Frederick Smith, Jr. v. SpringHill Suites ( 2022 )


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  • CLD-022                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 22-1968
    ___________
    FREDERICK W. SMITH, JR., also known as Ricky,
    Appellant
    v.
    SPRINGHILL SUITES
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D. Del. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00323)
    District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) or
    Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    November 3, 2022
    Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, AND MCKEE, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: December 16, 2022)
    _________
    OPINION*
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se appellant Frederick Smith, Jr., appeals from the District Court’s order
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    dismissing his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow,
    we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    In 2022, Smith filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that he slipped and
    fell on the property of a SpringHill Suites hotel in Newark, Delaware in 2021. He
    claimed that he sustained several injuries as a result of his fall and sought damages from
    the hotel as a result. After the District Court granted Smith leave to proceed in forma
    pauperis, it screened his complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B). The District
    Court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Smith’s complaint and
    dismissed it. Smith timely appealed. 1
    The District Court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
    over Smith’s claims. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    511 U.S. 375
    , 377
    (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”). It is apparent from Smith’s
    filings in both the District Court and on appeal that his allegations do not form any basis
    for federal question jurisdiction.2 See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    . There is also no basis for
    1
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we exercise
    plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Smith’s complaint for lack of
    subject matter jurisdiction. See Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 
    540 F.3d 179
    , 180 (3d
    Cir. 2008); Allah v. Seiverling, 
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may summarily
    affirm a district court’s decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails
    to present a substantial question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 
    650 F.3d 246
    , 247 (3d Cir.
    2011) (per curiam).
    2
    Although Smith mentions 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     in some of his filings, that reference does
    not aid him in securing federal jurisdiction. Even setting aside the fact that Smith’s
    complaint included no factual allegations of a civil rights violation, § 1983 permits suit
    2
    diversity jurisdiction, as Smith’s filings indicate that both parties are citizens of
    Delaware. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a)(1); Mennen Co. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 
    147 F.3d 287
    ,
    290 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[J]urisdiction [under § 1332] is lacking if any plaintiff and any
    defendant are citizens of the same state.”).
    Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Smith
    an opportunity to amend his complaint, as doing so would have been futile under the
    circumstances of this case. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
    293 F.3d 103
    , 108 (3d
    Cir. 2002); cf. Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. M.V. Hakusan II, 
    954 F.2d 874
    , 886 (3d Cir.
    1992). Smith’s filings do not indicate that he seeks relief against any other party or for
    any reason other than his alleged fall.
    Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    against “persons” who are state actors for purposes of that statute, and there is no
    indication that the sole defendant in this case — a private hotel — fits either threshold
    requirement. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 694 (1978); Benn v.
    Universal Health Sys., Inc., 
    371 F.3d 165
    , 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004).
    3