Dobson v. Northumberland , 151 F. App'x 166 ( 2005 )

Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-13-2005
Dobson v. Northumberland
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4561
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"Dobson v. Northumberland" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 417.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-4561
WILLIAM J. DOBSON,
Appellant
v.
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY; EDWARD ZACK, individually and in his Capacity
as human relations director for Northumberland County; WILLIAM STESNEY,
individually and in his capacity as Northumberland County Chief Clerk; JOHN
BOBECK, individually and in his capacity as Northumberland County Commissioner;
ROBERT GRECO, individually and in his capacity as Northumberland County
Commissioner; SAMUEL DIETRICK, individually and in his capacity as
Northumberland County Commissioner
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cv-01801)
District Judge: The Honorable Malcolm Muir
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 29, 2005
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 13, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
William J. Dobson appeals U.S. District Judge Malcolm Muir’s Order granting
Appellee Northumberland County, Pennsylvania’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Based on our review, we Affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Because we write only for the parties, we recount only the most essential facts. As
this appeal arises from a successful motion to dismiss, we take all factual allegations and
reasonable inferences as true, viewing them in a light most favorable to Appellant
William J. Dobson. In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Secs. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir.
2002). Dobson worked as a Workers’ Compensation Specialist for Appellee
Northumberland County, Pennsylvania (“Northumberland”) for approximately twelve
years. During that time, Dobson’s work was stellar, earning him numerous awards. In
June of 2003, Dobson submitted timesheets for overtime performed going back to April.
These sheets indicated that Dobson had worked certain hours that in reality he had not.
Dobson was paid for these hours.
Upon discovering Dobson’s misrepresentation and the unearned payment made to
him, co-Appellees Edward Zack, human relations director for Northumberland, and
Willian Stesney, Northumberland chief clerk, met with Dobson and told him he could
either resign or be terminated for accepting money he had not earned. Faced with this
choice, Dobson sought to be provided with the evidence of wrongdoing being used
against him and requested to meet with co-Appellees John Bobeck, Robert Greco, and
Samuel Dietrick, Northumberland’s three county commissioners. These requests denied,
Dobson resigned.
Dobson claims that the manner of his departure from Northumberland constituted
a violation of his Constitutional right to due process. Specifically, he alleges that
Northumberland’s refusal to grant him a hearing or to show him the evidence against him
violated his Procedural Due Process right and that his firing was an arbitrary and
irrational action on the part of the state, in violation of his right to Substantive Due
Process. He supports these contentions by arguing that he had a well-founded expectation
of continued employment and that his employee handbook guaranteed him the right to a
thorough investigation and hearing before he could be terminated. Dobson also asserts a
claim under Pennsylvania law for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In response to Dobson’s Complaint, Northumberland filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Having received briefing from both sides, Judge Muir granted
the motion. Dobson timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because
the cased was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we exercise plenary review. Bradshaw v.
Twp. of Middleton, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 18622 (3d Cir. 2005).
III. Discussion
Due Process Claims
To prevail as to his substantive due process claims, Dobson must establish that he
has a property interest as to which the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
protection applies. See Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139-40 (3d
Cir. 2000). State law governs whether Dobson’s employment with Northumberland
constituted a protected property interest. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976).
Because Pennsylvania is an at-will employment state, its authorities and agencies, such as
Northumberland, “do not have the power to enter into contracts of employment that
contract away the right of summary dismissal since the power to confer tenure must be
expressly set forth in the enabling legislation.” Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 548
Pa. 265, 267 (Pa. 1997). Dobson does not claim to be protected by any such legislation.
Because he had no protected property interest in his job with Northumberland under
Pennsylvania law, Dobson’s Substantive Due Process Claim fails.
Not having a protected right voids Dobson’s Procedural Due Process claim as
well. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1976) (“The requirements of
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”). That Dobson’s employee
handbook claimed to give him the right to due process before being terminated does not
have any legal effect: “an employee handbook or personnel manual issued by a
Commonwealth agency is not a legislative action in itself and cannot be considered a
contract guaranteeing a property right in employment unless the legislature has so
provided.” Short, 548 Pa. at 267. Dobson’s employee handbook therefore did not grant
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him any due process right, including the right to an investigation and hearing before being
fired. His Procedural Due Process claim fails as well.
State Law Claim
Because Judge Muir rightly dismissed Dobson’s federal law claims, it was also
proper for him to dismiss the pendent state law claims without prejudice. Markowitz v.
Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1990).
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed in its
entirety.
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