Community Preschool & Nursery of East Liberty, LLC v. Tri-State Realty, Inc. , 430 F. App'x 125 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2702
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COMMUNITY PRESCHOOL & NURSERY OF EAST LIBERTY, LLC,
Appellant
v.
TRI-STATE REALTY, INC.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00979)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
March 11, 2011
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Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 7, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Tri-State Realty, Inc. (“Tri-State”) leased a portion of its building to Community
Preschool & Nursery of East Liberty, LLC (“Community Preschool”). After a fire in the
building damaged the property and forced Community Preschool to vacate the premises,
Community Preschool sued Tri-State for damages. The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Tri-State. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case, we relate only those facts necessary to our analysis.
Tri-State leased the first floor of its two-story building to Community Preschool.
Before Community Preschool moved in, Tri-State obtained a permit from the City of
Pittsburgh allowing occupancy of the first floor and stating that the second floor was to
remain vacant. Tri-State subsequently renovated the second floor and leased it to
multiple occupants. Tri-State did not, however, acquire an occupancy permit for the
second floor, nor did it have the second floor’s renovated electrical system inspected.
Shortly after moving in, one of the second-floor occupants complained to Tri-State about
problems with electrical service in the building. Tri-State responded by stating that it had
recently updated the building’s wiring and meters. It does not appear that Tri-State
investigated the matter any further.
Approximately fifteen months later, a fire broke out in the building, destroying the
second floor and damaging much of the first floor. The Pittsburgh Fire Department
investigated the fire and concluded that it originated in the wiring in the ceiling above the
second floor. Tri-State subsequently exercised its option under the lease agreement to
terminate the lease with Community Preschool in lieu of repairing the premises.
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Community Preschool filed this lawsuit three months later. After the District
Court dismissed two claims that are not the subject of this appeal, Community Preschool
filed an amended complaint asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract.
During discovery, Tri-State and Community Preschool secured expert testimony
concerning the cause of the fire. Community Preschool’s expert concluded that “[t]he
fire was likely electrical in origin” and that “[o]ccupancy of the second floor increased
the probability of a fire event.” (A. 393.) Tri-State’s expert agreed that an electrical fault
caused the fire. He also noted, however, that wiring servicing the first floor ran though
the ceiling over the second floor and would have been used even if the second floor had
remained unoccupied. He further explained that some potential causes, such as faulty
wires or improper installation, might not have been detectable upon inspection.
Accordingly, Tri-State’s expert opined that occupancy of the building’s second floor “had
nothing to do with the ignition or spread of this fire.” (A. 443.) Additionally, two
investigators from the Pittsburgh Fire Department concluded that an electrical
malfunction caused the fire, but neither investigator could identify the root cause of the
malfunction.
Tri-State moved for summary judgment on the ground that Community Preschool
was unable to adduce competent evidence that occupancy of the second floor was a
substantial factor in causing the fire. The District Court agreed. Specifically, with
respect to the negligence claim, the District Court concluded that the record lacked any
evidence that Tri-State’s alleged breach of a duty caused the fire. The Court also
concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. With respect to the
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claim for breach of contract, the District Court found that there was insufficient evidence
that Tri-State breached the lease’s warranty of quiet enjoyment. Community Preschool
now appeals.
II.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court’s summary judgment order. Shook v. Avaya Inc., 625 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2010).
A.
Community Preschool argues that the District Court erroneously granted summary
judgment on its negligence claim. In Pennsylvania, “[t]here are four elements to a cause
of action for negligence: a duty of care, a breach of that duty, a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury, and damages.” Zeidman v.
Fisher, 980 A.2d 637, 639 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). Although a party may prove its case
with circumstantial evidence, “there is a limit to the inferences that the jury may
reasonably draw from such circumstantial evidence.” Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d
1229, 1241 (Pa. 2008). Specifically, “while the jury may draw reasonable inferences, it
may not be permitted to reach its verdict merely on the basis of speculation or conjecture,
but . . . there must be evidence upon which logically its conclusion may be based.” Id. at
1241-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even if we assume that Tri-State breached its duty to Community Preschool by
leasing space on the second floor, Community Preschool’s negligence claim fails because
it cannot prove that Tri-State’s allegedly negligent conduct caused the fire. It is
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undisputed that the electrical wiring that delivered power to the first floor ran though the
ceiling over the second floor, where the fire originated. These wires would have been in
use regardless of whether the second floor was vacant or occupied. Accordingly, the fire
could have started even if the second floor remained vacant. Community Preschool has
mustered no evidence showing that the presence of tenants on the second floor had
anything to do with the outbreak of the fire. Absent any evidence specifically linking
occupancy of the second floor to the fire, Community Preschool cannot satisfy the
causation element of its negligence claim.
Community Preschool argues that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes
causation. That doctrine allows a court to infer that a defendant’s negligence harmed the
plaintiff only when:
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the
evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.
Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 100 (Pa. 1974) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 328D (1965)). Res ipsa loquitur does not apply here. First, the fire could very
well have occurred without any negligence on the part of Tri-State. None of the experts
who studied the fire could identify a cause more specific than “electrical malfunction.”
Although Tri-State did not arrange for an inspection of the second floor wiring, its expert
opined that an inspection might not have revealed the problem that started the fire.
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Second, Community Preschool did not sufficiently eliminate other possible causes of the
fire. For example, defective wires, which would have had nothing to do with Tri-State’s
alleged negligence, could have caused the fire to ignite. Accordingly, the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine cannot be used here to establish a causal relationship between the fire
and Tri-State’s conduct in leasing the second-floor space.
B.
Community Preschool also appeals the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on its breach of contract claim. Specifically, Community Preschool avers that
Tri-State breached the lease agreement’s covenant of quiet enjoyment. Appellant
concedes that this argument rests entirely on whether Tri-State caused the fire. Because
we have concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to causation, we will
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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