers,” and former INA § 212(c), which
    then gave IJs broad discretion to grant “discretionary waivers” of deportation for aliens
    who had accrued at least seven years’ permanent residence. On October 15, 1996, the IJ
    granted Salamone a waiver under § 212(h), failing to make a final determination on
    Salamone’s § 212(c) application, ostensibly because that application was rendered moot
    by the IJ’s grant of relief on the alternative ground. On March 23, 1998, the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed, “rul[ing] that, according to reforms made to the
    INA after the IJ’s . . . decision, Petitioner was no longer eligible for the waiver [under §
    212(h)] because his firearms conviction qualified as an aggravated felony.” Salamone v.
    Dept. of Homeland Security, 
    2004 WL 503544
    , *2 (Feb. 5, 2004). The BIA did not
    address Salamone’s alternative argument that he was entitled to relief under § 212(c),
    4
    which was not discussed in the IJ’s grant of § 212(h) relief. It entered a deportation
    order. Salamone did not seek review of this BIA determination.
    In September 2003, Salamone was arrested on the BIA’s outstanding order of
    deportation. As a result, on October 7, 2003, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus in the District Court, arguing that he was deprived the opportunity to present his §
    212(c) application.2 The District Court denied his petition. We review his timely appeal.3
    II.
    Before the District Court, the primary issue was the retroactivity of certain
    amendments to (and the subsequent repeal of) § 212(c). INA § 212(c), which was
    repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) §
    304(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(b), enabled deportable aliens with seven years of lawful
    permanent residence to request discretionary relief from deportation. Even aliens who
    had been convicted of aggravated felonies could invoke this provision (if the term of
    imprisonment was less than five years). Prior to its repeal by IIRIRA, this provision was
    2
    Salamone also argued that the BIA erred in vacating the IJ’s grant of relief under §
    212(h). At oral argument, Salamone’s counsel indicated that, notwithstanding the
    extensive briefing on this issue, Salamone no longer wished to pursue this argument. In
    any event, for the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that the BIA’s disposition
    of Salamone’s § 212(h) claim was proper.
    3
    The recent passage of The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13 (2005), creates
    yet another procedural wrinkle in the fabric of this dispute. It is unclear whether that Act
    converts this habeas appeal into a petition for review. Because we would reach the same
    result in either scenario in this case (given the clearly constitutional character of
    Salamone’s argument) and because the practical effect of the Act is clear in this case (we
    remand to the BIA), we do not attempt to interpret the relevant language of the Act.
    5
    first limited by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) § 440(d), 8
    U.S.C. § 1182, which rendered aliens convicted of aggravated felonies ineligible for
    discretionary relief under INA § 212(c).
    The District Court retroactively applied IIRIRA § 304(b) and AEDPA § 440(d) to
    bar Salamone’s application for relief under § 212(c). In so doing, at the parties’ urging, it
    relied primarily on INS v. St. Cyr, 
    533 U.S. 289
    (1994). Unfortunately, the parties failed
    to address before the District Court (and the Court did not discover) two provisions of
    federal law that govern the retroactivity question in this case (and render St. Cyr
    inapplicable). 8 C.F.R. § 212.3(g) and IIRIRA § 309(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, make clear
    that § 440(d) of AEDPA (amending INA § 212(c)) and IIRIRA’s repeal of INA § 212(c),
    respectively, do not apply to applications under § 212(c) when deportation proceedings
    began before certain critical dates of effectiveness. There is no question that Salamone’s
    deportation proceedings began before these critical dates and, thus, these two provisions
    are applicable. As a result, the District Court’s retroactivity holding was legal error and
    Salamone’s § 212(c) application was not foreclosed.
    III.
    After appellate briefing had concluded, when it was asked to address the elusive
    legal provisions that govern the dispute, the Government asserted a last-minute
    exhaustion challenge to Salamone’s petition. In essence, it argued that, by failing to
    cross-appeal to the BIA the IJ’s “silent treatment” of his § 212(c) application, Salamone
    6
    failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and is thus barred from relief at this
    juncture. We disagree.
    Salamone went before the BIA to defend against the Government’s challenge of
    the IJ’s grant of relief under § 212(h). The IJ had not rejected—indeed, had not
    addressed—Salamone’s § 212(c) application. The IJ’s decision reflects his
    determination, as the Government concedes, that the grant of relief under § 212(h)
    rendered Salamone’s § 212(c) application “pretermitted as moot.” Because the IJ failed
    to address this conclusion in his opinion, the BIA understandably failed to remand
    Salamone’s case for adjudication of his § 212(c) application in the first instance.
    Salamone was required to exhaust only claims and remedies that were “available
    to [him] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Because of the unique procedural posture
    in this case, Salamone did exhaust the remedies that were actually available to him by
    raising his § 212(c) claim before the IJ in the first instance. In other words, Salamone’s §
    212(c) claim was not actually available to him before the BIA because the BIA’s
    appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of the actual determinations made by the IJ.
    See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) and (d).
    Had the IJ included his pretermission conclusion in his opinion—or any reference
    to Salamone’s § 212(c) application—there is no question that the BIA would have been
    obliged to remand Salamone’s case for a § 212(c) determination (or to otherwise address
    his application) once it overruled the grant of § 212(h) relief. The Government’s
    7
    exhaustion argument turns not on Salamone’s conduct but on the (lack of) completeness
    of the IJ’s opinion.
    The only action that Salamone conceivably could have taken to raise his
    arguments under § 212(c) once the BIA reversed the IJ’s grant of § 212(h) relief would
    have been to file a motion to reconsider or reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.
    However, because the grant or denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen is completely
    discretionary, such a motion cannot be a remedy available “as of right.” See
    Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 
    335 F.3d 874
    , 881 (9th Cir. 2003); Castro-Cortez v. INS,
    
    239 F.3d 1037
    , 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause the BIA need not actually reopen its
    prior decision, a motion to reopen is considered a request for discretionary relief, and
    does not constitute a remedy that must be exhausted.”).
    For these reasons, we conclude that Salamone did not fail to exhaust
    administrative remedies available to him as of right. Given the unique posture of this
    case, Salamone is not to be faulted for his § 212(c) application’s fall through the
    proverbial cracks.
    IV.
    We thus vacate the District Court’s order denying Salamone’s habeas petition and
    remand this case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-1678

Judges: Ambro, Van Antwerpen Shadur

Filed Date: 6/20/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2024