United States v. Greenslade , 255 F. App'x 691 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    11-29-2007
    USA v. Greenslade
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-1095
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    Recommended Citation
    "USA v. Greenslade" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 179.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/179
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-1095
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    CONRAD GREENSLADE
    a/k/a "Pooter"
    Conrad Greenslade,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    D.C. Criminal No. 04-cr-0405-5
    (Honorable William W. Caldwell)
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 5, 2007
    Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed November 29, 2007)
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
    Conrad Greenslade was one of 23 defendants charged in a drug conspiracy
    indictment. He was sentenced to a term of 156 months after pleading guilty to
    distribution and possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §
    841(a)(1). We will affirm.
    I
    Greenslade appeals on two grounds. First, he argues the District Court erred in
    determining drug amounts by reference to the presentence investigation report. A court
    may rely on any evidence as long as it has “sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States
    v. Brigman, 
    350 F.3d 310
    , 315 (3d Cir. 2003). It need not meet trial standards. U.S. v.
    Leekins, 
    493 F.3d 143
    , 149 (3d Cir. 2007). Greenslade contends the guidelines
    calculation for drug amounts should have been limited to six controlled purchases made
    by Drug Enforcement Agency agents that were addressed at the change of plea hearing.
    But the presentence investigation report, which attributes well over one and one half
    kilograms to Greenslade, was based on Greenslade’s interview with DEA agents, in
    which he told investigators that in one week he obtained approximately two ounces of
    crack cocaine per day and for approximately three months afterwards, he and a co-
    defendant obtained approximately ten ounces of crack cocaine per week. This evidence
    has sufficient indicia of reliability. The District Court reasonably relied on it to determine
    the drug amounts.
    2
    Greenslade also contends the District Court erroneously used the cocaine base
    crack guidelines to determine the offense level, and he attacks the disparities in penalties
    for distribution of crack cocaine and powder cocaine. But we have consistently found
    this disparity does not violate due process rights. See, e.g., United States v. Alton, 
    60 F.3d 1065
    , 1069 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding “Congress had a rational basis for treating offenses
    involving the two substances differently”) . While a court errs if it believes it has no
    discretion to consider such disparity, it is not required to give a lower sentence because of
    it. United States v. Gunter, 
    462 F.3d 237
    , 249 (3d Cir. 2006). The record does not
    suggest the court thought it had no discretion to impose a lower sentence. Therefore, the
    District Court did not act unreasonably in imposing sentence.
    II.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the
    District Court.
    3