S Washington Avenue v. Wilentz Goldman , 259 F. App'x 495 ( 2007 )

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-18-2007
S Washington Avenue v. Wilentz Goldman
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-3472
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-3472
S OUTH W ASHINGTON A VENUE, L.L.C.; R UTH H ALPER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS E XECUTRIX
OF THE E STATE OF H UBERT H ALPER, THE ESTATE OF H ELEN H ALPER; L AURENCE H ALPER,
C LARA H ALPER, LAURENCE HALPER’S WIFE; M ARK H ALPER; R UBY H ALPER-
E RIKKILA, M.D.; R ONALD H ALPER; C INDY H ALPER R AIMAN, F AITH R OST; LAURENCE
AND CLARA HALPER, AS GUARDIANS FOR THEIR CHILDREN ZACHARY
HALPER, SARAH HALPER, NICOLE HALPER, CASSANDRA HALPER,
Appellants
v.
W ILENTZ, G OLDMAN & S PITZER, P.A.; W ARREN W ILENTZ; J OHN H OFFMAN, ESQ., THE LAW
FIRM OF K APLAN & K ELSO, L.L.C.; B RUCE K APLAN; T HOMAS K ELSO; D AVID C RABIEL,
F REEHOLDER OF M IDDLESEX C OUNTY, ON BEHALF OF M IDDLESEX C OUNTY BOARD OF
FREEHOLDERS; M IDDLESEX C OUNTY; M IDDLESEX C OUNTY I MPROVEMENT A UTHORITY;
T HE T OWNSHIP OF P ISCATAWAY; B RIAN W AHLER, M AYOR OF THE T OWNSHIP OF
P ISCATAWAY; J AMES C LARKIN, III, ESQ.; S TEVE C AHN, ESQ., FROM THE LAW FIRM OF
E ICHEN, L EVINSON, C AHN AND P ARRA, LLC AND E ICHEN AND CAHN, LLC AND COUNSEL
FOR THE M IDDLESEX C OUNTY P LANNING B OARD AND COUNCILMAN FOR HE TOWNSHIP OF
P ISCATAWAY; M IDDLESEX C OUNTY P LANNING B OARD; T OWNSHIP C OUNCIL OF
P ISCATAWAY; C HRIS N ELSON, ESQ., OF V ENEZIA AND N OLAN, LLC AND COUNSEL FOR
P ISCATAWAY T OWNSHIP PLANNING B OARD; S TATE OF N EW J ERSEY, G OVERNOR OF N EW
J ERSEY; J OHN D OES 1-30; M ARY D OES 1-30
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-03068)
District Judge: Honorable Peter Sheridan
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a),
November 30, 2007
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Before: BARRY and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND,* District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: December 18, 2007)
OPINION
DIAMOND, District Judge.
Members of the Halper family and their business, South Washington Avenue,
L.L.C., appeal an Order from the District Court of New Jersey denying their request for
an injunction to prevent the transfer of condemned property. We conclude that the
District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute. Accordingly, we vacate
and remand with directions to enter an order dismissing the case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because we write only for the benefit of the Parties, we will set out the facts only
briefly. This appeal is the most recent chapter of a lengthy saga concerning the efforts of
the Township of Piscataway, New Jersey to condemn a parcel of farmland. Appellants
own the farm; Appellees were involved in the condemnation proceedings. Among the
Appellees are the Township, other parties supporting the condemnation, and the law firms
that represented those parties. One of the law firms – Appellee Wilentz, Goldman &
Spitzer – represented the Halper family in separate farm-related matters from 1994 until
*
Honorable Paul S. Diamond, District Judge for the United States District Court of
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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1998.
In 1999, the Township initiated proceedings to take possession of Appellants’ farm
pursuant to New Jersey’s Eminent Domain Act. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 20:3. Years of New
Jersey state court litigation culminated on February 17, 2006, when the Superior Court
issued a final judgment ordering Appellants to deliver possession of the land to the
Township. (App. 2030-31.) Appellants had alleged before the Superior Court that the
Wilentz firm was “secretly” advising Middlesex County – an amicus in the condemnation
proceedings – and using confidential information the firm learned during its earlier
representation of the Halpers. (App. 716.) Appellants argued that this conflict of interest
invalidated the condemnation proceedings. (Id.) During a hearing on September 22,
2005, the Superior Court rejected the contention as baseless. (12T at 137-38, 140.)
On June 9, 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court set a date for transfer of the land
and prospectively denied any requests for stays. (App. 2050.)
On July 7, 2006, Appellants filed a Complaint in New Jersey federal court,
claiming that the state court proceedings and judgments had violated their constitutional
rights because they were tainted by a conflict of interest. (App. 2069-3167.) Appellants
again alleged that the Wilentz firm used confidential client information in advising
Middlesex County during the condemnation proceedings, and asked the District Court to
enjoin the transfer of the property. (App. 2078-79.)
On July 10, 2006, the District Court denied Appellants’ request for a temporary
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restraining order, ruling that the New Jersey state courts had already heard and rejected
the conflicts issue. (18T.) On July 13, 2006, the District Court denied Appellants’
Motion for Reconsideration. (19T.) Appellants now appeal the District Court’s decision.
Although Appellants’ brief generates more heat than light, it is apparent that they are
asking us to sustain the conflicts claim rejected by the New Jersey state courts. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).
II. DISCUSSION
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over actions in which relief is sought that would effectively “reverse a state
court decision or void its ruling.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181,
192 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). This doctrine applies to final decisions of
state courts at all levels. In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005).
The instant action falls squarely within the prohibitions of Rooker-Feldman. The
New Jersey state courts have already addressed the conflicts issue Appellants raise here.
Thus, to rule in Appellants’ favor, we would necessarily have to decide that the state
courts erred in rejecting the conflicts claim. This is precisely what Rooker-Feldman
prohibits. See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284; Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 192 (doctrine precludes
jurisdiction over claims actually litigated in state court); Knapper, 407 F.3d at 580
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(Rooker-Feldman “prohibits District Courts from adjudicating actions in which the relief
requested requires determining whether the state court’s decision is wrong or voiding the
state court’s ruling”); Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 151 (3d Cir. 2004) (claims based
on those already adjudicated in state court present “the most straightforward application
of Rooker-Feldman”).
Moreover, even if the state courts had not ruled on the conflicts issue, Rooker-
Feldman would still preclude the District Court from hearing this case. After almost eight
years of litigation, the state courts upheld the condemnation of Appellants’ farm and
ordered transfer of the property. Claiming that these rulings caused them constitutional
injury, Appellants ask the federal courts to nullify them. Under Exxon Mobil, however,
district courts may not hear: “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon,
544 U.S. at 284; see also Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 192 (actions that would void a state court
ruling are prohibited); Holt v. Lake County Bd. of Comm., 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7 th Cir.
2005) (Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiff’s action because “absent the state court’s
judgment . . . [plaintiff] would not have the injury he now seeks to redress”). In these
circumstances, the District Court plainly had no jurisdiction to hear this case.
III. CONCLUSION
We will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand with an instruction to
enter an order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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