Patrick King v. Attorney General United States ( 2022 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 21-3100
___________
PATRICK JUNIOR KING,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________
On Petition for Review of an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A205-905-449)
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 19, 2022
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Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, McKEE and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 13, 2022)
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OPINION*
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CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
Patrick Junior King petitions this Court to review a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
order of removal. For the reasons that follow, we will grant the petition for review.
I.1
King, a native and citizen of Jamaica, arrived in the United States in August 2016
pursuant to a visa, which later expired. He pleaded guilty in January 2020 to third-degree
felony fleeing or eluding a police officer in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3733(a). The
Government initiated removal proceedings and charged King as removable for having
overstayed his visa and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
(“CIMT”) within five years of entering the United States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(B),
(a)(2)(A)(i). King later married a United States citizen and has applied to adjust to the
status of lawful permanent resident.
The IJ held a hearing and issued an opinion. The IJ decided that King had
conceded both of the removability charges and so did not analyze whether the felony
fleeing conviction qualifies as a CIMT. The BIA determined on appeal that this was
error because King had not conceded the CIMT issue. The BIA therefore considered
whether the conviction qualifies as a CIMT, concluding that a Pennsylvania felony
fleeing conviction is categorically a CIMT because it involves a culpable mental state of
1
Because we write for the parties, we recite only those facts pertinent to our decision.
2
willfulness and applies to reprehensible conduct.2 King timely filed this petition for
review.
II.3
Central to this matter is whether King’s felony conviction for fleeing or eluding
qualifies as a CIMT. That crime is defined under Pennsylvania law as follows:
(a) Offense defined.-- Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to
bring his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing
police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a
stop, commits an offense as graded in subsection (a.2).
(a.2) Grading -- . . .
(2) An offense under subsection (a) constitutes a felony of the third degree if the
driver while fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer does any of the following:
(i) commits a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of
alcohol or controlled substance);
(ii) crosses a State line; or
(iii) endangers a law enforcement officer or member of the general public due to
the driver engaging in a high-speed chase.
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3373.
2
The IJ and BIA addressed additional issues, including whether King should be entitled
to a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Because our decision to grant
the petition for review is limited to the CIMT issue, we will not discuss the other aspects
of the agency decisions.
3
The BIA had jurisdiction over the appeal of the IJ’s decision under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(b). We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo. Mahn v. Att’y
Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014). Because the BIA’s decision is unpublished and
issued by a single board member, it is not entitled to deference. Larios v. Att’y Gen., 978
F.3d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 2020).
3
We assess the statute by employing the categorical approach, looking to the
statutory elements of the offense rather than the specific actions that led to the conviction.
Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465–66 (3d Cir. 2009). We ask whether the
“least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction” under the statute
involves moral turpitude.4 Larios v. Att’y Gen., 978 F.3d 62, 70 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 2018)). The least culpable conduct
must be reprehensible and be committed with some level of consciousness or deliberation
in order to qualify as turpitudinous. Javier v. Att’y Gen., 826 F.3d 127, 130 (3d Cir.
2016).
Pennsylvania’s felony fleeing statute criminalizes willful behavior and thus
satisfies the scienter requirement for a CIMT. 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3733(a) (“Any driver
of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, or who
otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer . . .” (emphasis added)).
4
We employ the modified categorical approach if a statute is divisible and the relevant
documents permit us to determine the specific provision under which a defendant was
convicted. Larios, 978 F.3d at 67–68. Here, the fleeing statute is divisible between the
felony and misdemeanor portions because different punishments apply to each, see
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 518 (2016), and the guilty plea (a Shepard
document) shows that King was convicted of the felony offense. We need not determine
whether a felony fleeing conviction is further divisible as to the three aggravating sub-
sections set forth in § 3733(a.2)(2) because, even if it is, the record does not specify
which sub-section applies to King’s fleeing conviction. We must therefore apply the
categorical approach to the entirety of the felony portion of the statute in any event. See
Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 416 (3d Cir. 2005).
4
The least culpable conduct covered by the statute is not, however, sufficiently
reprehensible to qualify.
We first reject the Government’s position that the felony portion of the statute
does not extend to a failure to stop. Section (a) defines the misdemeanor offense as
applying to “[a]ny driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his
vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police officer,
when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 3733(a). Although the felony portion of the statute does not repeat the “fails or
refuses” phrase, it incorporates subsection (a). See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3733(a.2)(2)
(“An offense under subsection (a) constitutes a felony of the third degree if . . .”).
Moreover, the statute’s use of the term “otherwise” suggests that “fleeing” encompasses
both one who “fails to bring a vehicle to a stop” and one who “refuses to bring a vehicle
to a stop.” See Otherwise, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “otherwise”
as “[i]n a different way; in another manner” or “[b]y other causes or means”). In other
words, the use of “otherwise” indicates that failing or refusing to stop is simply another
manner of fleeing or eluding.
We conclude that the “least culpable conduct” encompassed by the felony version
of the statute is a scenario in which “[a]ny driver of a motor vehicle . . . willfully fails or
refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop” and “crosses a State line.” 75 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§§ 3733(a), (a.2)(2)(ii). We therefore must next determine whether this least culpable
5
conduct is, as a matter of law, “inherently base, vile, or depraved.”5 Knapik v. Ashcroft,
384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004).
In Mahn v. Att’y Gen., we held that a misdemeanor conviction that “may place
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury” was not a CIMT because a
traffic offense where no other person is necessarily placed in danger does not
categorically involve moral turpitude. 767 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2705). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded in Ramirez-Contreras v. Sessions that a California fleeing statute —
which, like the Pennsylvania statute, does not include an element of danger or injury to
another person — is not a CIMT because it “criminalizes a swath of conduct that simply
does not rise to that level.” 858 F.3d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 2017).
Recognizing that the Pennsylvania statute does not expressly include an element
of danger or injury to others, the Government responds that vehicular flight inherently
gives rise to such a risk. In support of its view, the Government relies primarily upon
Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 10 (2011). Not only did Sykes arise in a different
context and not consider whether the statute at issue was a CIMT, it has since been
overruled, so its analysis is of dubious value here. See Johnson v. United States, 576
5
The BIA considered the “the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being
prosecuted under the statute” rather than the least culpable conduct encompassed by the
statute. App. 14. This was error. The “realistic probability” test does not apply to a
CIMT analysis. Larios, 978 F.3d at 72 (“We have held that th[e] ‘realistic probability’
analysis is inapplicable when assessing crimes of moral turpitude under the categorical
(or modified categorical) approaches.”); Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 481 (observing that
importation of the “realistic probability” test to the CIMT context is “wrong-headed”).
6
U.S. 591, 606 (2015). The Government further suggests “crossing state lines escalates
the confrontation between the offender and law enforcement and invites violent
confrontation.” Gov’t Br. 36. Yet while such conduct may increase the likelihood of
violent confrontation in some situations, our focus must remain on the least culpable
conduct prohibited by the statute.
The plain language of the statute, coupled with the reasoning of Mahn and
Ramirez-Contreras, persuades us that the Pennsylvania felony fleeing statute does not
qualify as turpitudinous. While the failing to stop for a police officer while crossing a
state line is conduct that may put another in danger, it does not necessarily do so. The
agency therefore erred in its conclusion that King was convicted of a CIMT.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition for review.6
6
The agency’s erroneous legal conclusion that King was convicted of a CIMT pervaded
its assessment of King’s claims, including the denial of a waiver of inadmissibility. See,
e.g., Appendix (“Appx.”) 22 (agreeing with the IJ that a heightened standard applies
because “fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer necessarily entails dangerous
conduct”). We therefore will not reach King’s remaining arguments and instead will
remand the matter to the agency to consider King’s claims in light of this opinion.
7